

Five Kinds of Ethics Across the Curriculum

An Introduction to Four Experiments with One Kind

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Starting in 1991, the National Science Foundation has made three large grants to the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions (CSEP) at Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT) to offer workshops to help faculty integrate ethics into technical courses across the curriculum.¹ For the first three years, we trained IIT faculty. Having proved the concept, we began offering the workshop to faculty outside IIT, including (in the last few years) faculty from as far away as the Philippines, Japan, Sudan, France, and New Zealand.

We called what we were doing “ethics across the curriculum” because that was what the two young engineering professors who asked for CSEP’s help in integrating ethics into their courses called it in 1989. No one now recalls where they got the term. I had not heard it before they used it, but “writing across the curriculum” was already current. I supposed “ethics across the curriculum” to be an obvious analogy, a simple substitution of “ethics” for “writing”. I did not then have any idea that the term might be ambiguous. Only in the last few years have I come to realize how many kinds of ethics across the curriculum there are—and how important it is to be clear which one is under discussion. Though each has its place, the place of each is somewhat different, and the standard of success is correspondingly different. I therefore wish to introduce the four papers that follow this one by explaining what kind of ethics across the curriculum they represent—and what kinds they do not represent. I believe every discussion of ethics across the curriculum should begin with a (brief) version of this introduction. I hope this paper will make clear why.

The Four Kinds

There are (at least) five distinctive activities now sometimes called “ethics across the curriculum” (what we may distinguish as): 1) *morality* across the curriculum; 2) *moral theory* across the curriculum; 3) *social ethics* across the curriculum; 4) *ethics from* across the curriculum; and 5) *professional* ethics across the curriculum. Let us consider these in order.²

By “morality” I mean those standards of conduct that we all (at our rational best) want everyone else to follow even if that means having to follow them ourselves.³ Among those standards are the moral rules “Don’t lie”, “Don’t cheat”, and “Keep your

promises”, moral principles such as “Help the needy” and “Return good for good”, and moral ideals such as truthfulness or equal justice under law. One kind of ethics across the curriculum understands “ethics” as a mere synonym for “morality”. Morality across the curriculum may exist in one of at least three forms (or, more often, in a mixture of them).

One form emphasizes adherence to a written code, such as an “honors code” or rules of a religion (understood as a statement of universal standards). Another emphasizes virtue (morally good dispositions to act in certain ways) rather than the following of any particular rules. These first two forms of morality across the curriculum emphasize conduct; the third, what we may call, “moral literacy” (or “value clarification”), does not. It is a largely intellectual undertaking. Morality is treated as a subject worthy of scholarly investigation across the curriculum. What students learn about morality may, or may not, register in conduct.

A university (or other institution of higher education) can emphasize adherence to a code or to virtue without having a program deserving the name “ethics across the curriculum”. What makes a program deserve the name is that the code or the virtues are integrated into the classroom as a subject of study (though not for its own sake but in an attempt to guide conduct outside class, as well as within). The best examples of morality across the curriculum as code or virtue are probably to be found in nineteenth century American liberal arts colleges (well before “ethics across the curriculum” was a name for it), but we can find something quite close in some “Christian” liberal arts colleges today. For example, Bob Jones University understands the whole institution, including its classrooms, as a single “place where Christ would be the center of all thought and conduct.”⁴ But today, morality across the curriculum, even in its moral literacy form, seems to be much more at home in primary and secondary schools (though under different names).⁵

By “moral theory” I mean (roughly) the attempt to understand morality as a rational undertaking.⁶ Though moral theory is generally considered the monopoly of the philosophy department (with an occasional “ethicist” in a department of religion, political thought, or the like privileged to participate), the purpose of moral theory across the curriculum is to make “philosophical ethics” available more widely.⁷ One way to do that is simply to require all students to take a course in moral theory. While such a course is undoubtedly a contribution to moral literacy, and is relatively easy to establish, it has the disadvantage of standing alone, making no connection with the rest of the curriculum. Ethics is spread across the curriculum only insofar as students carry what they learn into other courses. This way of doing ethics across the curriculum leaves the philosophy department’s monopoly intact.⁸

To expect students to integrate moral theory into their other courses more or less without assistance is to expect a lot, probably more than most students are capable of. Some universities have therefore tried, in addition or instead, to insert moral theory into courses across the curriculum. The simplest way to do this is to have a moral

theorist come over from the philosophy department as a guest lecturer for a day or two. A guest lecturer will, of course, have trouble making many connections between moral theory and whatever course he happens to be visiting on a particular day. (“Today is March 23; so, I must be in Computational Physics.”) Expertise, even mere familiarity, is hard for any one person to maintain across much of the curriculum, and in all but the largest departments, only one or few philosophers will feel competent to serve as a guest lecturer on moral theory in any non-philosophy course. That is one problem with guest-lecturing across the curriculum, spreading the guest too thin. The other problem is that not much of use can be said about moral theory in an hour or two of class. Moral theory is also spread too thin. (After all, most who teach a course in moral theory feel forty-five hours—a semester-long course—too little to cover what we should.)

Having a moral theorist serve as co-instructor in courses across the curriculum provides at least a partial solution to these problems, especially if the moral theorist co-teaches for several semesters, that is, long enough to learn the subject, understand what the students will need in the way of moral theory, and develop a sense of how much moral theory the students can absorb (and when in the semester they can best absorb it). There is no routine for making moral theory useful in a history, biology, or literature course, no substitute for trial and error.

While co-teaching a course will solve the two problems just identified. It will do so only by generating others. Generally, co-teaching a course doubles its cost (even if one of the teachers does it “for free”), an effect administrators are likely to worry about. Co-teaching moral theory *across the curriculum* is beyond the resources of most philosophy departments as they are now—and also beyond what a prudent administration is likely to have in its plans. Most philosophy departments resist teaching very large classes, arguing that teaching philosophy properly means assigning one or more papers a term and grading them with some care. Many philosophy departments also resist teaching required courses (an attitude “turf-conscious” departments find odd—and just what they would expect of “impractical philosophers”). So, a number of universities (for example, Marquette) have undertaken to export moral theory to faculty across the university, hoping to decentralize the teaching of (basic) moral theory. The philosophers offer a summer workshop in moral theory. Having graduated from the workshop, non-philosophers can use moral theory in their teaching and research (with, perhaps, continuing support from the philosophers).⁹

My impression is that, generally, these workshops have been more successful in getting faculty across the curriculum to do research into morality-related questions than in getting them to include moral theory in their own courses. The workshops have, however, had the happy side-effect of enlarging substantially the number of people in the university who understand the ways in which a moral theorist may be helpful. The workshops seem to reduce substantially the academic isolation that philosophy typically suffers in American universities.

The third kind of ethics across the curriculum is concerned with social ethics rather than morality or moral theory (though both morality and moral theory may have a place in the resolution of the problems with which social ethics deals). By “social ethics” I mean those questions about social arrangements for which morality does not, or at least does not yet, provide, a decisive answer but to which it contributes, or might contribute, considerations relevant to resolution. Stealing is not a question of social ethics (in this sense). Stealing is (prima facie) morally wrong. But what to do about stealing, whether “we” should respond to stealing with punishment or mercy, with training or medication, is (in part at least) a question of social ethics.

Social ethics across the curriculum may take the form of a single required course in which important social issues, such as gay rights, duties to future generations, affirmative action, privacy, and war, are discussed. Such a course in “applied” or “practical” ethics may have a title like Moral and Social Values, Moral Problems, or Social Issues. In many philosophy departments, the voluntary version of this course has become a popular alternative to the traditional Introduction to Philosophy. Though philosophers often refer to the course as “baby ethics”, it is seldom a watered-down version of the course in moral theory. Indeed, such courses often have little or no moral theory. They are instead an attempt to bring philosophy, all of philosophy, to bear on current “hot topics”. What they emphasize is philosophical method, not moral theory. That is why they are a good introduction to philosophy.¹⁰

Having a single social ethics course required across the curriculum has the same administrative problems as requiring all students to take the philosophy department’s course in moral theory. For that reason, and perhaps others, universities have found other ways to have social ethics across the curriculum. The most common of these seems to be developing courses typically titled “X and Society” (where the “X” holds the place of the name for the department in which the course is located or some close relation). So, for example, a biology department might have a (required) course in Biology and Society; the computer science department, Computers and Society; the engineering school, Technology and Society; and so on (more or less) across the curriculum.¹¹

Such courses differ from those taught in the philosophy department in at least two ways. First, the course will have a smaller range of social issues. So, for example, while a course in Moral Problems might include any issue appropriate as well to Computers and Society, Computers and Society could not take up many issues (such as abortion or gun control) appropriate to Moral Problems.¹² Second, an X and Society course taught outside of the philosophy department will generally emphasize information rather than method. It will not be a good introduction to philosophy.

Because administrators resist the multiplication of courses generally, and are especially adverse to courses in different departments that seem to belong to some larger category (as X-and-Society courses certainly do), universities have developed two less “wasteful” versions of social ethics across the curriculum. One version is to

choose a single social issue, appropriate to the institution, and have it serve as a theme across the curriculum. The Colorado School of Mines (CSM) offers a good example of this version. The theme, “stewardship of the earth”, appears in the Mission Statement, is central to a required first-year course, and is thereafter raised now and then in courses across the curriculum (from Mechanics of Petroleum Production to Senior Design).¹³

Another way to spread social ethics across the curriculum is to have each course in the curriculum contain some moral reflection on what might be done concerning social issues arising from material taught in the course. So, for example, a genetics course would be an ideal place to discuss social issues arising from genetic testing. Should such testing be required? What should insurance companies do with the information? And so on. There is no (substantive) theme across the curriculum, only a (formalized) thoughtfulness. What this way of spreading social ethics across the curriculum lacks in unity, it gains in flexibility. That flexibility seems more appropriate to a liberal arts college or large university, places of deliberate (and often ungovernable) diversity; unity of theme seems more appropriate in a professional school (such as CSM) or a (small) religious university, places of (relative) homogeneity.

Getting students to engage in moral reflection on social issues, whether on a campus-wide theme or just the material of a particular course, is not something faculty in many disciplines other than philosophy do instinctively. I once attended a session at the annual meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics in which a philosopher from St. Olaf College described his impressive program for (what he called) ethics across the curriculum. The “ethics” was primarily (but not exclusively) social ethics. His presentation included a brief video of a discussion in a science class. The instructor posed a question of the appropriate sort but then sat quietly while the students discussed it. He gave no guidance, not even asking further questions. Though the discussion was lively and the students obviously enjoy it, it seemed to go nowhere. I could not tell from the video what the students were supposed to have learned from it. I was not surprised to learn in response to a question I put that the course would include no graded assignment or exam question related to the ethics issue discussed that day. The philosophy department had prepared the St. Olaf instructor to identify issues, that is, they had given him a course in social ethics; but they had not taught him how to teach social ethics. In my experience, philosophers generally have no idea how hard it is for others to do what philosophers do almost without thought.¹⁴

Ethics *from* across the curriculum, my fourth kind, brings faculty (and students) together from across campus to consider some controversial issue in which morality is an important consideration. The subject matter of ethics from across the curriculum overlaps social ethics across the curriculum (though it may include some issues of “personal ethics”—for example, “Should I commit suicide?”—that do not seem to be social ethics, however we stretch the term). Ethics from across the curriculum is primarily a method, not a subject matter. The point of bringing them together is to

provoke discipline-specific insights that may shed light on the issue, without necessarily leading to a solution. The insight may come in the form of an analysis or summary of empirical research (typical of the sciences), in performance of a creative work (typical of theater, music, or creative writing), in exposition of crucial texts (typical of literary critics and religious scholars), and so on.¹⁵

Generally, the consideration of a controversial issue will be a public event that students attend voluntarily (though the event may also be staged in one or more classes). It is ethics *across the curriculum* only in an extended sense, for at least two reasons. First, at any given time, only a small part of the curriculum will be represented, say, four departments out of twenty-three. Several years may pass before all the departments rotate through, if the issues allow for such a rotation. Second, few students are likely to attend all, or even a large part, of these discussions, since the students will choose those that especially interest them (or the events will occur only in a few classes). Students are, then, unlikely to benefit directly from the cross-curricular nature of the series of events.

