War, according to some, is antithetical to democratic tastes. Tocqueville held this view and so did Wilson. Thucydides did not. He dramatically shows the skilled orator, Alcibiades, persuading the majority of Athenian citizens to embark on the misbegotten Sicilian expedition of territorial expansion that cost Athens her army and her navy, and opened the door for the final Spartan victory against Athens in the Peloponnesian War. Sometimes the popular taste in a democracy turns toward war. Sometimes, as the incident of the Sicilian expedition shows, the popular taste is turned toward war unwisely, or even perhaps unjustly. Given that a war that is unwise or unjust might be popularly approved, we might wonder what the moral obligation of individual soldiers is when they are called upon by their democratically arranged society to fight in an unjust war.

This issue has relevance, of course, for the United States and other advanced democratic nations. A flurry of recent US wars has put just war conduct into sharp focus, and a particular variant of this theme concerns the moral obligations of individual soldiers who find their country embroiled in what might be an unjust war. It is this variant about individual obligations that I will address here. Against the idea that individual soldiers, as autonomous moral agents, have an obligation not to fight the unjust wars of their countries, I will argue as follows. First, I point to a moral dilemma for soldiers. Soldiers take an oath to perform the actions that their country calls them to. Of course, any morally autonomous individual also has an obligation not to perform unjust acts. In light of these contending obligations—the obligation for an individual not to fight an unjust war, and the obligation to abide by a promise—individual soldiers face a moral dilemma where ordinary moral principles direct individual soldiers both to fight unjust wars and not to fight unjust wars. I next examine the possibility that the soldier’s promise should not really count as a promise, in which case no genuine dilemma would arise, and I exclude this possibility. Finally, I resolve the apparent
dilemma by arguing that a soldier’s promise ought to have priority over any obligation not to engage in unjust war on three grounds. First, the possibility of a civil society rests on the priority of soldiers abiding by their promises. Second, traditional just war theory itself identifies an obligation for soldiers to fight even in unjust actions. Third, the priority of soldiers keeping their promise better satisfies the end of reducing violence than does having soldiers opt out of keeping their promises. I conclude that the moral onus for not fighting unjust wars rests ultimately with the citizens of civil democratic societies rather than with their soldiers. I do not claim, however, that this argument holds for all types of governments whatsoever; instead I claim it holds only for legitimate democratic civil governments that actually give recognition to the moral autonomy of their citizens.

In the United States, more than a decade of war under an arrangement of purely voluntary military service has made surprisingly little contact with the lives of most college-aged students. Outside of a few brief periods when they pierced agonizingly into the national consciousness, the wars in south Asia have mostly been distant background considerations. And yet, among these college-aged students who fill my ethics classes, there have often been one or two students, or perhaps even uniformed students who are returning home from south Asia after having their lives significantly affected by their experiences there. For these students, the wars have not been mere abstractions, nor were the obligations impressed upon them. There is a sense which I hope to develop here in which these returning service people have gone and done our bidding. It really is, then, a matter of citizenship training to come to understand what obligations military personnel incur in their voluntary service, and what obligations the ordinary citizenry have toward the military personnel. Among the various ethical issues that contend for our attention, the moral relations in a legitimately governed state that obtain between a citizenry and its military constitute a suitable topic for consideration in ethics classes.

**Autonomous Recusal**

Michael Minch (2004) in his essay “When Soldiers Aren’t Heroes,” suggests that as autonomous moral agents, individual soldiers have a moral obligation to recuse themselves from fighting all unjust wars. It is wrong for soldiers to participate in immoral acts just as it is wrong for any other moral agent to participate in immoral acts (p. 31). While I am
generally sympathetic to Minch’s underlying sentiment of using moral principles to limit and curtail violent actions, I will argue that he incorrectly places the moral onus on soldiers. I oppose Minch’s suggestion that soldiers are morally obligated not to participate in wars that are wrong on the basis of Just War Theory (JWT). Instead, I will argue that JWT, together with ordinary moral notions of duty obligate soldiers to obedience to legitimate political authority, even if the war is morally questionable. In short, I will be offering support to those who say, “Whether the war is moral or immoral, we should honor the soldiers there” (p. 31).

Minch’s position is that soldiers, as individually autonomous moral agents, have sole responsibility for their moral conduct. This position, as he notes, is well-supported by a long line of western moral theory including Aristotelian virtue ethics, Christian ethics, deontology, and utilitarianism. These theories buttress our common and ordinary moral intuitions that individuals are responsible for their own moral choices. If they are so responsible, then it stands to reason that individual soldiers are morally responsible not only for their participation in particular actions like, say, the My Lai massacre, but also for their participation in unjust wars in general. Minch’s grounds of judgment for the justness of war follow traditional JWT. In his view, if a war does not meet the JWT criteria, with some reservations for the difficulties of applying the theory to concrete situations, then the war is wrong. If the war is wrong, then it is wrong to fight it. “How,” asks Minch, “can it be right to fight a wrong war? How can it be honorable to fight a dishonorable war?” (p. 31). Minch wants to call attention to the wrongness among soldiers of what he calls “stand-in-lineism,” (p. 36) where moral agents give their moral decisions over to others. He holds to a no-compromise position of unchanging individual moral autonomy and responsibility.

It should be noted that while I disagree with this conclusion, there is strength and plausibility to it. We ought not to excuse individual immoral actions that are elicited by group dynamics. We can think of numerous instances where our intuitions will support Minch’s claim. When an organization is engaged in illicit conduct, be it the Mafia, WorldCom, or a gang of thugs, the individual wrongs are not excused by appeal to membership. We also might think that this same idea holds for the Nazi atrocities of World War II. I think that such sentiments are morally placed, but I think that membership in a civil society in which citizens who are able to democratically deliberate within the constraints of constitutional barriers is different, and I will try to make that case.
PROMISE MAKING AS AN ALTERATION TO AUTONOMY

A starting point in objecting to Minch’s line of reasoning about individual moral autonomy is the recognition that as a matter of ordinary practice, soldiers make promises. Soldiers in the United States and elsewhere take an oath to perform the actions they are called upon to do by their country through its representatives. General moral intuitions support the principle that making a promise creates a moral obligation. There is also philosophical support for this principle that comes from all the moral frameworks invoked by Minch (pp. 33 - 34) for the claim that making a promise creates an obligation. Promise keeping is a paradigm case of duty for Kant (1949), one that he uses to actually illustrate his moral decision procedure of the categorical imperative (pp. 39 - 40). It is true that there are special problems with promise keeping as an obligation in utilitarianism,² but rule utilitarianism can show that promise keeping leads to a net social utility gain.³ If we look for social consequences rather than logical contradictions, Kant’s procedure of the categorical imperative really has something to teach the utilitarian. What would be the consequences if everyone always violated their promises and thus made the institution of promise-keeping impossible? It is a safe suggestion that the world would be much worse off. The rule utilitarian would then want to establish a rule of promise keeping that avoids the disutility arising from the absence of such a rule. Christian ethics inherited the rich language of a covenant from Judaism. God as a moral ideal is a God who makes and keeps promises. Aristotle too remarks on the rightness of abiding by our promises (1164a )

H. L. A. Hart (2006) addresses the moral nature of promise keeping in a way that has a direct bearing on Minch’s concern about individual autonomy. When we make promises we voluntarily incur obligations and “we alter the existing moral independence of the parties’ freedom of choice in relation to some action and create a new moral relationship between them, so that it becomes morally legitimate for the person to whom the promise is given to determine how the promisor shall act” (p. 284). This description of the promisor’s obligation seems to answer Minch’s charge of stand-in-lineism. Moral agents do in fact commonly give their moral decisions over to others through the obligations they voluntarily incur by making promises. When they do so, it alters their moral independence and freedom of choice in respect to the actions specified by the promise. When it comes to promise keeping, Minch is surely mistaken in his assertion that “we can’t by definition, give our
moral decisions over to others, to do so is to violate morality, to shirk one’s moral responsibility” (p. 36). In fact it goes the other way around. To assert one’s moral independence after one has incurred an obligation by making a promise is to violate morality and shirk one’s moral responsibility. It is important to note that it is not just soldiers, then, who alter the nature of their moral autonomy. There is a voluntary alteration to the moral independence of everyone in the common life of morality who enters into promises. So, if soldiers have a moral obligation to abide their promises, and they have, as Minch suggests, a moral obligation not to fight unjust wars, then they face a moral dilemma whenever their country commands them to fight an unjust war.

THE MORAL PRIORITY OF THE PROMISE

For Minch’s position to work he needs a principle that establishes a priority of not fighting unjust wars over promise keeping. I will be arguing that the weightier principle in this situation is for soldiers to keep their promises.

We might circumvent the claim of a dilemma by claiming that a soldier’s oath may somehow not really be a promise. If that were the case then there would actually be no moral dilemma because the soldier has no promissory obligation, and therefore has a solitary obligation to fight no unjust war. How might that case go? It must be conceded that some promises are wrong to make. A contract killing for example is a promise to perform an action. The action to be performed, however, is a wrong action, and in fact it is so wrong that morality precludes the making of any such promise, and the promise itself, not just the action which is the content of the promise, is wrong. Could it be that the soldier’s promise is like that? If the promise commits soldiers ahead of time to immoral actions, it would seem then that making such a promise is wrong for an autonomous agent to make and perform.

There is good reason to think that the promise soldiers make is not of this nature. The promise made by soldiers serves a legitimate end, one in fact that I think Minch intends to advance. The regulation of violence is one of the main functions of government. I want to defend the principle that violence is legitimate if and only if it is authorized by the legitimate democratic government—if violence is not authorized by legitimate government, then it is not legitimate, and if violence is authorized by legitimate government, then it is legitimate. It seems to me that Minch would agree to one half of this bi-conditional: government
legitimately operates to keep citizens from taking violent actions against each other. In a civil society violence is made illegitimate, even for morally autonomous agents, except under the most drastic conditions. On social contract accounts, autonomy over violent actions is offered up to the prerogative of the state as a condition for having the state in the first place. Social contract theory specifies in a metaphorical compact the relation between individual citizens and the government with respect to violence. Citizens value the role of government to protect them from violent action, and so they would subjunctively agree to such a role for government. In our agreement, though, we make an alteration to our moral autonomy over the use of violence. Minch would likely agree to this much.

Government, however, has a bi-conditional prerogative over the use of violence. So far only half of that bi-conditional relation has been established, that of government regulating violence by de-legitimizing it among citizens. The other half of the bi-conditional is the one with which Minch would disagree. That half of the bi-conditional states that if the legitimate government authorizes violence, then it becomes legitimate. I think that this follows as a practical matter from the first half of the bi-conditional. If the government is going to protect from violence citizens who by compact have altered their autonomy concerning violence, then the government as a matter of practical necessity must reserve the capacity for using violence against all those who would do harm to those citizens in their altered state of autonomy. This means that government has a legitimate role in licensing agents for violent actions. Otherwise the government could not protect non-violent citizens in their altered state of autonomy from those who would illegitimately use violence against them. It follows from this that the other half of the bi-conditional is upheld: violence is legitimate when authorized by legitimate government.

From this principle it follows that those agents licensed by legitimate government to use violence have also altered their autonomy by agreement in a way that parallels the altered autonomy of the citizens of a civil state. Citizens foreclose the use of violence among themselves by altering their autonomy through a mutual agreement and by licensing some citizens who have by agreement also altered their autonomy and who thus act as agents of the state in administering the legitimate use of violence. Moreover, this agreement specifies the conditions under which the citizenry as a whole authorizes violence. Soldiers and police officers make a symbolic oath, a speech act in which they alter their autonomy
over the use of violence. Such agents, then, are obligated to use violence whenever the conditions stipulated by the citizenry as a whole are met. The nature of the promise that soldiers make, then, supports the overall structure of civil society. It is not like the immoral promise to perform a contract killing. The dilemma faced by soldiers, then, cannot be overcome by claiming that the promise soldiers make is illegitimate.

