



Contested Spaces in Mali: Justice, Security, and the State

Zoë Gorman (Princeton University, New Jersey, United States)

Abstract

While recent studies find positive effects of violent conflict on judicial systems and trust in the state, this paper provides subnational evidence for the opposite trend in the context of Mali's current conflict. I argue the loss of territorial control to rebel groups leads to a sense of abandonment among populations by the state and a turn towards parallel mechanisms for judicial service provision, which become further entrenched within local society and neo-patrimonial power hierarchies. Meanwhile, efforts to improve the judiciary at the national level through initiatives, platforms and laws do not percolate to conflict-affected periphery regions in a way that meaningfully repairs their trust. The analysis leverages a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) developed by Anders (2020) to map territorial control across Mali from 2011-2019. Quantitative analysis based on the HMM mapping and Afrobarometer survey data finds a clear and robust correlation between levels of territorial occupation by rebel groups and deteriorating trust in the state judiciary, the rule of law, judicial fairness and anti-corruption

Acronyms

ACLED..... Armed Conflict Location and Event Data

AQIM..... Al Qaeda and the Islamic Mahgreb (Al Qaeda's local branch merged with other groups to become JNIM)

CLMM..... Cumulative linked mixed model (A model with hierarchy and ordinal outputs)

CMA..... Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (Armed grouped faction in North aiming to establish an independent state of Azawad; signatory to 2015 Algiers Accords)

COFO..... Commissions foncières (Land commissions)

CVJR..... Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation Forces (Truth, justice, and reconciliation commission)

FAMa..... Armées Maliennes Forces de defense et de sécurité (The Malian armed forces)

FDS..... Forces de defense et de sécurité (Security and defense forces: army, police, gendarmes, national guard)

G5 Sahel or FC-G5S..... Group of Five Sahel Force conjointe de la G5 Sahel (Joint force consistency of battalions from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger)

GATIA..... Groupe autodéfense toureg Imghad et allies (Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies)

HMM..... Hidden Markov Models

IBK..... Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (President of Mali 2013-2020)

ISGS..... Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (Local faction allied with the Islamic State)

JNIM..... Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Support group for Islam and Muslims- also GSIM for French; umbrella al Qaeda-affiliated Sahel and North Africa group active from 2017 under Iyad Ag Ghaly)

MSA..... Mouvement pour la Salvation d'Azawad (Movement for the Salvation of Azawad)

MINUSMA..... United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Active since 2013; 18,000 personnel: 15,000 troops, as of Nov. 2021)

MUJAO..... Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa- also MOJWA; affiliate of AQIM, Al-Mourabitoun and later JNIM)

SIPRI..... Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

UN..... United Nations

UNDP..... United Nations Development Programme

Introduction

While the 'security-development' nexus is all the rage in peacekeeping discourses, states emerging from conflict are unlikely to achieve sustained peace or development without justice in the eyes of the people. Peacebuilding access to justice, inclusivity and accountable institutions might not intuitively seem haphazardly thrown together in United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16, yet the mechanisms linking them remain underexplored. Though the assumption that transitional justice leads to peacekeeping is an underlying logic of external intervention, scholarship on how these intertwined goals shape each other remains limited (Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik, 2016).

In light of the failure of 'good governance' oriented interventions to build sustainable institutions in conflict states (Hazelton, 2021) and prolonged intrastate wars (Fearon, 2017), these

relationships among peacebuilding, transitional justice, democracy and the rule of law¹ has become a pertinent topic among scholars and policymakers (O'Donnell, 2004). Druckman and Wagner (2019) demonstrate by examining 50 peace agreements between 1957 and 2008 that both procedural (process principles of fair treatment, transparency and access) and distributive justice (equitable outcomes) are instrumental to stable peace agreements over the short and long term (also García-Villegas and Espinosa, 2015). Okoye (2004) argues the international human rights framework, which serves as a foundation for the promotion of the rule of law², borrows from longstanding African conceptions of communal interest, mediation and group lobbying and informal dispute resolution, yet customary and weak state institutions often clash in conflict and post conflict settings across the continent.

Literature on modern conflicts identifies periods of insecurity as critical junctures for institutional reform and the re-evaluation of state-society relations. Epperly and Sievert (2019) argue conflict increases the possibility of institutional change; conflict onset triples the likelihood of de jure change related to the autonomy of judges and doubles the likelihood that the emerging political order will uphold court decisions. Newer democracies are especially likely to experience positive shifts in both de jure and de facto judicial independence (Linzer and Stanton, 2015). In turn, credible dispute institutions also decrease opportunities for criminal groups to become new de facto rulers in formerly occupied areas (Arjona, 2016). Several analyses cite conflict and post-conflict periods as 'golden moments' for institutional reform (Blair, 2020), windows of opportunity 'to overhaul the state apparatus and revitalize its relationship with citizens' (Call, 2008b) and critical periods of improving inclusivity by questioning enduring societal status quos that privilege certain social groups (Tripp, 2015). However, findings on the effects of conflict on judicial institutions remain mixed², and improvements to institutional capacity at the macro level do not trickle down uniformly to all societal cachets (Autesserre, 2014a). Haggard and Tiede (2014) indicate a reversion to pre-conflict levels of the rule of law in the post conflict setting. They record the mean values of rule of law indicators pre and post conflict finding countries revert to the pre-conflict rule-of-law status quo with regard to civil liberties, judicial independence and restraints on executive authority.

The modern history of Mali, and recurrent conflict in Africa more broadly, appears at odds with strains of research proposing more positive views of the revitalizing effects of conflict on statebuilding, democratization and the expansion of judicial institutions. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Mali has undergone four cycles of rebellion, reconciliation and reconstruction. Yet despite these periods of upheaval and subsequent statebuilding

¹ Definitions of the rule of law vary across different subsectors of scholarly and legal literature (Blair, 2021). This analysis will adopt Sririam et al. 2011 definition of the rule of law as 'juridical conceptions and mechanisms that preside over the functioning of the state' while protecting the fundamental human rights of its citizens. Appendix B details rule of law indicator calculations.

² Bellows and Miguel (2009) attribute a psychological legacy of exposure to political violence to political mobilization and participation in local collective action among marginalized groups. Boateng (2016) reports increasing fear of crime and victimization as undermining institutional trust and confidence.

initiatives, perceptions of the state judicial services have remained historically low. In a 2015 survey conducted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), civil society representatives from across the country ranked trust in the courts at the bottom of a list of governmental and nongovernmental authorities. The present conflict in Mali provides insights into the interactions between security and justice across a highly variegated spatial and temporal conflict landscape.

The central research puzzle aims to address the attenuation of trust in the state judiciary in contested spaces despite significant reform efforts and international aid as part of a 'golden moment' for innovation of these systems. I will argue territorial contestation leads to a sense of abandonment by the state and a turn towards parallel mechanisms for judicial service provision, which become further entrenched within local society and neo- patrimonial power hierarchies. This fosters an inhospitable environment for the return of credible, state judicial actors, despite reform programmes at the national and international levels. My study advances the theory put forth by Arjona (2016) in detailing how rebel governance structures entangled with pre-existing traditional systems reflect back on perceptions of the central state. The Mali case gives insights into the evolution of the judiciary amidst an expanding number of intrastate conflicts receiving international attention in post-colonial African democracies.

Background of Conflict in Mali

In 2012 a mixture of northern rebels, jihadists and fighters returning from Libya after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi capitalized on local grievances, including failed decentralization attempts, lack of commitments to northern development programmes and limited political representation for northern Tuareg, as well as a historic weak state presence in the north to take over two thirds of Mali's territory. At the same time, a military coup in the south of the country ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré, causing political chaos. An unprecedented national and international mobilization resulted in a democratic transition to the presidency of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) in 2013 as well as joint military and security-sector reform operations, ceasefires and negotiations between the Malian Government and armed groups, and a peace agreement in 2015 (Chauzal and Van Damme, 2015). However, the agreement has not been successfully implemented—in part because it maintains a political status quo, corrupt judicial precedent and the inability to adapt to evolving grievances and a proliferation of armed actors (Desgrais, Guichaoua and Lebovich, 2018). Regular violence persists in the country's north and has spread to the central regions, intermixing with intercommunal tensions, compounded by persisting political instability and subsequent coups overthrowing IBK in 2020 and the transition government in 2021 (Thurston, 2020; Wing, 2021). The country is currently under military rule until new elections can be organised.

Efforts to stabilize the region often rely on weak, corrupt or absent state institutions, whose derelictions incite a marketplace of alternative actors attempting to provide the missing links for populations, further delegitimizing central governments (Gorman, 2019). Foreign intervention and the Group of Five (G5) Sahel joint security force — comprised of battalions from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger — aim to fill the gaps of the state in re-establishing endogenous

control to offset a regional arc of instability but are poorly adapted to local realities (Gorman and Chauzal, 2018). Frustrations over the security situation and political disputes have resulted in France announcing the withdrawal of its operation Barkhane, and Mali removing itself from the G5 and calling for the withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping force MINUSMA.

Although unprecedented in scale, the present conflict fits into a historic cycle of disillusionment with the central state and rebellion despite reform efforts, international support and reconciliation processes. During the previous northern rebellions, the 1992 National Pact and new democratic constitution only deepened the crisis over the next four years. Political changes in Bamako made implementation of the pact sluggish, and leaders of armed groups lacked sufficient control over their organizations to ensure compliance and prevent the forming of new splinter groups not included in the agreement (Straus, 2015). The 1994 devaluation of the CFA prompted an increase in rebel demands and the formation of counter-rebel militia from the ranks of the FAMa, the Ganda Koy ('Masters of the Land' in Sonrai), who massacred hundreds of civilian Tuareg that year. The national pact decentralization programme fell short of northern demands for autonomy and did not foster substantial power devolution; truth commissions to investigate human rights violations never became functional with Malian official complicit in criminal trade operations in the north (Lankhorst, 2013)³. 'Deep state complicity in crime and laxity towards terrorism arguably go a long way to explain why the issue of a weak rule of law and institutional capacity, which in fact allowed the trade to flourish, were never seriously addressed' (Hiil, 2017). Dialogue processes initiated during the conflict escalation period under President Konaré, including the locally driven dialogue forums among herders and farmers and 1996 Flame of Peace Ceremony in Gao, failed to institutionalize within state structures, politically oriented alongside Southern interests. state complicity in crime and laxity towards terrorism arguably go a long way to explain why the issue of a weak rule of law and institutional capacity, which in fact allowed the trade to flourish, were never seriously addressed' (Hiil, 2017).

Similarly in the current conflict episode, the situation has deteriorated following the 2015 peace agreement and intervention efforts. The de jure Algiers Accords only insinuated further contestation; political changes at the capital rendered enforcement sluggish; armed splinter groups (including the pro-government GATIA militia) proliferated, and the country suffered from endemic issues of state complicity and judicial corruption. Following the Accords, Mali experienced a proliferation of armed actors and deteriorating state beyond the north and hotspots in Mopti and the Liptako-Gourma tri-border region, which are no longer conducive to traditional re-negotiations of localized power (Sangaré and Tobie, 2019). The historical patterns of rebellion in Mali, along with unique facets of this cycle of conflict, provide some indications of the challenges of national-level reform efforts to target relevant communities.

The factors underlying Mali's instability—disunity along ethnic lines, economic discontentment, limited territorial control, and corruption and weak institutions—are common to many democracies emerging since the Third Wave (Rose and Shin, 2001). This research seeks to explain how

³ Activities included smuggling illicit goods, cocaine from South America to Europe and Moroccan cannabis to the Levant. Complicit Malian officials would form alliances with local leaders and elites to keep the Tuareg rebellions in check while reaping resource profits.

conflict can perpetuate low confidence in judicial systems (essential for dispute resolution) despite significant reform efforts and international investment.

Hypothesis Development

Understanding the judicial-security environment in African conflicts hinges on foundational, contextual analysis of diverse societies and institutions. Building on theories of the detriments of colonial legacies, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) demonstrate weak state institutions rife with corruption are often unable to cope with insecurity or mediate disputes in a credible and satisfactory manner. Patron-client and neo-patrimonial modes of political support create disparities in statebuilding efforts across different regions and power structures (Rothchild and Olorunsola, 1983). This furthers noticeable divides between the centre and periphery with regard to state institutionalization, resource management and the diffusion of policies (Bonacker, 2018). The political electoral runoff system inherited from France further galvanizes this centre- periphery divide in Francophone West African countries. The single party national lists are tightly controlled by central party elites, which discourages politicians from establishing strong constituency linkages and rather seeking favour from elites at the centre, who regulate access to media and financial resources (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005, Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Amidst a legitimacy crisis, institutions such as the courts not viewed as 'strategically independent and nonpartisan institutions with the moral, authoritative and legal mandate to adjudicate, render verdicts and make (un)popular decisions in both civil and criminal proceedings' (Boateng and Adjorlolo, 2019).

The 2012 coup d'état amplified the fragility of the national political and security edifice and the proliferation of crime prompted a crisis of the judicial system (Ba, 2018). A 2014 survey conducted by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung cited the judiciary as the most effected service by both bad governance (72%) and corruption (78%), followed by the police and schools. In 2018, the magistrates went on strike, demanding a greater investment in state justice in the form of salary raises, indemnities and a risk infrastructure to protect justice workers in difficult security contexts. The 10-month strike slowed prosecutions and extending the length of pretrial detentions (USDOS, 2018). Meanwhile, numerous cases of human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings, illegal detentions and disappearances of civilians by the Malian Army (FAMA), battalions of the G5 Sahel and the new-kid-on-the block, the Russian Wagner group, often are not prosecuted.

Challenges in the diffusion and institutionalization of national judicial reform initiatives pre-date conflict and are exacerbated by it (Cloward, 2015). The Malian state judicial system has undergone a series of reforms to improve the impartiality of the courts since the last cycle of conflict. The justices of the peace combining the functions of investigator, prosecutor and judge in one individual to serve rural regions are being phased out (since 1992) for courts with separate judge, examining magistrate and prosecutor, and the mid- level '*tribunaux de première instance*' will be replaced with panels of three judges rather than one. Higher courts include the courts of appeal in Bamako (south), Kayes (south) and Mopti (centre), and the highest courts, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court and High Court of Justice (Idris 2020). Despite these (still incomplete) reforms, the state judicial system remains plagued with both individual level corruption in the form

of bribes from litigants and systemic corruption in collusion among the justices and other governmental branches. A constitutional referendum was scheduled in Mali for 31 October, 2021 but postponed indefinitely after the 2021 coup. Additional programmes of interest include the Land Commissions (COFO), the 2013 creation of the Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation and the 2014 Commission for Justice and Reconciliation (CVJR), comprised of 11 commissariats with three-year mandates focusing on combatting impunity, as well as recent efforts to bridge the divide between state and customary jurisdictions. Yet qualitative case studies show these efforts have no impact on the most affected regions and most inhabitants have never heard of them (see forthcoming qualitative study).⁴ As national reforms aim to revitalize judicial infrastructure, 'new institutions may simply be unable to manage the multiplicity of demands upon them, as they are expected to address civil and criminal matters, potentially including a backlog of cases,' social power dynamics and tensions may be imported into institutions of law (Sririam et al. 2011), as the new political order experiences incentives to institutionalize these reforms in the periphery.

The flight of state authorities from insecure periphery regions chisels away at the fragile perceptions of their legitimacy among local populations, who turn to alternative structures for dispute resolution. Recognized by the UN as essential for conflict and post-conflict dispute resolution since 2004, customary authorities of village elders (notables), religious judges in the North (cadis), southern traditional communicators (griots) and local village authorities fill an important gap in state juridical service provision and are viewed as more efficient and accessible than the state judiciary for minor, civil cases (Sririam et al. 2011).⁵ A March 2017 law granted traditional authorities' roles in mediating land disputes, and in July 2021 customary authorities were formally added under the remit of the Ministry for Religious Affairs (Maliweb, 2021). Traditional justice systems tend to emphasize restoring community harmony, rather than enacting personal punishment, procedures are malleable with similar cases not always treated the same (*ipse sui generis*), and the process is voluntary with verdicts enforced only via social pressure (Skelton and Sekhonyane, 2007). The case studies found the conflict has galvanised traditional cadis to expand their dockets to include criminal matters, sometimes in collaboration with jihadist rebels who bring the arms to enforce decisions. Because traditional, elderly and male customary leaders reinforce a 'conservative social order often characterised by patriarchal hierarchy and social inequality' (Idriss, 2020), their judgements are unlikely to satiate all social cachets.

⁴ Because of space constraints, these case studies were not included in this main analysis in full, although their primary observations have been integrated into the discussion section. They will serve as the basis for a additional forthcoming article with Boubacar Ba and Assinamar Ag Rousmane.

⁵ Customary and civil law were codified and deployed by colonial states to differentiate a political or 'civilized' minority from an uncivilized majority of native subjects, with 'divide and rule' policies encouraging indirect rule of law that further demarcated distinctions among ethnic groups and atomized loci of governance at the micro level. This bifurcated state, divided between a central apparatus of power organized through civil law in the urban spaces and a 'plethora of local groups in rural areas ruled through chieftaincy' embodies a 'complex legacy of colonialism for post-colonial states' (Obarrio, 2011). The codification processes of colonial rule did not represent a true integration of traditional law into colonial legal institutions, but rather a saupoudrage serving colonial interests with colonial law as the ultimate norm. The perception of state justice as exogenous to socio-cultural and religious realities persists in the post-colonial era (Rodet, 2018).

In light of these observations, I put forth the following hypotheses:

H1: *Populations in contested territories where rebel groups have gained the upper hand will lose trust in the state judiciary.*

H2: *Turning away from the state, occupied communities will increase reliance on traditional and religious authorities for judicial service provision in cases outside of their usual remit, but satisfaction in these options will not increase.*

The hypotheses align with Huntington's (1968) claim that territorial contestation generates imbalance between stagnated institutional development and mobilised demands. Control of the de facto dispute resolution mechanisms is paramount in establishing rebel governance, but in communities where local leaders are strongly endorsed by the population, rebels may engage in bargaining and intimidation of local community authorities and develop hybrid systems (Arjona, 2009). As populations turn away from the state judiciary and towards these systems, areas with well-established customary systems will handle more complex and criminal cases outside of their historic remit — potentially leading to mixed levels of satisfaction with judicial outcomes. Furthermore, because of entrenched power hierarchies inherent in traditional authority dating from the colonial period, it is possible not all members of society (particularly women and locally minority ethnicities) will feel represented. Conflict affected areas accumulate both unresolved grievances and an aversion to reliance on state systems for their resolution, circumscribing subnational pockets of vulnerability and potential conflict resurgence.

I also proffer that efforts to improve the national judiciary through initiatives, platforms and laws will not trickle down to conflict-affected periphery regions in a way that meaningfully repairs their trust in state justice, which I test in the related qualitative research.

Alternative Hypothesis and Current Debates

Situating this study within recent literature, this analysis will contribute to discussions of the adverse and propitious ramifications of loss of state control on judicial expansion and institutionalization, while documenting potential scope conditions for other arguments in the field. The study builds on the pillars of SGD16 by exploring how issues of access to justice and accountable and inclusive institutions influence prospects for peace and vice-versa.

García-Ponce and Pasquale (2013)'s study of Afrobarometer survey data in 16 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2002 to 2009 provides insights into the immediate effects of political violence on institutional trust on the continent. Their study found individuals interviewed immediately following violent events were significantly more likely to report trust in the head of state, parliament, local government officials and police forces, with the relationship strongest the closer the violent event is to the interview date. Their justification for this positive relationship between violence and state trust stemmed from the desire of affected populations for the restoration of political order after a shock. However, this positive correlation appeared only salient within a narrow window of violent events near the interview dates. For example, the effect of

violence against civilians on trust for the president was strongest in the 7-10 day window but became insignificant after 15 days and insignificantly negative after 30. The study also does not consider effects of violent events on trust in the court system or the effects of prolonged, repeated violence or occupation by non-state groups. Rather, violence is considered as an isolated event without accounting for how well the state controlled the relevant territory at the time.

My analysis considers the significance of levels of state control, which shapes wartime political orders (Staniland, 2012), on institutional trust over the medium term, beyond the initial shock period analysed. I hypothesize that this level of control is significant and that, beyond an initial shock period, violence in contested and rebel-controlled territories has negative effects on judicial system trust over the medium term. This hypothesis is consistent with Lewis and Topal's (2021) finding that exposure to conflict in Africa lowers levels of generalized and out-group social trust, while increasing levels of in-group social trust because in periphery regions of low-capacity states, state judiciaries are often perceived as 'out-groups', while parallel informal, community structures constitute the 'in- group'. Studies outside of Africa such as Cassar et al.'s (2011) investigation of post-war Tajikistan associate conflict exposure with lower levels of trust and fairness, as well as entrenchment of within-group norms. As the quantitative analysis builds on this research by looking not only at the effects of conflict exposure, but degrees of rebel territorial control, the qualitative field component of the research design seeks to detail how conflict- affected communities perceive informal and state systems as in and out groups.

Blair (2021) posits that conflict can improve the rule of law by attracting UN peacekeeping missions and related UN activities focussed on state reform and creating liaisons between states, non-state authorities and citizens. His 2020 study finds a positive relationship between the number of deployed UN peacekeepers on improvements to the rule of law in the first two years following civil wars, although the effects diminish by the third year and were zero or negative during the conflict. According to Blair, UN missions lend legitimacy to the state by working with it to revise laws, rehabilitate state institutions, and train and redeploy state security and justice personnel, yet other research suggests third-party intervention may reduce loyalty to the state, increase dependence on the foreign power (Lake, 2010). Although my analysis takes place during the conflict, the causal processes documented in parallel case studies, along with a historical analysis of previous conflict episodes, showcase some of the longterm limitations of Blair's hypothesis and support for the Haggard and Tiede (2014) finding on rule of law reversion to the pre-conflict status quo.

Methodological Overview

The methodology emphasizes the link between territorial control, not just conflict exposure, on judicial trust and furthers a mixed methods design. Mapping control levels across the country and over time allows for comparison among areas experiencing rebel governance and areas with greater continuity of state judicial service provision. Scholarship on governance in civil conflicts indicates the degree of rebel control affects the treatment of civilians and can inspire localized perceptions of the conflict and the state (Akcinaroglu & Tokdemir, 2018; Arjona, 2009, 2016; Bouhlel & Guichaoua, 2021).

The literature on the interrelated effects of conflict and the evolution of the judiciary has focussed on case comparisons and country-level data analysis. However, sub-national studies minimize contextual differences and eliminate some sources of potential bias in causal inference, while calling attention to perceptions of the citizens the conflict affects the most (Blair, 2021). Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik (2016) posit the need to turn locally to understand what justice and peace really look like, while Lundy and McGovern (2008) suggest unofficial, 'bottom-up' truth telling processes are instrumental to how local communities view justice in several contexts. Mixed method designs detailing causal pathways between micro-level theories and their macro-level implications are instrumental in linking individual outcomes or group behaviour with conflict trajectory (Sambanis, 2004; Balcells and Justino, 2014).

This research explores whether periods of rebel occupation influence persisting perceptions of the state judiciary at the local level within the context of the current conflict in Mali using a mixed methods design. Focusing on Mali's judicial system during the 2012- 2019 conflict period provides a useful mechanism for reliably testing the effects of lapses in state service provision more generally because state judicial services are among the most likely to be disrupted during periods of rebel occupation. Other state institutions such as schools may have been allowed to continue in some localities; this heterogeneity would make determining differences in perceptions from periods of disruption more cumbersome. Judicial services remain essential for post-conflict reconstruction — the mechanism by which credible governmental institutions resolve disputes without violence. Christensen and Laegreid (2005) also find trust in visible public authority such as the courts may have a rippling effect on other state institutions.

The research methodology first maps levels of state and rebel control monthly in 25 km hexagonal grid cells across Mali's territory using a Hidden Markov Model with data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and Global Events Database (GED). The model pioneered by Anders (2020) draws on control typologies and probabilities from Kalyvas (2006), which exploits the principle rebel groups are more likely to use conventional attacks in areas over which they wield greater control. From there, it is possible to run a series of hierarchical models on geo-located Afrobarometer survey data from 2014 and 2017 to assess effects of rebel control periods on judicial confidence, the rule of law, judicial corruption and trust in traditional authorities. A robustness analysis includes evaluating reverse causality (judicial opinions generating conflict) at the conflict onset and noting regionally disaggregated trends in pre-conflict data.

Mapping Rebel Control

The first phase of the research established a map of levels of rebel vs. governmental control in Mali from 2011-2019. Control levels generated by location and month serve as a guide for measuring sub-national changes in judicial perceptions and service provision at various stages of local and national conflict.

Territorial control is an important indicator in conflict but can be challenging to measure. As Osaghae (1994) states, 'the minimum requirement for effective [conflict] management is the acknowledgement that conflicts and the differences which produce them are legitimate

because...the state must be regarded as a contested rather than settled terrain.’ Research has leveraged new spatial analytical techniques and machine learning algorithms to map control throughout different stages of intrastate conflicts based on the premise armed groups adapt tactics to their relative capacity to the state (Kalyvas, 2006; Fortna, 2015; Polo and Gleditsch, 2016). Kalyvas (2006) sets groundwork for understanding attack type as a critical indicator of levels of control through analysis of the 1946-1949 Greek civil wars. Kalyvas identifies five zones of control:

1. Full government control (permanent incumbent garrison)
2. Leaning government (sporadic/underground disputes)
3. Highly contested (active insurgency)
4. Leaning rebel (free operation of insurgents)
5. Full rebel control (permanent insurgency garrison with no incumbent activity)

I build on the model by Anders (2020), which calculates changes in control based on the use of conventional attacks (recorded in the GED) and terrorist attacks (recorded in the GTD) via a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Anders operationalizes Kalyvas (2006)’s finding that rebel groups are more likely to resort to terror attacks when their position is weaker vis-à-vis the government. While terrorist tactics are used by actors with low levels of territorial control, extremist violence can nevertheless play an important role in sabotaging peace agreements by persuading the establishment a more moderate opposition group will not stop the attacks and cannot be trusted to implement a peace deal (Kydd and Walter, 2002); the presence of terrorist attacks still features as contestation in the model, albeit at lower control levels.

The HMM relates each latent state (control) to the current observable expression (rebel action) and the previous state (former level of control). Territorial control is measured over a hexagonal grid units of 25km, with the probabilities for grid cells modified by spatial and temporal decay functions given the likelihood of rebel control in nearby territories at similar points in time. The model integrates the emission probabilities the rebels will attack in a predictable way given their level of control and the transition probabilities that control will shift from one state to another to calculate the most likely sequence of states.⁶

I adapted Anders’ model to the ongoing conflict in Mali for the 2011-2019 period in order to account for low-governance spaces. As rebels are more capable of dispersing across territories

⁶ Each HMM also has a stationary state, or the probabilistic state that would occur by playing infinitely many rounds, represented by the eigenvector p . The *stationary state* facilitates decoding sequences of states that would otherwise require lengthy, iterative applications of Bayes’ rule. The Viterbi algorithm calculates the most likely path by computing the next most probable states in sequence using the probability of the previous state, the transition probability to the next state, and the emission probability that the observed outcome at time t reflects this state (without normalization) (see Arora and Hazan, 2016).

where the state does not have strong control, I increased Anders' pre-selected spatial and temporal decay factors, drawing on Braithwaite (2010) and Koren and Sarbahi (2018).⁷ The northern-most desert hinterlands of northern Kidal and Taoudéni (northern Tombouctou) should be excluded from the analytical meaningful region because territorial control can easily permeate these regions in the absence of state authority (leading to over-estimates of government control). However, mapping of Afrobarometer interview locations for the relevant years showed no surveys were conducted in these areas, likely because of their remote, sparsely populated nature. The HMM is also only able to predict control levels for a single actor relative to another, yet Mali has experienced a proliferation of non-state armed and jihadist actors (as well as international peacekeeping forces)⁸, who regularly form and break alliances. The model therefore considers all rebel groups, excluding only military coups, as an aggregate rebel actor (and their attacks directed against the state rather than each other or international forces) to map the overall levels of government versus non-government control. This allows for a parsimonious and easily replicable mapping tool without requiring detailed micro-analysis of the conflict.

The following map depicts yearly averages for the HMM for Mali from 2011-2019 with the parameters described above with blue spaces government controlled and red rebel controlled.

⁷ The choice of spatial and temporal decay parameters in the original Anders model were unmotivated. However, the several replications of the model showed results are highly sensitive to these parameters, so further research might derive the best relationship between the parameters and the regions of study.

⁸ During the time period of study, Mali has played host to two French military operations, Serval and Barkhane, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with 61 troop contributing countries, various military training missions, specialized counterterrorism task forces and the regional G5 Sahel force. Only attacks against Malian forces (including the relevant G5 Sahel battalions) were considered in the model to isolate control effects of rebel versus state. (Barma, 2017; Piombo, Barma and Levy, 2017 and 2019)

Yearly averages of monthly estimates of territorial control




Figure 1: Map of territorial control levels in Mali from 2011-2019

The mapping shows a clear conflict trajectory from no conflict in 2011 to wavering state control in Kidal, Tombouctou and Gao from 2012 until the 2015 peace agreement (the central map), when a proliferation of armed actors in the central regions is mirrored with revitalized fighting in the north — the second conflict moment (Thurston, 2020). This moment further escalates until the state regains some control in 2019 with the deployment of the G5 Sahel and French counterterrorism forces targeting the Liptako. With the exception of the far northern hinterlands, and the initial, rapid capture of Gao in 2012 — for which limited fighting skews the model to overstated levels of government control — the map pairs with similar figures measuring conflict exposure based on ACLED data and with Lebovich’s 2019 analysis of the locations of armed groups⁹, although some differences are expected as the above map focuses not just on exposure, but control.¹⁰ A dataset of monthly control values scaled from 0 (fully rebel) to 1 (fully government) was generated from the model and used in subsequent sections of the analysis.

⁹ See Lebovich (2019) : https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping/.

¹⁰ Anders (2020) has already verified the model against ACLED data, so I will skip this robustness check. The GED and GTD databases provided the best differentiation among terrorist and non-terrorist attacks for the HMM.

Analysis of Judicial Perceptions

To test the developed hypotheses across Mali's territory at different levels of rebel control, geo-located Afrobarometer survey data on perceptions of the state judiciary, traditional authorities, corruption levels, fairness and the rule of law were analysed against the territorial control values calculated in the previous section. The results show a clear and robust correlation between higher levels of rebel control and lower reported trust in the state judiciary, and trust in traditional authorities is also decreased. Rebel occupation also appears to have a negative but more subdued effect on perceptions of the rule of law, judicial fairness and anti-corruption. Positive gains for the state in previously occupied territories do not correspond to improved judicial perceptions.

Methods

First, I tagged geo-located Afrobarometer data with the corresponding hexagonal grid cell and level of government control during the month of interview using a spatial join function.¹¹ I also computed the average control level for each interview location during the 23 months prior to the survey, which provides the maximum informative interval for the interim periods between surveys conducted during the conflict in December 2012, December 2014 and February 2017 while avoiding overlap. The `control_diff` variable computes the change in control levels during the month of interview compared with the 23 month previous average with negative signs denoting losses in government control. The analysis focuses on the December 2014 and February 2017 surveys, which provide the greatest variation in control levels across territories, with the conflict-onset 2012 data and four rounds of pre-conflict data referenced for comparison.

Analysis and Results

The bulk of the analysis focuses on cumulative linked mixed models (CLMM) and hierarchical linear models combining data from the 2014 and 2017 conflict periods. These models allow for clustering of hierarchical data using fixed and random effects from multiple time periods while retaining the individual level sample size (Gelman and Hill, 2006), and the CLMM is able to capture ordinal outcomes. Mixed effects models are able to eliminate time-invariant confounders, regardless of their measurability or source.

To test the impact of rebel territorial control on perceptions of the state judiciary, a cumulative Link Mixed Model was fitted with the Laplace approximation and a standard logistic regression to capture the ordinal dependent variable with mixed effects in Model 1. Model 1 showed a change from fully rebel to fully government control corresponds *ceteris paribus* to a more positive average judicial system of 1.50 points on a four-point scale (from 0, no trust to 3, complete trust) with a significance level within 0.01 p value. Changes in control values, the `control_diff` variable, when

¹¹ 270 observations had control levels of less than 1 (ranging from 0.25-1) during the month interviewed and 803 observations had experienced some level of rebel control during the 23 months preceding the interview date.

compared to the average control value from the 23 months preceding the survey had a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$), negative effect on trust in courts. This is a compelling result because it shows that while low levels of state control are correlated with decreased trust levels, improving state control does not correspond to repaired trust levels; in fact it appears to have the opposite effect. The statistical results in Model 1 strengthen confidence in H1 and its enduring effects by showing the negative impact of rebel occupation and territorial contestation on trust in the state judicial system. The models are based on the following equation with trust as the dependent variable, random intercepts by region, control values and differences as independent variables, fixed effects control variables, and individual level standard errors.

$$\text{Model 1: Trust in courts} = \alpha_{\text{region}} + \beta_1(\text{control_num}) + \beta_2(\text{control_diff}) + \beta_3(\text{year}) + \beta_4(\text{urbanrural}) + \beta_5(\text{gender}) + \beta_6(\text{education}) + \beta_7(\text{employment}) + e_i$$

Model 2 and 3 follow similar equations testing for trust in traditional authorities and trust in religious authorities respectively. Model 2 charts similar although dampened patterns for trust in traditional authorities who often remain active during periods of territorial contestation and rebel control. These results add explanatory power towards H2. As conflict-affect communities turn increasingly towards traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution, they become gradually dissatisfied with them (losing trust in traditional authorities about half as much as in the state). This reflects mixed perceptions of how traditional authorities have filled judicial vacuums from the qualitative findings. A loss in governmental control does not appear to have any statistically significant impact on perceptions of religious figures (Model 3).

Rural communities were moderately more trusting of the state (0.37 points) and traditional authorities (0.54). Significant trends for some facets of education and employment surfaced when both were included in the models, suggesting decreasing trust levels in traditional authorities with linearly increasing education level (-1.51) and slightly elevated perceptions in state judiciaries among the highly employed. Regional clusters had unique intercepts and significant differences, which supports the choice of random-intercept model clustered at the regional level.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
control_num	1.51** (0.51)	1.52** (0.56)	0.48 (0.58)
control_diff	-0.93* (0.43)	-0.86 (0.48)	-0.26 (0.49)
year	-0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
URBRURrural	0.36** (0.13)	0.55*** (0.14)	0.22 (0.14)
genderfemale	0.28*** (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	0.19* (0.09)
employment1	0.18 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.14)	0.17 (0.15)
employment2	0.12 (0.14)	-0.25 (0.15)	-0.23 (0.16)
employment3	0.35* (0.15)	-0.18 (0.16)	-0.29 (0.16)
edu.L	-0.74 (0.48)	-1.52** (0.50)	-1.45** (0.47)
edu.Q	0.06 (0.49)	-0.75 (0.51)	-0.36 (0.47)
edu.C	0.31 (0.44)	-0.17 (0.46)	-0.03 (0.43)
edu^4	0.20 (0.35)	0.06 (0.37)	-0.16 (0.35)
edu^5	0.06 (0.28)	0.36 (0.29)	0.29 (0.28)
edu^6	0.34 (0.24)	0.08 (0.24)	0.19 (0.24)
edu^7	0.33 (0.23)	0.08 (0.23)	0.32 (0.23)
edu^8	0.19 (0.22)	0.19 (0.23)	0.15 (0.23)
edu^9	0.06 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.21)	0.26 (0.21)
0 1	1.20* (0.55)	-0.71 (0.62)	-1.92** (0.63)
1 2	2.31*** (0.55)	0.67 (0.62)	-0.62 (0.62)
2 3	3.33*** (0.56)	1.70** (0.62)	0.35 (0.62)
3 9		10.05*** (1.18)	8.80*** (1.18)
Log Likelihood	-2984.22	-2247.50	-2192.65
AIC	6010.45	4539.00	4429.30
BIC	6130.28	4664.55	4554.84
Num. obs.	2223	2223	2223
Groups (region)	9	9	9
Variance: region: (Intercept)	0.16	0.26	0.15

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Statistical models

Figure 2: CLMMs of trust in state, traditional and religious judicial authorities

Perceptions of Judicial Fairness, Corruption and the Rule of Law

A number of scaled indicators were developed to test different angles of the hypotheses including assessments of the rule of law, judicial fairness and equity and judicial corruption. Each indicator combines relevant questions of the Afrobarometer surveys and scales response from 1 (most negative) to 4 (most positive). These indicators contribute to understanding of perceptions of judicial process. In addition to allowing for data clustering and random effects at the regional level, I also introduced a fixed effects control variable 'peri' which assigned periphery regions higher numbers of an ordered factor with Bamako assigned the minimum value of zero.

The level of state control over the territory was significant across all three models. Higher levels of state control corresponded with moderately higher views of judicial fairness and equity (0.58) and the application of the rule of law (0.56), as well as more favourable views on judicial corruption (0.68). Change in conflict had statistically significant and negative values for rule of law and corruption, which might seem surprising at first, as increases in state control should correspond to better perceptions of the rule of law. However, changes in state control levels, even if positive, could be seen as counter-productive to establishing the rule of law; large values of the control_diff variable imply greater control variation and therefore poor levels over the past 23 months, which translated to lower judicial perceptions. The fairness indicator also showed a slight national level decline over time (- 0.06 points per year), and men (and to a lesser extent the more educated) seemed more prone to view judges as corrupt. The fixed effect peri variable did not yield any significant effect, which is expected because these effects are accounted for in the random intercepts by region.

	Rule of Law	Fairness	Corruption
(Intercept)	2.70 ^{***} (0.24)	2.54 ^{***} (0.24)	1.69 ^{***} (0.33)
control_num	0.56 ^{**} (0.18)	0.58 ^{**} (0.20)	0.68 [*] (0.27)
control_diff	-0.83 ^{***} (0.15)	-0.19 (0.17)	-0.63 ^{**} (0.22)
URBRURurban	-0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.07)
year	0.00 (0.01)	-0.06 ^{***} (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
peri	0.02 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.07)
gendermale	0.06 [*] (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.14 ^{***} (0.04)
edu	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 [*] (0.01)
employment	-0.03 [*] (0.01)	0.04 [*] (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
AIC	3749.26	4543.93	5815.29
BIC	3810.90	4606.17	5877.52
Log Likelihood	-1863.63	-2260.97	-2896.64
Num. obs.	2005	2117	2117
Num. groups: region	7	7	7
Var: region (Intercept)	0.05	0.02	0.04
Var: Residual	0.36	0.48	0.88

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Statistical models

Figure 3: HLMs of rule of law, fairness and (anti-)corruption perceptions

Robustness Checks and National Trends


To check robustness of the findings and examine directional trends, I conducted additional ordinal logit models without random effects. A significant correlation between territorial control and perceptions of state and traditional judicial authorities, as well as perceptions of judicial fairness, the rule of law and corruption held across all models, including when clustering standard errors by region. The result was robust across models with different combinations of control variables, as well as among an ordinal logit model without random effects, an OLS model with the dependent variable as a numeric score and a hierarchical linear model with clusters for year and region.


Finally, a series of ordinal logit and OLS models were run to test overall national effects of time on the outcomes of interest irrespective of levels of control. Perceptions of the national courts do not appear to have improved following the 2015 Algiers Accords and subsequent initiatives even

in zones not acutely impacted by the conflict, a finding complimented by waning impressions of rule of law, particularly in rural communities, as well as of fairness and judicial corruption. Interaction terms for year and most regions were significant in models not including control levels — reinforcing justification for clustering at the region in testing control levels, as the interaction term implicitly captures regional shifts in control. The interactive effect on trust in courts was strongest in Mopti, which experienced the most dramatic shift in conflict from 2014 to 2017.

Pre-Conflict Trend Analysis

Trust in courts increased from 2001 to 2002 but decreased again in 2005 and began to stabilise in 2008, although these trends varied by region. The global mean for trust in courts was 2.79/3 in 2005 and 2.59/3 in 2008. Fig. 4 shows populated data points for trust in courts across different years colour coded by region, as well as average values by region and by broader zone. While judicial trust decreased in Gao from 2002-2008, it increased in other conflict regions, Tomboutou and Kidal, from 2005-2008. In Mopti, trust peaked in 2005 but returned to levels close to 2002 in 2008.





Figures 4-6: Pre-Conflict trends in court trust by year, region and zone

Broad confidence intervals make it difficult to articulate trends, and data for the northern regions is not available in the conflict-onset dataset in 2012, but there does not appear a time-dependent trend particular to the regions of conflict of the magnitude of our results from Model 1. The regional perceptions of the judiciary leading up to the conflict do not correlate with indicators of state capacity based on travel time to Bamako mapped in Müller-Crepon (2021). This adds credence to H1 that deteriorating perceptions of the state judiciary result from losses of state control related to the conflict rather than pre-existing access issues.

Perceptions of the state judiciary were decreasing to the greatest degree in the south leading up to the conflict, which might indicate perceptions of judicial systems are not good predictors for

conflict. This also strengthens the results of Model 1 because it implies correlations are unlikely to arise from reverse causality – lower perceptions of state judiciary do not generate more conflict. To formalize this and test reverse causality, I regressed trust in courts in 2008 (the latest year before the conflict with available data in the north) with control values at the conflict onset.

	Conflict Onset
(Intercept)	0.99*** (0.00)
trustcourts.L	-0.00 (0.00)
trustcourts.Q	-0.00 (0.00)
trustcourts.C	0.00 (0.00)
trustcourts^4	-0.00 (0.00)
regionKoulikoro	-0.00 (0.00)
regionSikasso	0.00 (0.00)
regionSegou	-0.01*** (0.00)
regionMopti	-0.06*** (0.00)
regionTombouctou	-0.10*** (0.01)
regionGao	-0.12*** (0.01)
regionKidal	-0.16*** (0.01)
regionBamako	0.01 (0.00)
URBRURrural	0.01*** (0.00)
AIC	-4763.96
BIC	-4687.29
Log Likelihood	2396.98
Deviance	1.44
Num. obs.	1226

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
Statistical models

Figure 7: Reverse-causality check for conflict onset data

Pre-conflict levels of trust in courts had no significant effect on conflict onset, indicating pre-existing judicial perceptions do not incite conflict yet judicial trust varies with levels of rebel control once the conflict has begun. While socio-tropic levels of trust in the state judicial systems in specific locations do not appear an indicator for conflict onset, alternative studies show evidence that deteriorating trust as a result of insecurity may fuel violence at the individual level.

Grievances against state institutions and inter-ethnic cleavages represented the most recurrent factor leading to engagement in violence among interviewed inmates at Bamako Central Prison by the United Nations Inter-Regional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism between 2016 and 2019 (Vermeesch and Dal Santo, 2020).

Interviewees cited frustrations and neglect from state authorities and institutions and lack of access to justice as motivations to join armed groups. Seventy-one percent of respondents in a 2017 UNDP survey studying violent extremism in Africa pointed to ‘government action’ including the killing or arrest of a relative or friend as the incident that prompted them to join an extremist group (UNDP, 2017). Although regression studies cannot control for all temporally linked confounders, the quantitative data and field research support the causal direction outlined in my framework. Socio-tropic trust levels do not appear to predict conflict, but individual experiences of injustice may prompt engagement in violence within established rebel groups in the area. In this way, evidence from the Bamako prison does not undermine these results, but rather bolsters the salience of H1 and suggests potential a feedback mechanism for conflict recidivism.

Synthesis and Discussion

The above analysis provides strong support the hypotheses of decreased trust in state judicial authorities in areas that have experienced losses in state control, as well as a lack of balancing increase in trust in traditional authorities. Qualitative evidence from a parallel set of case studies suggests these processes may become entrenched in communities and difficult to reverse, despite reform programmes. This elucidates some of the complications associated with programmes aimed at improving SGD 16 in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Case studies carried out in Ansongo, Gao and Konna, Mopti documented how insecurity has led to a sense of abandonment from state judicial structures to regulate resource conflicts and prosecute crimes among diverse populations. While geographically, ethnically and politically distinct, populations in both areas shared experiences of the absence of the state judicial structures, a turn towards customary and religious mechanisms and the lack of diffusion of national reform programmes. Interviews also pointed to the transformation of social and political order under jihadist occupation which intermixes with traditional custom (see also Arjona, 2016; Rupesinghe, Naghizadeh and Connen, 2021). By invoking traditional justice as the first jurisprudential reference, followed by Islamic law, jihadist actors occupying Konna have entrenched themselves within communities in ways state authorities never managed to. Traditional and jihadist judicial authorities gave swift and useful outcomes when regulating natural resource conflicts but were not always inclusive of women and other minority groups for criminal cases. Customary and religious avenues for justice do not always provide satisfactory judicial solutions consistent with the inclusivity goals of SGDs 5 and 10 (on achieving gender quality and empowerment and reducing societal inequality) and their influence may exacerbate gender divisions in the post-conflict setting (Cooper, 2018).

The quantitative analysis in this paper implies the 2015 peace accords and programmes emerging from them did not have an overall positive impact on judicial perceptions. Participants in the case studies did not claim programmes such as the CVJR helpful to them (if they had heard of these). In fact, some NGO initiatives turned community members further towards customary authorities in the absence of the state. In this way, efforts to foster collaboration among state and traditional judicial structures increased legitimacy for alternative structures in their ability to bypass the state — emphasizing the difficulties of harmonizing traditional systems with the legal frameworks of the

reigning political authority (see Scharf and Nina, 2001; Englebert and Tull, 2008). Limited legal literacy and social stigma further impeded meaningful engagement with state judicial programmes, and opinions of United Nations initiatives were mixed at best.

A major drawback of topical research is its inability to capture longer temporal trends in relation to conflict recidivism. By focusing on a current conflict, my analysis is unable to fully test the effects of subnational rebel control on longer term perceptions of the state judiciary, in particular the hypotheses of Blair (2021) with regard to UN peacekeeping impacts on the rule of law. Still, the analysis suggests potential limitations or scope conditions on the findings of García-Ponce and Pasquale (2013) and Blair (2021). The violent events identified by García-Ponce and Pasquale may have short-lived effects on augmenting state trust, do not appear to apply to the judicial system and are moot when populations turn instead to rebel governance structures for support. The positive impact UN activities on the rule of law documented by Blair (2021) do not take effect until the state regains control and may have difficulty embedding themselves within localized structures strengthened during occupation periods — therefore the longevity of these programmes remains questionable. The historical analysis of past rebellions in Mali described in the background section, as well as findings from the qualitative studies, bolster this claim.

The results highlight that literature pointing to improvements in social engagement and the robustness of state institutions (Migdal, 2004; Spruyt, 2017) do not account for micro-level processes of disillusionment and emergence of parallel judicial structures in occupied zones, which in turn reshape the social order. 'State-building theories which assume that empirical statehood is more fundamental than juridical statehood, and that the internal is prior to the international in state formation and survival, are at odds with contemporary African experience' (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). Rather, hierarchical social strata, complex governance structures, historical legacies and intricate dynamics among local and national elites complicate questions of legitimacy (Herbst, 2000). This environment facilitates micro-level, zero-sum political squabbles in which one groups' legitimacy gains detracts from another's situated differently within an ethnic hierarchy or across ethnic groups.

The outcomes identified in this study place significant strain on this system and its legitimacy, while international programmes do little to counteract this trend. For Osaghae (1994), citizen-based legitimacy underscores the most essential requirement of state-building in societies with a widening gulf between citizens and the state. Legal institutions remain crucial for ensuring horizontal accountability among branches of government and propagating a sense of legitimacy to populations from the centre (O'Donnell, 1996). Political transitions that pave the way for the entry of new groups and the displacement of others generate new expectations to which the emerging state must quickly respond – conflict can render the rebounding of state institutions and services challenging (Sahlin, 1977). As Lipset (1983) observes, 'after a new social structure is established, if the new system is unable to sustain the expectations of major groups (on the grounds of 'effectiveness') for a long enough period to develop legitimacy upon the new basis, a new crisis may develop.'

It is therefore vital to acknowledge power structures and locally-entrenched norms when designing programming aimed to strengthen SGD 16 with regard to access to justice, the rule of law and peacekeeping. Furthermore, approaches targeted primarily at cities do not appear to reach rural communities most affected by rebel group occupation.

Conclusion

This research provides evidence that losses in state territorial control lead to decreased trust in and reliance on the state judiciary, as well as indications that this trend continues even after state authority is restored and judicial reform programmes instituted. The study of Mali emphasizes the need for subnational analysis of rebel control and community perceptions in intrastate conflicts to understand relationships implicit in SGD16. 'The transformation of African democracies requires good governance that builds the rule of law, not the rule of force or the rule of one man,' writes the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2012). This analysis has demonstrated some of the ways in which territorial contestation (the rule of force) in conflict complicates the process of building legitimate and inclusive conceptions of the rule of law. Subnational realities of intertwined judicial and security initiatives remain critical to understanding and predicting conflict recidivism, judicial institutionalization and legitimacy in post-colonial democracies.

Acknowledgements

I thank my department and college for generous funding support for the fieldwork associated with this project. I would like to acknowledge the advice of my supervisor Stathis Kalyvas in guiding the research and excellent work of my Malian colleagues Boubacar Ba (Mopti study, assisted by Hamidou Niapogou and Oumar Senou) and Assinamar Ag Rousmane (Gao study) on related qualitative research in the field. Also thanks to Marta Quemada Lopez, Jessie Jiang, Oscar Torres-Reyna, Jacob Lewis, Anna Chirniciuc and Jesse Murray for advice on data preparation and coding in Python and R and to Spyros Kosmidis, Jody La Porte North, Aaron James Miller, Michael Cerny, Jacob Shapiro and Jennifer Widner for additional feedback.

References

- Akcinaroglu, Seden, and Efe Tokdemir. 2018. 'To Instill Fear or Love: Terrorist Groups and the Strategy of Building Reputation'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35(4): 355–77.
- Anders, Therese. 2020a. 'Territorial Control in Civil Wars: Theory and Measurement Using Machine Learning'. *Journal of Peace Research* 57(6): 701–14.
- Anders, Therese. 2020b. 'Online Appendix: Territorial Control in Civil Wars: Theory and Measurement Using Machine Learning'.
http://therese.rbind.io/publication/anders2019_jpr/territorialcontrol_jpr_appendix_200608.pdf.

- Annan, Kofi. 2012. *Interventions: A Life in War and Peace*. London: Penguin Books.
- Arjona, Ana. 2009. 'One National War, Multiple Local Orders: An Inquiry into the Unit of Analysis of War and Post-War Interventions.' In *M. Bergsmo and P. Kalmanovitz (Eds), Law in Peace Negotiations*, Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic Publisher.
- Arjona, Ana. 2016. *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rebelocracy/67B0396DABAA4AE1C988A2DA3FBAC425> (November 19, 2021).
- Arora, Sanjeev, and Elad Hazan. 2016. 'Lecture 4: Optimization and Convexity'. Presented at the Princeton University.
<https://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/fall16/cos402/lectures/402-lec5.pdf>.
- Autesserre, Séverine. 2014. 'Going Micro: Emerging and Future Peacekeeping Research'. *International Peacekeeping* 21(4): 492–500.
- Ba, Boubacar. 2018. *Crises de gouvernance : justice transitionnelle et paix durable au Mali*.
- Baah-Boateng, William. 2016. 'The Youth Unemployment Challenge in Africa: What Are the Drivers?' *The Economic and Labour Relations Review* 27(4): 413–31.
- Baker, Catherine, and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik. 2016. 'Mapping the Nexus of Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding'. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 10(3): 281–301.
- Balcells, Laia, and Patricia Justino. 2014. 'Bridging Micro and Macro Approaches on Civil Wars and Political Violence: Issues, Challenges, and the Way Forward'. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(8): 1343–59.
- Barendrecht, Maurits, Martin Gramatikov, Roger El Khoury, et al. 2014. *Justice Needs in Mali: From Data to Action*. <https://www.hiil.org/projects/justice-needs-in-mali-from-data-to-action/> (November 19, 2021).
- Barma, Naazneen H. 2016. *The Peacebuilding Puzzle: Political Order in Post-Conflict States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/peacebuilding-puzzle/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6> (November 19, 2021).
- Barma, Naazneen H., Naomi Levy, and Jessica Piombo. 2017. 'Disentangling Aid Dynamics in Statebuilding and Peacebuilding: A Causal Framework'. *International Peacekeeping* 24(2): 187–211.

- Bellows, John, and Edward Miguel. 2009. 'War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone – Edward Miguel'. <http://emiguel.econ.berkeley.edu/research/war-and-local-collective-action-in-sierra-leone/> (November 19, 2021).
- Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. 'On Democratic Backsliding'. *Journal of Democracy*. <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/on-democratic-backsliding/> (November 19, 2021).
- Blair, Robert A. 2020. *Peacekeeping, Policing, and the Rule of Law after Civil War*. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Blair, Robert A. 2021. 'UN Peacekeeping and the Rule of Law'. *American Political Science Review* 115(1): 51–68.
- Boateng, Francis D., and Samuel Adjorlolo. 2019. 'Judicial Trustworthiness in Africa: Do Macro-Level Conditions Matter?' *Crime & Delinquency* 65(12): 1689–1710.
- Bonacker, Thorsten. 2018. 'Security Practices and the Production of Center–Periphery Figurations in Statebuilding'. *Alternatives* 43(4): 190–206.
- Bouhrel, Ferdaous, and Yvan Guichaoua. 2021. 'Norms, Non-Combatants' Agency and Restraint in Jihadi Violence in Northern Mali'. *International Interactions* 47(5): 855–72.
- Braithwaite, Alex. 2010. 'Resisting Infection: How State Capacity Conditions Conflict Contagion'. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(3): 311–19.
- Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas Van de Walle. 1994. 'Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa'. *World Politics* 46(4): 453–89.
- Charbonneau, Bruno. 2017. 'Intervention in Mali: Building Peace between Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35(4): 415–31.
- Chauzal, Grégory, and Thibaut Van Damme. 2015. 'The Roots of Mali's Conflict'. https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/the_roots_of_malis_conflict/ (November 15, 2021).
- Christensen, Tom, and Per LÆgreid. 2005. 'Trust in Government: The Relative Importance of Service Satisfaction, Political Factors, and Demography'. *Public Performance & Management Review* 28(4): 487–511.
- Clingendael. 2015. *Judicial Performance: State and Customary | Beyond Dichotomy*. https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/beyond_dichotomy/3_examining_operations_performance_and_change_in_malis_justice_systems/ (November 15, 2021).

- 'Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa'. 2009. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health* 33(4): 397–98.
- Derouen, Karl, Jenna Lea, and Peter Wallensteen. 2009. 'The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements*'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(4): 367–87.
- Desgrais, Nicolas, Yvan Guichaoua, and Andrew Lebovich. 2018. 'Unity Is the Exception. Alliance Formation and de-Formation among Armed Actors in Northern Mali'. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2018.1488403> (November 15, 2021).
- Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino. 2021. 'The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters | Journal of Democracy'. <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-quality-of-democracy-why-the-rule-of-law-matters/> (November 15, 2021).
- Druckman, Daniel, and Lynn Wagner. 2019. 'Justice Matters: Peace Negotiations, Stable Agreements, and Durable Peace'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(2): 287–316.
- Englebort, Pierre, and Denis M. Tull. 2008. 'Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States'. *International Security* 32(4): 106–39.
- Epperly, Brad, and Jacqueline Seivert. 2019. 'Conflict and Courts: Civil War and Judicial Independence across Democracies'. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1065912918803200> (November 15, 2021).
- Fearon, James D. 1995. 'Rationalist Explanations for War'. *International Organization* 49(3): 379–414.
- Fearon, James D. 'Civil War and the Current International System'. : 22.
- Finkel, Evgeny, and Scott Gehlbach. 2020. 'Reform and Rebellion in Weak States | Political Economy'. *Cambridge University Press*. <https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/political-economy/reform-and-rebellion-weak-states>, <https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/political-economy> (November 15, 2021).
- Fombad, Charles Manga. 2013. 'Some Perspectives on Durability and Change under Modern African Constitutions†'. *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 11(2): 382–413.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2015. 'Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes'. *International Organization* 69(3): 519–56.

- García-Villegas, Mauricio, and Jose Rafael Espinosa. 2015. 'The Geography of Justice: Assessing Local Justice in Colombia's Post-Conflict Phase'. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 4(1): Art. 41.
- García-Ponce, Omar, and Benjamin Pasquale. 'How Political Violence Shapes Trust in the State'. Berkeley Working Paper.
- Gellman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 'Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models'. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/data-analysis-using-regression-and-multilevelhierarchical-models/32A29531C7FD730C3A68951A17C9D983> (November 19, 2021).
- Goff, D, M Diallo, and AE Ursu. 2017. 'Under the Microscope: Customary Justice Systems in Northern Mali'. https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=irtMC8EAAAAJ&citation_for_view=irtMC8EAAAAJ:d1gkVwhDpl0C (November 15, 2021).
- Gorman, Zoë. 2021. 'Pursuing Elusive Stability in the Sahel | SIPRI'. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/pursuing-elusive-stability-sahel> (November 15, 2021).
- Gorman, Zoë, and Grégory Chauzal. 2018. 'Establishing a Regional Security Architecture in the Sahel | SIPRI'. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2018/establishing-regional-security-architecture-sahel> (November 15, 2021).
- Gorman, Zoë, and Grégory Chauzal. '*Hand in Hand: A Study of Insecurity and Gender in Mali*'. SIPRI. <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/hand-hand-study-insecurity-and-gender-mali> (November 15, 2021).
- Green, Donald, Soo Yeon Kim, and David Yoon. 2001. 'Dirty Pool'. *International Organization* 55 (2): 441 – 468.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Lydia Tiede. 2014a. 'Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings: The Empirical Record'. <https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/58/2/405/1792638?login=true> (November 15, 2021).
- Hazelton, Jacqueline. 2021. *Bullets not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Herbst, Jeffery. 2000. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hiil. 2019. *Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Mali - Second Wave*. <https://www.hiil.org/projects/second-justice-needs-and-satisfaction-in-mali/> (November 15, 2021).

- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. renewed. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
- Ibhawoh, Bonny. 2004. 'Restraining Universalism: Africanist Perspectives on Cultural Relativism in the Human Rights Discourse from Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Development in Africa on JSTOR'. In *Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Development in Africa*, University of Pennsylvania Press.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhjj0.4?refreqid=excelsior%3A9cbff424d6ded5f4000afd7c%3A9a8f77&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents (November 15, 2021).
- Idris, Iffat. 2020. 'Justice Systems in the Sahel'. UK Government Report.
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/15247/765_Justice_Systems_in_the_Sahel.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982. 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood'. *World Politics* 35(1): 1–24.
- Jufarsky, Daniel, and James Martin. 2021. 'Hidden Markov Models'. In *Speech and Language Processing*, Stanford University. <https://web.stanford.edu/~jufarsky/slp3/A.pdf>.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/logic-of-violence-in-civil-war/3DFE74EA492295FC6940D58CA8EF4D5C> (November 15, 2021).
- Kohli, Atul, ed. 2014. *The State and Development in the Third World: A World Politics Reader*. Princeton University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt7zv88r> (November 15, 2021).
- Koren, Ore, and Anoop K Sarbahi. 2018. 'State Capacity, Insurgency, and Civil War: A Disaggregated Analysis'. *International Studies Quarterly* 62(2): 274–88.
- Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara Walter. 2002. 'Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence | International Organization | Cambridge Core'.
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/sabotaging-the-peace-the-politics-of-extremist-violence/666AF3ED0F89A36B21DBBF61A54C862F> (November 15, 2021).
- Lake, David A. 2010. 'Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War'. *International Security* 35(3): 7–52.
- Lewis, Jacob, and Sedef Topal. 2021. 'How Does Exposure to Conflict Events Shape Social Trust? A Spatiotemporal Approach'. *Afrobarometer Working Paper Series* WP189.
<https://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp189-how-does-exposure-conflict-events-shape-social-trust-spatiotemporal-approach> (November 15, 2021).

- Linzer, Drew A., and Jeffrey K. Staton. 2015. 'A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1948– 2012'. *Journal of Law and Courts* 3(2): 223–56.
- Lorentzen, Jenny. 2021. *Women as 'New Security Actors' in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Mali*. Peace Research Institute Oslo. <https://www.prio.org/publications/12713> (November 19, 2021).
- Lundy, Patricia, and Mark McGovern. 2008. 'Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up'. *Journal of Law and Society* 35(2): 265–92.
- Maliweb. 2021. 'maliweb.net - Cité ministérielle à Bamako : