



## Addressing the Growing Gender Inequalities in New Conflict Areas in Africa: The Case of Cameroon and Nigeria

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### Abstract

New conflicts in the post-Cold War era destabilize and lead to new inequalities that significantly restructure African societies. These are either low intensity conflicts or short-lived civil wars with political motives proposed by radical Islam or secessionist movements (violent or peaceful). African societies are evolving towards a situation where gender inequalities are narrowing or gaps bridged for some segments in some countries, there is regression in achievements, stagnation in relation to gender equality and deterioration of conditions in conflict areas. This requires concerted efforts through partnerships at national and international level involving governments, non-governmental agencies and private organizations with the capacity to significantly influence the course of action. This paper sets out to study the impact of conflicts on the rights and status of women in two conflict areas in Africa with limited reference to some field research. The paper highlights the perverse effects of conflicts as they dislocate societies putting a halt to overall development, overturn values and result in losses for agency and value for women and girls. The gains in improvement in gender relations or a narrowing of gender gaps are eroded putting into question prospects of achieving development goals related to gender equality (Goal 5) and equality in general (Goal 10). The call is for more vigorous action not only to put an end to peace as a condition for development but to focus on the problems that arise out of conflict zones, notable amongst which are gender inequalities.

Keywords: gender, conflict, violence, vulnerability, inequality, development, partnership.

### Purpose

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was marked by a decline in armed conflicts of the type that characterized inter-state relations culminating to the Second World War and the balance of terror of the bipolar Cold War era with its proxy wars and wars. In fact, the World Bank and the Human Security Report Project (2008: 9) reported optimistically that:

The world is becoming less war-prone. The number of civil wars dropped by three-quarters from 1992 to 2005, ... (and) the number of international conflicts has been falling since the mid-1970s – the most sustained decline in two activities.

This development was relative because the transition from the Cold War into a new international situation generated new types of conflicts. New conflict spots have risen in the backdrop of new stakes such as the bid for new nationhood status, Islamic religious fundamentalism developing within a peculiar form of clash of civilizations – to borrow from Samuel Huntington (1996)- and the rebirth or revival of identity questions within the nation-state of the post-World War II system. The new conflicts affect societies in which they take place in several ways ranging from human insecurity, disorganization of community life, displacement (internal or external) and psychosocial disorders to loss of strategic rights and vulnerabilities of all kinds. It is within the same period that the United Nations developed, advocated and fostered the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be followed later by Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) among which are Goals 5 (gender equality) and 10 (reduced inequality). The new conflicts that have arisen within this period seem to be eroding the strategic gains made by multilateral organizations, governments and advocacy groups in the domain of gender relations whether these are within the scope of previous initiatives (notably the Beijing platform for Action which specifically addresses women and armed conflict as one of the 12 critical areas of concern) or within the scope of the development goals.

This paper seeks to examine the developments by critically analyzing the peculiarities of these conflicts and how they are resulting in new forms of gender inequality and abuses that frustrate efforts at reducing such as well as propose collaborations or partnership structures that can minimize gender inequality. This paper makes the point that although action is taken to tackle the conflicts either within the states as the depositories of sovereignty or through collaborations at inter-state and multilateral levels within the context of the war on terror and assist states from failing, these are global level actions that do not target deleterious effects at societal level as one observes with dislocations, regression in gains in gender relations and abuses that debase the humanity of women and girls and that concerted efforts among African countries can make a significant difference in achieving gender equality. The latter catch the attention of the international community, the global powers, state actors, powerful international and national civil society actors, and vocal activities from influential personalities who could collectively address these societal level issues but who seem not to be able to do anything beyond denouncing or very little to salvage the situation. Partnerships between organizations from different sectors in the search for solutions to complex global issues and challenges have increased significantly in recent times. Such collaborations are critical in bringing together people and organizations with diverse experiences and resources to coordinate efforts and tackle common challenges especially gender inequality aggravated by conflicts. Gender equality and empowerment of women and girls are both goals within the 2030 Agenda and drivers of sustainable development in several other goal areas of the SDGS (UNWOMEN, 2018). There is therefore a need for new mobilization efforts that will bring varieties of actors on board in global coalitions to synergize in tackling the problem of gender inequalities, inequities and abuses (target of Goal 5) that are emerging from the new conflicts and conflict areas.

This paper will start with an analysis of conflicts and then proceed to an examination of how they have affected the social contexts where they take place as well as how this has led to gender abuses and widen gender gaps. It will also critically examine how gender power relations

influence, and are influenced by paying attention to the differential impact on men, women, boys and girls in conflict prone communities. The paper ends with research limitations, implications and contributions.

## **Methods**

This contribution uses the comparative case study approach in some trouble spots across the African continent. The situation in North East Nigeria and the English speaking regions of Cameroon is examined using documents and reports as well as some limited ethnographic work. The communication that is based largely on already published sources and some field work will also use the case studies of Boko Haram in the North East of Nigeria and parts of surrounding countries (Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) and the conflict in the English speaking zones of Cameroon (Ambazonia insurrection) as well as carried out a documentary analysis of partnerships that can enhance gender equality in conflict areas. These reports are then discussed in-depth in relation to the literature, gender preoccupations and prospects for action.