Nonetheless, ethics from across the curriculum may be a worthwhile undertaking (especially if combined with one or more other forms of ethics across the curriculum distinguished here). One long-term effect of faculty participation in discussions (whether as participant or audience), and of seeing a philosopher guide them, may be to teach non-philosophers something of the art of leading such discussions, tempting non-philosophers to try to lead such a discussion in their own classes. Another long-term effect may be to inspire (moral) philosophers to use resources elsewhere on campus (not only experts but also actors, poets, and critics) in their own classes.

A Fifth Ethics across the Curriculum

The fifth kind of ethics across the curriculum, *professional* ethics across the curriculum, is distinct from the other four in two ways. First, it is about *professional* ethics (and, as I shall soon explain, *institutional* ethics), not morality or social ethics in general. Second, its focus is the professional (or other career-specific) curriculum, not the entire university. Professional ethics crosses the entire professional curriculum. It crosses the entire curriculum only insofar as each department or program has its own professional (or institutional) ethics across the curriculum. To make clear how much professional ethics across the curriculum differs from the other forms of ethics across the curriculum and social ethics, I must explain what professional ethics is—and, especially, how it differs from both morality and social ethics. It is to that explanation I now turn.

A profession is a number of individuals in the same occupation voluntarily organized to earn a living by openly serving a certain moral ideal in a morally permissible way beyond what law, market, and morality would otherwise require.¹⁶ Professions organize all, or part, of a single occupation in a certain way. Professional

ethics are the special standards defining the (morally permissible) way the would-be profession are to pursue its moral ideal. These standards are arbitrary (more or less) in the way promises are. Ordinary morality sets limits on professional ethics without determining the content. One cannot deduce professional ethics from morality or moral theory.

Ordinarily, I use “professional ethics” in this way. Here, however, I want to use the term in a somewhat wider sense—one including what I have elsewhere called “institutional ethics”.¹⁷ What distinguishes institutions from professions is that institutions are a form of organization in which more than one occupation works. So, for example, engineering ethics concerns the special standards of one profession, engineering, but business ethics concerns an institution, business, in which engineers, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals work—along with many who are not members of any profession (laborers, clerks, carpenters, and so on). Business ethics is one kind of institutional ethics. Research ethics is another kind of institutional ethics; academic ethics, another; and so on. Medical ethics is institutional ethics if it is understood as, say, concerned with the special standards that govern, or should govern, hospitals and other medical facilities, but professional ethics—strictly speaking—if understood as concerned with the special standards that should govern physicians.¹⁸

Though the distinction between professional and institutional ethics is generally important, it is not important here. What distinguishes both from morality and social ethics is their parochialism. Both professional ethics and institutional ethics apply only to certain people, not society as a whole. Business ethics applies to people in business and no one else; engineering ethics applies to engineers and no one else; and so on. Professional ethics includes both special problems and special (morally permissible) standards. While professional ethics may interest, indeed, concern, everyone, its standards only govern members of the profession. For anyone not a member of the profession in question (or not thinking as members of that profession), professional ethics will seem a sort of social ethics—and the chief question will be whether “we” should allow such organizations or what restraints “we” should put on them.

The four papers that follow describe contributions to the teaching of professional (or institutional) ethics across the curriculum. Yet, only one (Cruz, Frey, and Sanchez) actually describes an activity (“ethics bowl”) reaching across the (engineering) curriculum.¹⁹ The other three describe instead small-scale contributions to such an undertaking, the insertion of professional ethics into a single course where there had been no ethics before (and, in two courses where it might have been thought there was no room for ethics).