On Minch’s account authorized individual agents of violence may opt out of violent actions when they deem those actions to be unjust according to their individually autonomous judgment. To do so, however, would be wrong. Doing so reasserts the absolute autonomy of those agents who by oath and mutual compact have agreed to alter their own autonomy. They have promised to use violence on behalf of the citizenry when the citizens as a whole decide among themselves that the conditions for violence have been met. Violating this agreement and their personal oaths betrays the trust that allows the citizenry as a whole to confidently renounce violence. Any assertion of autonomy of individual judgment by agents licensed by the state to perform violence runs parallel to an equal assertion of autonomy of individual judgment of citizens to use violence at their discretion. Minch’s position has quite the opposite logical bearing of what he intends. That position does not tend to reduce overall violence by reducing the violent actions performed by licensed agents of violence at their individual discretion. Instead, Minch’s position undermines the structure of agreement in civil society that keeps individual citizens from taking part in private violence against each other. When the citizenry as a whole decides that the conditions for legitimate violence have been met, the licensed agents of violence have a moral obligation to take violent action, their individual autonomies notwithstanding.

Thus, the promise made by soldiers is a legitimate promise. This means that there is at least a prima facie dilemma between fighting an unjust war and keeping one’s oath as a soldier. The two horns of this dilemma, however, are not on equal footings. Not only is the promise legitimate, but it is foundational to a civil society and this foundation constitutes the very condition of justice as a possibility. And so, soldiers keeping their oaths has moral priority over not fighting an unjust war.

**PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Besides these promissory reasons, there are also practical constraints on individual soldiers making judgments on the justness of the wars they
fight. In order to recuse themselves from fighting an unjust war, soldiers would have to have an available moral standard by which to judge the justness of the war, and this is where Minch invokes JWT (35). A principle might be derived, then, that if soldiers’ oaths commit them to fighting unjust wars then such an oath is not a legitimate promise. Individual soldiers, however, are not in a good position to make this kind of moral assessment. To see why this is the case we must investigate JWT.

The traditional features of JWT theory divide into two parts. The first part *jus ad bellum*, has to do with the conditions that lead to war. For a war to be morally authorized it must:

1. Have a just cause.
2. Be waged by a legitimate authority.
3. Be formally declared.
4. Be fought with a peaceful intention.
5. Be a last resort.
6. Have a reasonable probability of success.
7. Use means proportionate to the ends sought.

The second part of JWT, *jus in bello*, governs just conduct while actually engaged in the war. These conditions are that:

1. Noncombatants must be given immunity.
2. Prisoners must be treated humanely.
3. International treaties and conventions must be honored. (35)

Minch rightly identifies St. Augustine as one of the foundational thinkers behind JWT. Augustine (1962) himself in his discussion of the just war appeals to Cicero and to the natural law tradition, and this outlook seems somewhat implicit in Minch’s discussion that mirrors Cicero’s declaration that, “If we behave unjustly, we shall not only cheat ourselves of honor and glory; we shall undermine our ability to promote the common good and thereby to uphold our own liberty” (quoted. in Skinner, 1981, p. 165), and “there are some acts either so repulsive or so wicked that the wise man would not commit them even to save his country” (quoted in Skinner, 1981, p. 54). This natural law tradition later becomes closely associated with St. Thomas Aquinas. On this understanding there is something that is, say, a just cause for war by nature. The signs of a natural law are that they are immediately obvious to reason, or in other words, they are self evident. In gazing over the list of *jus ad bellum* conditions we might wonder, though, how last resort, or
probability of success, or proportionality of means to ends might be matters of self evident identification. Each one of these seems to call for complex judgment, and there is room for skepticism that definitive answers to these issues can be obtained. Reason, however, can reveal the features of a legitimate government, and hence a legitimate authority for declaring and waging war. Nature does not reveal precise specifications of just cause, proportionality, etc. Instead, reason reveals the general outlines of a legitimate government that rules in the interests of its citizens. Augustine himself outlines features of a legitimate government that we might today endorse: “For what is a republic but a commonwealth? Therefore its interests are common to all; they are the interests of the state” (p. 174). The application of JWT features are matters for the judgment of a legitimate authority as Augustine recognized (p. 163). These features of JWT are not so much matters of self-evident discovery of empirical facts against principles of natural law as they are interpretations by a legitimate government after wise and rational deliberation within the organs of a constitutional government.

There are, then, both features of natural justice and of conventional justice implicit in JWT. Natural justice highlights the conditions of JWT, but they are underspecified. It is a further feature of natural law that those conditions be further specified under conditions of wise deliberation. Under these conditions the required moral judgment of the soldiers is simplified. They do not have to worry about whether, say, the war-as-a-last-resort requirement was met, or whether the right intent requirement has been sufficiently satisfied. Individual soldiers as free-standing moral agents are not sufficiently positioned for making these kinds of judgments. Rationality demands that soldiers make a judgment on the legitimacy of their constitution, and then make their oaths as soldiers accordingly. At the time they make the oath, they cannot know which actions they will be commanded to make. Their best judgment should be that the government is legitimate and has the appropriate organs for deliberating appropriately about the requirements of JWT. The oath, then, should bind them as a matter of good faith and good intent. Moreover, if a legitimate government after deliberation makes a judgment that the requirements for just war have been met, there is nowhere else to make appeal, not to nature, or to God, or to pure reason. A judgment of justness in war by a legitimate government should be seen analogously to a jury making a decision about the guilt of a defendant. The arrangement is legitimate and there is a procedure by which after rational deliberation guilt is decided upon. The requirement
of justice is a procedural one. A legitimate government has a procedural requirement for deciding upon justness in war. If the government is legitimate then the individual soldier has no grounds for declaring his promise nullified because it demands immoral action. Soldiers have the duty to act upon the commands of their fellow citizens in the confidence that upon deliberation their fellow citizens will tell them to do right. The moral onus for conducting just war, then, lies with the citizenry on whose behest soldiers must take action.

**Proper Authority**

JWT in fact forbids the kind of moral individualism advocated by Minch, and with good reason. Minch believes that an appeal to individual moral autonomy would limit violence. JWT, however, forbids it on opposite grounds; seating authority for violence in the individual tends to expand it. Much of traditional political philosophy has been built around the idea that individual autonomy over the appropriate use of violence will increase the level of violence. This was famously Hobbes' position. He held that the assignment to a sovereign of the legitimate decision over the use of violence would reduce the overall violent chaos in the world and make *civitas* possible. For Hobbes the war of each person against every other person arises from the environmental factor of scarcity of resources together with particular features of human nature: egoism, rationality, and relative equality. The institution of a mutual promise allows humans to leave this awful state of nature by creating sovereign authority. Removing authority for violence from the individual and placing it with sovereignty eliminates the legitimacy of private violence including common thuggery, honor killings, ecclesiastical executions, etc. Hobbes teaches us that individuals are drawn to violence and that allowing individuals to make their own autonomous decisions over its use will only increase that violence.

Of course, given the existence of the state we have the ability to forbid Hobbesian violence on legal grounds. This move, however, no less than committing soldiers to fight in wars decided upon by legitimate authority, removes the possibility of individual autonomy over the legitimate use of violence. If we take as a principle that individuals must choose for themselves the conditions under which violence is warranted, it would seem that this principle would hold for private relations as well as for war. The social contract in which citizens renounce almost all usages of private violence to public authorities seems to amount to a
non-violent form of stand-in-lineism, but the social consequences seem to morally warrant the promissory obligation.

Hobbes’ view, however, might be taken to be far too pessimistic about human nature, and it might be suggested that a more accurate picture comes from Locke. Locke’s view is that humans in a state of nature where every individual retains sovereignty would not be in a state of war of each person against every other person because as rational animals without any compulsion from outside authority each person would recognize and inculcate the law of nature that no one ought to harm another. If unrestrained human nature leads, as Locke says, to “a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation” (p. 15), then he faces the problem of explaining how we justify legitimate government at all. Locke’s ingenious mechanism for justifying the formation of a legitimate state hinges on the idea that the law of nature is underspecified. The law of nature specifies that we ought not to harm each other. Anyone who violates this law “declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity” (p. 10), and “every man, in the state of nature, has the power to kill a murderer” (p. 11), or “punish the lesser breaches of the law” (p. 12). Which punishments, though, do these lesser breaches of the law merit? Locke recognizes that the underspecified measures of punishment require judgment, and without deliberation by reasonable and objective parties “nothing but confusion and disorder will follow” (p. 12). Civil government, says Locke, is the proper remedy for these inconveniences of the state of nature. A social contract establishing legitimate sovereignty abiding in the body politic makes the use of violence uniform and rational. The individuals forming the social contract allow the sovereign body politic to have authority over decisions concerning violence in almost all cases. Individuals retain autonomy over decisions concerning violence only under the tightly constrained parameters of self defense. The Lockean social contract makes it a matter of autonomous individuals altering their moral independence through making a promise when they transfer the authority to make decisions about violence from themselves as individuals to the citizenry that constitutes the body politic. This arrangement was thought to comprise a more rational administration of legitimate violence.

Hobbes and Locke, then, provide divergent understandings about human nature that come together in the same conclusion about where decisions over the legitimate use of violence are properly seated. If humans are essentially violent egoists, their condition is improved by
transferring authority over decisions about the legitimate use of violence to a sovereign in order to hem in the violent tendencies in human nature. If humans are cooperative and communal and governed by natural law, their condition is improved by transferring authority over decisions about the legitimate use of violence to a reasonable and objective body politic to apply proper judgment to the underspecified criteria of natural law.

This transference of authority over violence from individual to sovereign is reflected in JWT. Every man has not the authority to make violence on every other man in traditional JWT. Augustine places the authority to make war with the monarch:

Yet the natural order which seeks the peace of mankind, ordains that a monarch should have the power of undertaking war if he thinks it advisable, and that the soldiers should perform their military duties in behalf of the peace and safety of the community. (pp. 163 - 164)

Soldiers have their duties to abide the command of a legitimate authority, even if the command is unrighteous:

Since, therefore, a righteous man, serving it may be under an ungodly king, may do the duty belonging to his position in the State in fighting by the order of his sovereign, for in some cases it is plainly the will of God that he should fight, and in others, where this is not so plain, it might be an unrighteous command on the part of the king, while the soldier is innocent, because his position makes his obedience a duty… (p. 165)

In the *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas follows Augustine in placing the authority to decide on violence in the sovereign rather than the individual:

In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary, First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them (Part II, Question 40).
It would appear, then, that soldiers do not have moral recourse for vacating their oaths on grounds that their individual intuitions are that the war they are to fight is unjust. As is the case with all citizens, their views are to be given due consideration in the national deliberation by a body politic, but the justness of war is a matter decided upon through constitutionally organized rational deliberation by a body politic, and individuals are forbidden the authority by the moral standard of JWT to make decisions about the justness of war.

Placing the moral responsibility for war on the citizens has an important implication. Honoring the soldiers of a war cannot mean that the citizens can express no opinions against the war. The soldiers fighting the war must be dependent on the citizens to command only actions that are right. This requires constant and diligent moral scrutiny. Nor is a citizen condemnation a judgment against the soldiers fighting the war. It should rather be seen as part of the ongoing deliberations about right conduct that soldiers must depend on if they are to have confidence that their constitutional procedure will produce just outcomes.

Not all regimes in the world have democratic legitimacy. The recognized sovereign of the state may be a coercive agent, and a coerced promise, seems to be no promise at all. I will quickly close with two observations about coerced military service. First, the coerced soldier of an authoritarian regime cannot be considered a person operating with moral autonomy. These soldiers, then, cannot be held responsible for their coerced conduct in an unjust war. The moral responsibility for the war rests with the sovereign, and in such a case sovereignty does not belong to the people. Second, legitimate regimes sometimes compel military service. The same citizens who mandate compulsory military service hold moral responsibility for the conduct they compel. In either case, the compelled soldier must be excused from moral responsibility for fighting an unjust war. Because legitimate governments sometimes do coerce military service, there is a further need for citizenship training about military obligations that ought to be accomplished in college ethics classes.
NOTES

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2 See Kymlicka’s objection to utilitarianism on grounds that it fails to acknowledge the special obligations created by promises (pp. 22 - 26).

3 Hume seems to be particularly important here.

4 I do not want to take the notion of a social contract and tacit consent too far here. I think that social contracts can provide a useful device for specifying expected antecedent conditions and expected consequents. In this case the antecedent condition is that citizens of a civil state, as a matter of shared expectation, forego taking violent action with the shared consequential expectation that the state will take violent action as necessary to protect (now) non-violent citizens from illegitimate violence. As this is an understood precondition of a civil society, this is what rational citizens would agree to. Hence the invocation of a subjunctive agreement.

5 See Aristotle (5.7, 1134b 18 - 1135a 4). See also Bernard Yack (pp. 216 - 237).

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