## **Findings**

### **New Trends in Conflicts in Africa**

The African continent has over the last thirty to forty years witnessed an upsurge in novel forms of conflict that have been labeled variously as “new wars” (Hagg and Kagwanja 2008: 13; Kaldor 2001) that cut across all regions. These conflicts either come to graft unto older ones or arise out of the new context of globalization and the end of the Cold War that have ushered in what Amin Maalouf (2009) has termed as deregulation of the world or George Corms “new world disorder” (Corm, 1993). Being less inter-state and more of intra-state confrontations but also internationalized with transnational outlooks, they have been classified in different ways by different authors. Working on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) assessment reports on conflicts around the continent, Gluhbegovic identified five types, namely civil interest political conflicts, identity conflicts, resource-based conflicts and terrorism (Gluhbegovic, 2016: 2). Bujra (2002: 6-13), on his part, identified six types of conflicts in addition to inter-state conflicts: rebellions to overthrow governments, secessionist rebellions, coup d'états, Cold War sustained conflicts, many sided conflicts to seize power, rural conflicts over resources and urban conflicts. These two typologies overlap and intersect in that the first five in the second typology are political conflicts while rural conflicts are resource based conflicts. Terrorism is rather a conflict mode while identity points to the stakes behind some of the conflicts. Urban conflicts, on their part, may have a variety of stakes.

These new conflicts have led scholars to think of the post-Cold War era as one which is “unarguably a world of wars and conflict... that of increased civil wars and intra-state conflicts” and thus define the “global landscape” (Enuka, 2012: 19; cf. also Mamdani, 2004, 2009; Wieviorka, 2010). They are considered as largely social rather than inherently political in character such as those of the Cold War era or the preceding epochs in world history (Azar, 1990). They have tended to be destabilizing, disruptive and destructive of social systems characterized as

they are by “unspeakable acts of violence and brutality... new barbarism, an expression of senseless and irrational convulsion of violence” (Enuka, *ibid*: 20). One can add the erosion of social and cultural orders and the open criminalization of societies. The social or societal nature of the new conflicts is thus reflected in their direct impact on the internal social order whereas classical inter-state conflicts were otherwise restricted to battlefields or strategic targets. Some of the observable and recorded impacts have been displacement of populations (whether internal as IDPs or externally as refugees), ensuing humanitarian crises reflected in despondency, homelessness, loss of livelihoods, high death rates among non-combatants, insecurity, the dislocation of social and communal fabrics, a recession in efforts at development and, associated with the latter, unemployment and pauperization (cf. also Aremu, 2010: 554-556).

After having experienced a period of relapse within the years following the years at the end of the Cold War, the development agenda is returning to African countries either directly as in the case of the Development Plans of Cameroon and the continental Agenda 63 or indirectly through “emergence agendas” for a variety of countries (Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya). However lofty these agendas and plans may be, they do not factor the likelihood of conflicts into the equation although it is evident that conflicts retard development and destroy gains made in preceding periods in all domains. The losses are material, social and cultural among which are disruptions in social relations (rights, values, underlying inter-human and intergroup relations). Notable among the latter are the gains that have been made over the years in gender equality and equity including the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security where the international community affirmed for the first time that women were not only victims of armed conflicts, but that their potentials must also be harnessed to play an active role in conflict resolution, state building and in all phases of peace processes, thus including a gender perspective in peace and security policy measures.

Insurgencies constitute some of the most socially destructive conflicts in contemporary Africa. They have actually become some of the most obvious forms of armed conflicts around the world with a high cost in material damage, lives, insecurity, psychosocial damage and destruction to the social fabric and communities. Metz and Miller (2004: 2) define insurgency as:

A strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power ... characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization all meant to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor.

The aim may be as broad as “seizing power” (*ibid*), limited to “separation, autonomy, or alteration of a particular policy” (*ibid*). In that regard, they are characterized by a low level of military sophistication because of inaccessibility to high level conventional weapons, this limiting them to low intensity confrontations. Very often, the aim of the insurgency is to create an impression, inflict moral pain and create a psychological impression rather than win a war. That is why they “avoid battle spaces where they are weakest - often the conventional military sphere – and focus on those where they can operate on more equal footing, particularly the *psychological and the*

*political*" (ibid, underlining by the authors). Because of the lack of substantial means, insurgents also resort to criminal means such as "smuggling, robbery, money laundering, counterfeiting, merchandise pirating, illegal use of charities, racketeering, and extortion" (ibid: 4). This is where insurgency, illegality and crime intersect so far as financing is concerned. The link is so aptly presented in the interrogation by the World Bank and Human Security Report Project (op. cit.: i-ii): "Is there any practical difference between a criminal gang which grows narcotics and guards its crops with guns, and insurgents who grow drugs to finance their rebellion". Kaldor (op. cit.: 49, quoted in Enuka 2012: 20) has also identified a "blurring of the distinctions between warfare, organized criminality and "large-scale violations of human rights".

Metz and Meller (op. cit. 2-3) have classified insurgencies into liberation and national insurgencies although they caution against taking the distinction too rigidly. Whatever the case, the interest for us is the social/sociological impacts which the World Bank and Human Security Report Project sum up in the concept of human insecurity, that is, "[t]he complex of interrelated threats associated with international war, civil war, genocide, and the displacement of populations. Human security means at minimum, freedom from violence and the fear of violence" (op. cit.: i). Next will be a description of the two insurgencies mentioned before an analysis of the impact on development and gender relations.