Ermer describes her insertion of professional ethics into a first-year engineering course, Introduction to Engineering Design. Mosher does something similar for a first-year science course, General Chemistry. Between them, Ermer and Mosher illustrate the range of techniques available. Ermer makes extended use of cases, ordinary home work, and class discussions. She even finds time for a video. Mosher instead uses the

web, having his students form “companies” that must then deal with ethical (and ordinary chemical) problems that arise in conducting their business. Mosher uses little or no class time to teach (a fair amount of) professional ethics. Both Ermer and Mosher make extensive use of a professional code. Reference to a code of professional ethics is typical of professional ethics across the curriculum.

Curren, teaching a graduate course in educational administration (“leadership”), does not have the same luxury. While teachers have a code of ethics, educational administrators do not, and the teacher’s code seems not to address many of the ethical problems administrators must resolve. Curren’s approach to helping administrators properly resolve such problems is to present typical cases for discussion, provide help in thinking through the cases, and thereby “nurture habits of ethical reflection”. Curren’s approach to teaching the ethics of educational administration is similar to that common in teaching business ethics.²⁰

What does professional ethics across the curriculum achieve?

Though we seem to live in the Age of Assessment, we still lack a reliable way to assess anything important, whether public happiness or private misery. Certainly the objective tests now used to assess “learning outcomes” are a great disappointment to anyone who cares much about learning. Though disappointed with assessment generally, I do think we can assess some things, if only very crudely. Among these is not only student success in philosophy courses but faculty success integrating professional ethics into their courses.²¹

For more than a decade now, I have been collecting student assessments of the insertion of ethics of the sort described here. The assessments seem to me to show something significant: Students notice even a small insertion of professional ethics and generally approve of it—to a degree most professors at first find surprising. About forty-five faculty at my own university, another hundred or so from other American institutions, and a few from elsewhere in the world have taken my ethics-across-the-curriculum workshop. Most have used a standard evaluation form to assess the student response the first time they included ethics in their courses. The evaluation form has eight questions. Four (1, 3, 5, and 8) require “yes” or “no” as an answer. One (7) asks “too much”, “too little”, or “just the right amount” and then invites an explanation. The other three (2, 4, and 6) are open ended. Several IIT graduate students have been entering these responses into a data base for me. So far, we have entered the answers to 1208 questionnaires, a little more than half of the total number we have. We began with the most recent, working our way back. Here are the results.²²

Question 1 asked, “Did this course improve your awareness of ethics issues likely to arise in your profession or job?” Almost 87% of the answers (1046) were “yes”. Question 3 asked, “Did this course do anything to change your understanding of the importance of professional or business ethics?” Just over 73% of the answers (882) were “yes”. Question 5 asked, “Did this course improve you ability to deal with the ethical

issues it raised?" Almost 75% of the answers (918) were yes. Last, question 8 asked, "Did you have any professional or business ethics in a class before this one?" About two-thirds of the answers (774) were "no". (This is a disappointment after a decade in which many accrediting bodies have required ethics in engineering, computer science, and other scientific curricula but also an invitation to do more.) Question 7 asked. "In your opinion, did this course spend too much time on professional or business ethics, too little, or just the right amount?" Just under two-thirds (780) answered "right amount" (with another 108 answering something amounting to "can't say"). Ermer and Mosher report similar results for their classes; Cruz, Frey, and Sanchez report even better results for ethics bowl.

My purpose here is not to argue that professional ethics across the curriculum is better than the four other kinds of ethics across the curriculum. I approve of all of them, though I think one kind may be better for a certain purpose or in a certain kind of university. My purpose here has been to distinguish professional ethics across the curriculum from the other sorts so that its special advantages (and disadvantages) would be clear—and to help those trying to design an ethics-across-the curriculum program for their campus to have a better sense of the range of possibilities open to them. The papers that follow illustrate what can be done to spread professional ethics across the curriculum in particular, but there are probably ideas there that have other uses as well.

NOTES

This paper began as a presentation at the annual meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics (APPE), March 4, 2001, under the title “Four Kinds of Ethics across the Curriculum”. I learned a good deal from the discussion that followed. The four papers collected below formed panel presentation a later APPE annual meeting, February 27, 2004.

¹ 1991-1995 (DIR 9014220); 1997-1999 (SBR-9601905); and 2000-2003 (SES-9985813). For administrative convenience, I was the Principal Investigator on all three grants, with Vivian Weil and Robert Ladenson as “co-PIs”. The “we” here refers to the three of us—or, occasionally, to the three of us along with a half dozen or so faculty from around campus who served as an informal advisory body in the early stages of designing the workshop.

² Lawrence Hinman has published an “EAC Grid” also distinguishing five kinds of “academic” ethics across the curriculum (the left side of the grid). Though useful, his five-kind distinction is different from mine. (His five kinds are: 1. centralized required ethics courses; 2. specialized ethics courses within philosophy departments; 3. team-taught ethics courses with philosophers and non-philosophers; 4. ethics-component in non-ethics courses with philosopher as guest lecturer; and 5. course component taught by non-philosophers.) His five kinds are (as I shall partially show below) possible subdivisions in all of my kinds except the fourth. The “non-academic” side of his grid (five kinds of service learning in the middle and three kinds of community service on the left) are not strictly ethics across the *curriculum* at all. They belong to a larger category, what we might call “ethics across the *campus*”. For more, see Hinman’s website: [ethics.acusd.edu/eac/Presentation/Central APA/EAC2](http://ethics.acusd.edu/eac/Presentation/Central%20APA/EAC2) (June 24, 1999).

³ For a defense of (something like) this definition of morality, see Bernard Gert, *Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1988), esp. pp. 5-6.

⁴ “Throughout his travels, Dr. Bob Jones Sr. saw students whose faith was shaken during college, and he recognized the need for a thoroughly Christian school to train America's youth. His vision was to establish a training center for Christians from around the world that would be distinguished by its academic excellence, refined standards of behavior, and opportunities to appreciate the performing and visual arts. At the same time, Dr. Jones's intent was to make a place where Christ would be the center of all thought and conduct.” Bob Jones University website, www.bju.edu/aboutbju/history/index (July 10, 2004). See also the statement on academic education: www.bju.edu/academics/ed_purpose. This statement makes clear that BJU does not consider its ethics to be “sectarian” (whatever the rest of us may think). The only “true virtue”, it is necessarily universal.

⁵ For more on this, see my “What’s Wrong with Character Education?” *American Journal of Education* 110 (November 2003): 32-57.

⁶ Whether “moral theory” (so defined) is a mere synonym of “ethical theory” will depend (in part at least) on one’s moral theory. For those who derive the right from the good (as, for example, utilitarians typically do), there will be no distinction (since the study of the good will be part of the study of the right). For those, like Kant, for whom the right is (more or less) independent of the good, ethical theory will have a somewhat different domain. Ethical theory will be about the good in a way moral theory is not (and the correct term here would be “ethical theory” rather than “moral theory”). While I am myself a Kantian, I have used “moral theory” here because that seems to be the standard usage—and in part because discussion of the good seems to me rare in ethics-across-the-curriculum programs.

⁷ I put the term “ethicist” in quotation marks for three reasons. One is that it generally seems now to be used in some such context as this, that is, where there is a claim to expertise in ethics for someone not a philosopher. It is a polite way to let someone into the club while signaling that he does not really belong. The other reason for the quotes is that this modern usage departs somewhat from the term’s original use, itself (according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*) barely a hundred years old: one who “supports ethics or morality rather than religion”. For some people, the word may still call up anti-religious associations. Third, for others, the term has the opposite associations, suggesting a claim to knowledge or virtue rather than philosophy’s claim merely to pursue one or the other. An ethicist must be an exemplar of ethics (good conduct) must as a cleric must be an exemplar of piety. So, while the headline “Philosopher caught in adultery” invites a shrug or no reaction at all, the headline “Ethicist caught in adultery” is always good for a laugh.

⁸ For a typical example of this sort of ethics across the curriculum, see Santiago Sia, “Teaching Ethics in a Core Curriculum: Some Observations”, *Teaching Ethics* 2 (Fall 2001): 69-76.

⁹ Robert B. Ashmore and William C. Starr, editors, *Ethics Across the Curriculum - The Marquette Experience* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991). I believe Saint Louis University has a similar program, but I have found no reference for it in print.

¹⁰ It is this sort of ethics across the curriculum that is the subject of David R. Keller, “The Perils of Communitarianism for Teaching Ethics Across the Curriculum”, *Teaching Ethics* 3 (Fall 2002): 49-76.

¹¹ If taught in the philosophy department, such courses will have “ethics” in the title, for example, Biology and Ethics, Computer Ethics, or Ethics of Technology. The course content will generally differ as well, including more “philosophy” and less “information”, though it is my impression that the differences are often small.

¹² That would be true even if, as sometimes happens, Computers and Society were taught as a philosophy course.

¹³ I learned of the CSM program during a visit. There does not seem to be anything about it in print.

¹⁴ For some idea what can be done to help faculty outside philosophy lead such a discussion, see my "Ethics Across the Curriculum: Teaching Professional Responsibility in Technical Courses", *Teaching Philosophy* 16 (September 1993): 205-235; or, in a slightly revised version, in *Ethics and the University* (Routledge: London, 1999), pp.111-142.

¹⁵ I owe the concept of ethics *from* across the curriculum to Ken Alpern, but the program he proposed for Hiram College is primarily social ethics across the curriculum. See his unpublished memo, "INTEGRATED ETHICS: An Approach to Ethics across the Curriculum and Faculty Development" (Revised July 11, 2004), in which he makes a distinction I ignore here, between education for understanding (typical of the liberal arts, as he understands them) and education for decision (typical of professional programs). One reason I ignore it is, I suppose, a difference in philosophy. Since I consider ethics to be a form of "practical reason" (as Kant might put it), I doubt that one can educate for understanding without educating for decision. Compare Bernard Henderson, "A Reminder on Recognizing Ethical Problems are Practical: Distinctions in Teaching Theory and Practice", *Teaching Ethics* 3 (Spring 2002): 1-18.

¹⁶ For an extended defense of this definition, see my *Profession, Code, and Ethics* (Ashgate: Aldershot, England, 2002).

¹⁷ See my "What can we learn by looking for the first code of professional ethics?" *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 24 (2003): 433-454.

¹⁸ And, of course, medical ethics is *social* ethics if understood as (primarily) concerned with how government and the public should treat medicine, the medical professions, and the provision of health care.

¹⁹ This description of ethics bowl differs from Robert F. Ladenson, "The Educational Significance of the Ethics Bowl", *Teaching Ethics* 1 (March 2001): 63-78, in at least three ways. First, it describes the process of transplanting the ethics bowl to a more or less non-English-speaking environment. Second, it describes an effort to use the ethics-bowl for professional ethics across the engineering curriculum (rather than, as Ladenson presents it, use it to do social issues across the curriculum). And third, it describes the process of making the ethics bowl fit the time-constraints of an ordinary (engineering) classroom.

²⁰ That similarity is present even when business ethics is not taught as the ethics of business administration ("management").

²¹ I take this to be the general drift of the following articles: David T. Ozar, "Learning Outcomes for Ethics Across the Curriculum Programs", *Teaching Ethics* 2 (Fall 2001): 1-28; and Lisa H. Newton, "Outcomes Assessment of an Ethics Program: Purposes and Challenges", *Teaching Ethics* 2 (Fall 2001): 29-68.

²² Thanks to my graduate assistants, Abhishek Kulkarni, Sujan Bhattacharya, and Mayur Tarunkumar Naik, for entering the data and helping me evaluate it.