Two major conflicts broke out in Cameroon in the 2010-2020 years. When the country was celebrating the golden jubilee of its reunification in 2014, the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria had made in-roads into the northernmost part of the territory. This posed a major challenge to the country's security before a low-intensity insurrection broke out in the English speaking administrative regions of the North West and South West. While the Boko Haram insurgency was an off-shoot of an Islamic international movement purporting to create a caliphate or Islamic State within the scope of the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), and, thus, driven by religious motives, the second movement claims it is out to enable the separation of the two English speaking regions from the rest of the country to create a new nation and state called Ambazonia.

Both conflicts with the state have identity undertones, one being religious and the other working on socio-linguistic differences. They are violent, armed (even if the arms lack sophistication) and draw from post-Cold War tactics of small group insurrections/insurgencies. They respond to two post-Cold War phenomena, first, the dream of creating new nations in order to undo post-World War II arrangements (for the Ambazonia case) and the international Islamic State movement that puts itself outside the confines of the Western European model of the nation-state, each with its own motivations although strategies seem to converge at some point. They may appear to be identity related or even have identity arguments (which they do) but they are situated outside the nation-state sphere as they confront the state of Cameroon from outside (as a diaspora for "Ambazonians" and as a Muslim caliphate that subscribes to the Islamic state and does not recognize the secular modern state system). Drawing from identity arguments (religion for Boko Haram and rights to statehood based on a sociolinguistic difference for Ambazonia), both movements have posed a major threat to security and the integrity of the state of Cameroon and its neighbors (Nigeria, Niger, Chad). The impacts of the two movements have been amply reported.

## **Boko Haram**

This organization has been described as a “salafist terrorist organization” whose aim is to abolish “the secular system of government” and establish a “Sharia system” in Nigeria and by extension all the areas in which it operates. Its avowed strategy was therefore to destroy “all symbols of and institutions of Nigerian statehood” (Mbagwu and Alaiyemola, 2015: 88). It is opposed to the secular westernization of Nigeria especially co-educational learning and democracy and hopes to create an Islamic state in Nigeria or, failing which, in its northern states that have already adopted Sharia Law (Zenn and Pearson, 2014). Originally affiliated to Al Qaida and then to several other jihadist groups (Zenn, 2014), the group became notorious for its methods such as mass destruction of people and property including ransacking of whole villages that become completely deserted, suicide attacks, targeted assassinations, organized prison break-ins, armed robberies, summary executions and homicide, money laundering, kidnapping as “primary method of self-sustaining funding”, extortion and trade in illegal drugs, arms, ammunitions and explosives (Mbagwu and Alaiyemola, *op. cit.*: 90). Matfess (2017) estimated its casualties at 30,000 deaths and two million people displaced. Economic activities (agriculture, regional trade) have been so badly affected that they will touch 14 million people.

Perousse de Montclos (2014), holds that when Boko Haram moved from insurgency to terrorism they resorted to strikes against political targets such as police stations, which in some remote villages seem to be the only effective state apparatus present and effectively operational in such localities. Prisons were also targeted to release militants who had been sentenced and were serving terms. Schools that symbolised western education as well as mosques and Muslim scholars that contested the moral credibility of the sect as well as politicians and those accused of not properly implementing Islamic laws were also targeted. After the killing of the leader of the group in 2009, the group extended its operations to attacking churches, bridges, power plants, radar facilities of international airports as well as radio and television transmitters. According to Ukpong (2016), kidnappings by insurgents pose a security threat to the population. In general, the insurgency affects foreign as well as indigenous investments thereby hampering economic growth. Cameroon as a nation has also witnessed a series of kidnappings, abductions, armed robberies, and murders of all forms staged by Boko Haram in the northern regions.

## **The ‘Ambazonian’ Insurgency in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon**

A movement in the Southwest and Northwest of Cameroon which started as socio-professional demands by lawyers and teachers in 2016 later degenerated to an insurgency in 2017. It has targeted schools, government offices, government officials, municipal councils and chiefs, with the intended effect of “making the area ungovernable”. It has also targeted farming activities and occasionally trading activities. It manifested itself in its earliest moments through frequent pressure to halt activities (with the code names “lockdown” and “ghost town”), roadblocks, seizure of farms, and the takeover of villages. It has taken economic forms such as the hijack of property, extortion, intimidation and sabotage. There is destruction of public places, property and ensigns. There have been attempts to ban schools and replace them with what insurgents call “community schools”. UN News (2019) reported that “over 80 percent of schools” in the English speaking

region of Cameroon were closed. Several schools have been attacked and teachers, pupils and students murdered.

The insurgency has tended to adopt criminal attitudes with the evident consequences being plundering of villages, arbitrary assassinations, human rights violations and kidnapping for ransom (United Nations, 2021). Insurgents carry out deliberate attacks on the state symbols (such as schools), public institutions, health facilities, and churches and punish civilians who they think do not support the insurgency. This has affected the people of these regions in several ways. First, it has damaged physical infrastructure, destroyed human capital and caused the displacement of many people. Second, it has affected poverty levels within households that lost their incomes and who cannot afford to pay for health services or send their children to school. This conflict has affected economic productivity, thus exposing households to poverty.

This trend is confirmed by a study that took place in the small town of Muyuka in the South West administrative region (Achale, 2022). Muyuka that is noted for its food production capacity became famous as an epicenter of insurgency activities that caused most businesses to close down. As a consequence of the insurgency, business men, the financially viable, local chiefs, high profile government workers, parents and children of schooling age and persons who could not support the insecurity to escape the town of Muyuka. The insurgency has led to rising prices of goods and services. Farmers have also abandoned their activities as their farms have either been hijacked or subjected to the payment of tribute by insurgents. In fact, the insurgency has caused mass exodus of people. People have been displaced leaving their homes, properties and farms to start a new life in different places of no conflict. This has caused some people to become traumatized. The insurgency has led to a modification of social bonds as members of the same families may have to live in different towns and friendship, neighborhood and communal relations dislocated (Ebua, 2021).

Insurgents have ordered a stop in development projects in the town “postponing development to after the war”, this causing people to abandon personal and collective welfare projects. The spillover effects of frequent and continuous injunctions to halt economic activities (code named “ghost town”) has also affected economic activities. This has caused a drop in economic activities and a fall in the incomes of individuals and households. Work has also slowed down in the neighboring agro-industrial complex of the Cameroon Development Corporation with workers becoming redundant. The insurgency led to the formation of new communities around farm houses in the South West Region by persons who could not migrate to towns for safety. As a result, new economic activities have developed around these settlements but these businesses have tended to be very expensive as the prices of the goods and services are extraordinarily high. Dealers in psychotropic drugs also take advantage of the insurgency to do underground business.

### **Gender Issues in the Insurgencies**

Much has been written about the gender dimensions of the Boko Haram insurgency by scholars and right groups who have reported and analysed abuses such as abduction, torture, women

carrying arms and serving as combatants (even as suicide bombers), gender based violence, sexual violence (including rape), labour in camps, forced marriages and forced sexual relations. Matfess (op. cit.) and the International Crisis Group (2016) have highlighted the tendency for the group to place tighter restrictions on women and stricter gender segregation. Matfess also points to the “subservience of women and girls” as well as expectations of “acquiescence of violence” by victims.

Following the much publicized abduction of girls in a secondary school in Chibok in Nigeria’s North Eastern state of Borno, Human Rights Watch (2014) undertook to probe further into abuses on women and girls in captivity beyond the singular event. The group analyzed the “harrowing experiences” of physical and psychological abuses on women and girls (married or unmarried) who had been targeted because of their religion (Christianity) or their attending school or both. The report highlights forced labour, forced participation in military operations, forced marriages, sexual abuse, performance of household chores in camps and serving as porters. Prominent abuses are discrimination and religious persecution. Targets for abduction were Christian women and women from “predominantly Christian areas” who were forcefully converted into Islam, married to Muslim men or murdered. Such conversions were consistent with the idea of creating a Muslim caliphate in the area coinciding with Northern means of Nigeria where Sharia law had been imposed by 2012 (Zenn and Pearson, 2014: 50).

Several scholars have pointed to different types of abuses although there is convergence on some critical issues. Gender based violence stands out in most studies with reports of “gang rape of Christian women, while Muslims were spared” (International Crisis Group op.cit.: 7), the resort to traditions of using “women and girls as rewards to fighters” (ibid) and women abducted to “serve as sex slaves and war wives” (Mbagwu and Alaiyemola, op. cit.: 90) which are “extreme expressions(s) of gender based violence” (ibid.: 87). Concerning gender based violence, Zenn and Pearson (op.cit.: 50) report sexual violence, acts such as rape, torture, murder and discrimination against women (particularly Christian women) following an ideology that “promoted narrow gender roles for men and women, enforcing strict rules on women’s dress and sexual conduct and... other discriminatory and abusive practices against women” as well as “hyper masculine combat roles” and “combative ideological masculinity”.

The contextual implications or consequences of the insurgency on gender relations have also been identified. While men were abducted for their virility and specific skills that could be useful in combat or were simply killed, women were captured and subjected. This development has resulted in an imbalance in terms of gender composition of the population in affected areas. Women who lose male companions (husband) or relatives (sons) are left alone to look after families and themselves (International Crisis Group, op. cit.: 1). The strategy of raiding and ransacking target communities has generally led to the displacement of large numbers of displaced people (Matfess, op. cit.). In fact, some villages are completely deserted and livelihood activities abandoned. The resultant effect are losses in gains in a situation where “many women [had become] economic providers in their own right, [selling] goods in the market or from home, or perform farming activities, while others work in offices” (International Crisis Group, op. cit.: 3). Such vulnerabilities are compounded for girls when schools are targeted and shut down. The



increase in levels of education that had been contributing to narrowing the gender gaps or differentials has witnessed a regression with the shutting down of schools. In this regard, gains in empowerment will be lost over the years as women's autonomy is eroded. Internal displacement can be a particularly disempowering experience for women who are often overburdened by the realities of displacement when traditional protection mechanisms are eroded and violence in communities increases, given that traditionally women are responsible for children, the elderly and domestic work. The empowerment of women greatly contributes to the Gross Domestic Product of a country and to poverty reduction. Given that women outnumber men as internally displaced persons (IDP) and that the needs of women and men differ, the absence of a gender perspective in the assistance to internally displaced persons and in the literature illustrate that gender is either being ignored or is not properly understood.

Difficulties experienced in camps hosting refugees or internally displaced persons only add to the vulnerability, despondency and increasing dependency that arise from conflict situations irrespective of gender. Although some women may make gains by adhering to the apparently "liberating" impact of Boko Haram, such as protection for female adherents, this is insignificant in comparison to overall losses. Other core rights such as the right to freedom of belief, education, choice of sexual partners and, above all dispose of one's body and person are violated. This is definitely inscribed in a wider global context characterized by the rise of a combative (Jihadist) ideology and movements with links to Islam.

This is definitely different with the Ambazonian insurgency that is overtly secular in its posture and claims although similarities in strategies and effects can be identified in some respects. The Community Centre for Integrated Development (CCID) (2021: 50) has also observed "disruption in social and gender structures" characterized by gender based violence, domestic violence, forced marriages, child marriages, an increase in early marriages, and a drop in school attendance rates for all but with a disproportionate impact that disfavours girls. Physical and psychological abuse adds to new vulnerabilities arising out of insecurity that have engendered new forms of female single headed households, sex work for survival, the abandonment of regular livelihood activities (farming) and the adoption of new ones as there is a generalized drop in incomes and as women replace men in several spheres of activities. Although there are some opportunities for political participation at local and regional or national level (such as activism towards achieving peace), the organization has observed a "halt in the pursuit of gender equality due to the armed conflict" that has: "... brought new challenges to the population, such as sexual violence, killings, displacements, threats and all types of insecurities. As a result, achieving genuine gender equality has been set aside. The realization of gender equality and equity might not be the first priority of NGOs<sup>1</sup>, political and social actors, or women at this time" (ibid.: 63) with the stress on survival, gender based violence (GBV) and insecurity. "The attempts to increase gender equity and achieve gender equality [have] rarified as the crisis turned into a full-scale conflict. Instead protection of people from GBV due to the Anglophone crisis" (ibid.: 63). As insurgents have succeeded in closing schools in many areas, the opportunities for achieving

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<sup>1</sup> Internally displaced persons.

equality and equity through education have been compromised although there is a general drop in school attendance.

Cases of rape, forced marriages and forced pregnancies have been reported in the ongoing insurgency in the English speaking regions of Cameroon. The case of a wardress who was gang raped, openly mutilated and murdered as well as filmed and disseminated over the social media (Whatsapp, Facebook) by a group of insurgent militias in the Pinyin area of the North West Region became symptomatic of the extreme barbarism that characterizes attitudes and treatment of women in the conflict. Several young women were molested, battered, stripped naked, murdered or buried alive in several localities in the North West (Bamenda, Batibo) and South West (Kumba, Muyuka) Regions. Men have also been treated in similarly violent ways but the treatment of women has been humiliating, demeaning and marked by the desecration of their bodies. Social media images of young and middle aged women maltreated by insurgents are often nude as if meant to degrade what is sacred to them, namely their intimacy. This is the more so when such women are suspected of dating soldiers of the regular army, of being spies or of both. Several adult and elderly women accused of being witches, refusing to obey/violating instructions of insurgents, or openly opposing (collectively or individually) the latter's abuses have been severely tortured to the extent that they have sustained injuries that took long to heal or enduring scars. Some were simply disabled. This is not to say that men have not had their share of abuses but the violation of bodies and intimacy is specific to women. Men have not been able to resist better but the majority migrate to safer zones leaving wives and children to face the insecurity and brutalities almost single-handedly. The intimidations and threats have resuscitated the attitudes of silence that were already disappearing from a substantial number of women in this area with efforts at empowerment. Women are, once more, re-emerging as a muted category in the affected areas.

Collaborative efforts and partnership are observed at global multilateral level (Ellingrud, et. al. 2017) but these can be extended beyond the habitual concern with gender in peace time and in non-conflict areas. UNWOMEN has established strong partnerships with various stakeholders working in its targeted areas to strengthen mainstreaming of gender for gender responsive programmes alongside governments, civil society organizations, local communities, academia, development partners and other UN agencies among other actors (UNWOMEN, op. cit.). United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), on its part, provides financial and technical assistance to innovative programmes and strategies that promote women's human rights, political participation and economic security as it works with other UN bodies, governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to promote gender equality. These efforts are meant to link women's issues and concerns to national, regional and global agendas by fostering collaboration and providing technical expertise on gender main streaming and women's empowerment strategies. It is our argument that these initiatives be extended to factor gender inequalities, inequities and abuses against women in conflict areas.

## Research Implications

### Development Implications of Conflicts

Generally, conflicts lead to losses of the gains made in the protection of women, the enhancement or empowerment of women through affirmative action, efforts in bridging the gender gap and enforcement of rights as enshrined in national and international instruments such as Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Violence against Women (CEDAW). The context of conflicts affects development efforts directly by targeting development gains and efforts. This is exemplified in the result of the study in the locality of Muyuka in Cameroon who affirmed that “development can wait till the end of the war”. Conflicts also cause material and non-material (social and cultural) losses. Infrastructures built over time are destroyed, livelihoods are compromised and social relations that have been improving over time deteriorate or degenerate. The losses in the present cases are in the non-material domain and specifically the social and cultural. Conflicts also disrupt societies and the security without which development is impossible. Post-conflict situations concentrate efforts at peace and security compromising resources that should otherwise have gone to improve previous development efforts. The new conflicts in Africa compromise development efforts from a multidimensional perspective. CCID (ibid.) holds that the “prospects for the economic future” of the affected areas become “derisory”. Losses in gender equity and equality are some of the most pernicious effects of these conflicts. The growing inequalities and inequities arising as a consequence need to be addressed as much as the conflicts themselves if the development goals have to be met.

Conflicts affect development indirectly as they create insecure contexts for people who are both agents and beneficiaries of development. They disrupt communities, social structures of conviviality and displace people from their habitual residences that have over the years become “natural contexts” (in an ethnographic sense). Family and kinship relations are altered while social relations are dislocated, reworked or destroyed. Vulnerabilities emerge for disadvantaged groups and categories as not everyone is able to cope with the new challenges of instability that conflicts generate. For instance, when homes dislocate in conflict areas, men may relocate leaving women behind who assume greater responsibilities within households (often without adequate means) or become vulnerable to abuses of the type described above. When whole communities are displaced or have to abandon when forced by belligerents as in the case of the Boko Haram insurgency (but also in other cases on the continent) or by force of circumstance, victims become IDPs or refugees. Either housed and taken care of by good willed persons (relations, friends, well-wishers) or put in camps (benefiting from humanitarian assistance), victims of conflict insecurity lost in agency and became dependents. Despondency, dependency and assistantship have become widespread in the new conflict areas with their new forms of barbarism.

### The Conflict and Gender Nexus: Meanings and Trends in Africa

The concept of gender in the context of conflict, peace and security and social relation analysis remain the yardstick of gender and development (Razavi and Miller 1995). The relevance of gender is important in coming up with a planning program or project for conflict peace and

security. As such, as women and men have different positions within their societies and different control over resources, they not only play different and changing roles but also often have different needs (Moser, 2005). However, feminist scholars in the field of gender and conflict have raised growing concerns about the ghettoization of gender and gender inequality issues (more specifically) as potential causes and consequences of conflict (Sjoberg, 2013; Kinsella, 2003). Most analysis of conflict rooted in realist, liberal and constructivist ideologies pay very little attention to gender in the understanding of the “meanings, causes and consequences of conflict (Carpenter, 2003). Nevertheless, recent trends in conflicts notably from South (African countries inclusive) suggest that the meanings, causes and consequences of conflict are gendered.

Contrary to earlier conflicts characterized by clearly defined combat fields, recent trends in armed conflicts disrupt families and have negative consequences for women, men and children. Though both women and men are victims, women disproportionately suffer from the consequences of war (Goetz & Treiber, 2012). This explains why a significant momentum of the gender equality drive has been directed to the recognition and consolidation of women’s roles in conflict prevention as well as strategies to address violence against women and girls in situations of conflict (Domingo et al., 2014). This drive is against a backdrop of the numerous threats to women posed by conflict and violence. Hence, the promotion of sustainable peace and security is strategic to women’s contributions in creating stability and promoting reconciliation, peace and security (ibid.; United Nations 2010).

Women usually do not initiate conflicts but they do suffer heavily from the consequences. According to Eriksson-Baaz & Stern (2010), sexual violence is part of a larger pattern of generalized violence against both women and men. This pattern belongs to a long history of violence. Conflict spurs much higher rates of sexual violence and renders women acutely vulnerability to poverty, loss of jobs and destruction of property. In addition, women and girls become the individual systematic targets of sexual violence, specifically when rape and sexual assault are used as weapons of war. Women living in war zones are vulnerable even if they make efforts to adapt to and survive the violence, loss, and deprivation that goes hand in hand with conflicts. This perception of women likewise disregards their experience of war as combatants, promoters of peace, or community leaders (Laudati 2013). Thus, the very real protection and assistance needs of women living in armed conflict should not be overlooked. As such, refusing to recognize their agency means that many of the most fundamental decisions regarding their security and access to material resources will be taken without reference to them or without their consent.

### **Gender Inequalities, Power Relations, and Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in Situations of Conflict**

Sexual and gender based violence is rooted in attitudes towards gender roles and relations. Through social interactions, individuals learn what is expected, see what is expected, act and react in expected ways and simultaneously construct and maintain the gender order. Gender refers to the social difference between men and women in societies as well as the roles, responsibilities societies assigned to men, women, boys and girls. unlike sex (biological/

physiological differences between male and female) which is static, gender is a dynamic concept and is strongly shaped by socio-cultural norms and traditions that are deeply rooted in patriarchy. Gender is a social construction, varies with time and is context specific.

Given that most societies are gender stratified, the subject 'man' and 'woman', and the expected behaviors, attitudes, and responsibilities are defined in different and unequal ways. Though there may be variations, the subject woman and its attendant behavior and status is often held in less esteem than the status 'man' (Lorber, 1994). Consequently, men and women are placed in roles and positions of power, with women often in disadvantaged positions in relation to men. When gender intersects with class, race, ethnicity, women of favored groups (e.g. white, upper class) command more power, prestige and property than those from disfavoured groups (lower socio-economic categories, poor, etc.). As a result, disfavoured groups (particularly women) suffer from marginalization, exclusion and are more vulnerable to human right abuses and SGBV in pre-conflict societies.

Pre-conflict societies are plagued with both direct (physical) and indirect (structural) violence at the micro- (household) level as well as societal/institutional (macro) levels. At the individual (micro) level, gender inequalities expose women to physical violence such as rape, partner battery, abuse by partners and family members, honor killings, exposure to sexually transmitted diseases, harassment, injuries, murder, and so on.. Sexual and gender based violence is a direct manifestation of male dominance. Perpetrators see SGBV as a way of exercising dominance, privilege, power and control over others (who are considered victims, subordinate, less powerful and vulnerable).

In the event of a conflict, communities and family support systems are broken down, families separated, law and order is almost absent, and health facilities and police services understaffed or completely absent. There is also an increase in human rights violations and impunity, increased displacement and vulnerability. These conditions are fertile grounds for the intensification of SGBV. As tension increases during conflict coupled with frustration, powerlessness and loss of traditional male roles and identity, the incidence of sexual and gender violence increases substantively such that rape, force marriages, forced prostitutions, torture, mutilation, forced pregnancies and physical assault become acceptable acts during conflict.

Recent situations of conflict have seen warring parties perpetuate these types of violence as a strategy to punish opponents. Women and girls are significantly affected. Reports of conflict related sexual violence highlight the use of SGBV against women and girls to displace communities, expel "undesirable" groups and to seize contested land and other resources (United Nations, 2019). Cases from South Sudan, DR Congo, Nigeria, Syria and Burundi point to situations in which militias rape women as a means of repression, terror and control as well as those perceived to be political opponents. In some instances, victims are raped by up to 10 men sometimes in front of their parents or children. Others are detained as sex slaves. Non-state actors including armed group, local militias and criminal elements are largely responsible for the majority of incidences of SGBV although some cases of sexual violence involving state actors – national armed forces, police and other security entities have also been documented.

A relative new phenomenal observation in conflict is the inter link among SGBV, trafficking and terrorism with terrorist group increasingly involved in the trafficking of women and girls. Intensification of violence extremism is often associated with discriminatory gender norms that limit women's roles and enjoyment of basic rights. Through acts of human trafficking and exposure of captives to various form of SGBV, terrorist spread terror among civilian populations (Swiss & Giller, 1993). Cases of terror related SGBV have been documented in North-Eastern Nigeria and Mali (United Nations, 2019). Sexual violence against women and girls also play an important role in the political economy of terrorism with the presence of physical and online slave markets where terrorists generate revenue from abduction and trafficking of women and girls (ibid.). These trends explain why conflict related SGBV has been identified as one of the main reasons for forced displacement of civilian populations, particularly women and girls. Many women and children flee their homes not necessarily for fear of death from gun shots but from fear of rape, forced pregnancy, physical assault and other forms of SGBV. Even when they flee, women and girls are still exposed to SGBV in the course of displacement and navigating their way through borders and across checkpoints without documentation, money or legal status.

Upon arrival at refugee or internally displaced peoples (IDP) camps, women and girls are vulnerable and could easily be taken advantage of by several persons. The United Nations has documented cases where refugees and IDPs have reportedly suffered from SGBV at the hands of state employees working in such camps, armed groups, smugglers, traffickers, and even peacekeepers and others who control resources and services in humanitarian context (United Nations, 2017). In situations of extreme vulnerability, some parents force their daughters into early marriages to reduce risk of exploitation by strangers or in order to gain access to resources for the rest of the family (United Nation, 2019). It is also common to observe deeply entrenched gender-based violence such as intimate partner violence in displacement and resettlement camps, primarily affecting women and girls.

The formation of networks (peace alliances) by women can promote cooperation and trust which may eliminate the causes of conflict (Mpangala, 2004). Owing to the consequences of conflict on all categories of persons (men, women, boys and girls), women have been active in the peace process. This, however, remains an elite phenomenon. The elite women involved in the processes of conflict prevention, promotion, consolidation and reconstruction of peace and security (Mbuoben, 2018) seek to strengthen and promote women's organizations and initiatives that promote peace and foster an atmosphere of conviviality in their communities. However, these efforts by elite groups that rose up to decry and to protest the desecration of women within the conflict are far from successful. Much is observed in the campaigns and very little as to a modification of the situation on the ground. Local women's organizations have also stepped up their efforts in trying to bring about peace negotiators and mediators between warring parties and encourage dialogue at local level (Coning, 2013). Some resistance has been recorded for women's local grassroots activist social movements of the type that was observed in the transition into independence and critical moments in political history in Anglophone Cameroon as reported by several scholars for the Anlu of Kom (Mougoué 2018), the Fumbwen for related peoples of Babanki (Diduk 1989; Federici 2004) as well as Aghem (Fonchingong et al., 2008), and the more varied organizations of the Bamenda metropolitan area (Diduk 2004). For instance, women were

reported to have staged protests against insurgents in the Babanki communities (Big Babanki and Babanki Tungo) and Oku but these protests were rather timid and did not achieve the intended effect of putting an end to the abuses of the former. On the contrary, they have been met with more violent torture and repression. In fact, this has not contributed in any considerable way to improve the situation. The peaceful protest in Babanki Tungo was met with open fire from insurgents leading to the death of a woman and several others wounded. The leaders of the Fumbwen traditional social movement in Big Babanki were rounded up, kept in custody and tortured for several weeks by insurgent elements in 2020 on the grounds that the former had dared oppose their violence and activities or were collaborators of the “enemy” (code named “black legs”). When women in Oku marched in late March 2022 in protest over the brutality of local operatives of what have been styled Restoration Forces, insurgents placed an indefinite “lockdown” (code name of a ban on all activities) in the whole locality.

Besides the ineffectiveness of the initiatives, one observes the disjoint between what Touré et al. (2003) have styled the “two faces of African feminism”, one elitist and intellectual and another local and popular that has exposed not only the ineffectiveness of the disconnect but also the emasculation of either in the face of the new forms of violence. Local women cannot effectively face guns mobilized towards causes over which they have no control. They have lost their agency as guardians of the moral and social order as givers and sustainers of life (mothers, farmers, domestic caregivers and providers) that used to be effective because of the appeal these references used to have in the peaceful times and critical moments of their history (Diduk, op. cit.). For now, the social order has been disrupted and the moral order overturned. The campaigns, slogans and activism of the elite intellectual segments have been timid with limited audiences within belligerent circles. Whether at grassroots or at elite levels, women’s voices are once more disappearing and being muted.

Coming to the government, Cameroon drew up a National Plan of Action for the implementation of Resolution 1325 of the United Nations Security Council on Women, Peace and Security, and Companion Resolutions, banking on the fact that the country was considered for a long time as a model of peace in Africa. However, nowadays, it is confronted with enormous security challenges provoked by political instability in neighboring countries, on the one hand, and the insurgencies that it is facing and which are discussed in this presentation. Like other member countries of the UN, Cameroon has to take the necessary measures for the implementation of Resolution 1325 and Companion Resolutions on the consideration of gender in peace, security, conflict prevention and resolution processes, given the humanitarian crisis the country is facing and the reconstruction processes in which it is engaged. However, such efforts are coming at the same time that the government itself is an actor as both target (for insurgents) and seeker of solutions (as the guarantor of the security and welfare for the people). The problem is that of how it can provide solutions to problems where it is the target of a violent movement that seeks to sidestep it and create a new world. Solutions cannot be conventional or in the order of the status quo.

## Limitations

The insecurity of the study areas in general and the inaccessibility in North East Nigeria was a major difficulty in collecting primary data. The essentially documentary nature of the data limits the contribution that could eventually go further to describe and explain the real life experiences of the women. Facts on which the discussion is based are essentially qualitative and are therefore a summary. Detailed investigations and analysis with both quantitative and qualitative data will definitely give more insights into what is largely a reflection that is meant to inform action.

## Originality/Value of the Paper

Observing the developments and mutations in gender relations towards equality and respect for difference in improving the conditions of women at the turn of the century, Alain Touraine (2005) had observed the advent of a new paradigm in which the world was entering a “society of women”/“Nous sommes déjà entrés dans une société des femmes” (ibid.: 379). Developments point to opposite trends and reversals, if not a regression, with a concomitant development of new conflicts. Our reflections point to the fact that disruptions in local communities, internal displacement, the introduction and persistence of terror, and imposition of customs that insist on traditions of male dominance have led to losses in the gains of the Development Decades (1960-1980s), the Beijing Conference and public policies that have benefitted women in African countries. Some groups deliberately advocate for a return to traditions that enforce gender inequalities and inequities while violent conflicts render women vulnerable. Others perpetrate several forms of abuses in situations of breakdown in the moral and social order and disruptions in the social fabric. National governments tend to be helpless when confronted with the abuse of women’s conditions when they are violated by combatants in conflict situations. For instance, there was an outcry at both national and international level about the fate of the “Chibok girls” in the hands of the Boko Haram insurgent but no significant action - single handed or collaborative - was undertaken to rescue them. Some of them escaped or were purportedly freed but these were disproportionately a minority that recounted the horrors as captured in the Human Rights Watch (op. cit.) report heading: “*Those Terrible Weeks in their Camps*”. The fate of the rest is unknown as it is with that of others who suffer or lose their lives in the barbarism of the new conflicts. On the contrary, the tendency is for the international community to end only at condemnation without any means of confronting and putting an end to the abuses. The dominant discourses and actions on gender inequalities tend to assume situations where conflicts are absent especially when these are initiated within national contexts with relative stability. That is why it is important to revisit the new context of conflicts that differs from the otherwise contexts of peace and stability (cf. Koch, 2008).

Moreover, there is a need to focus on the abuses on the gender dimension whereas the focus has been disproportionately on stamping out terrorism or insurgencies which are the major preoccupations. Since 2001 and following the 9/11 attacks, there have been significant international mobilization towards combating terrorism and inter-state cooperation in counterinsurgency. For example, western governments have been cooperating with countries in the Sahel in fighting jihadist groups such as Boko Haram. So far as the conflicts persist the



problems will continue but ways are not sought to target the growing inequalities in the context of conflict itself. The preoccupations of some multilateral organizations are significant (OECD 2017) but these seem not to meet with equal vigor from regional/continental, national and local levels. There is therefore a need for intervention and action involving all levels of actors in partnership to provide new policies and take action to ensure equality and equity in these situations. This will require concerted action from national governments, multilateral organizations, civil society organizations, advocacy groups and local level grassroots organizations where top-down and bottom-up approaches converge. In this regard, governments, multilateral organizations and the intervention agencies need to add a gender dimension as they confront or resolve conflicts while they are on or after they have come to an end.

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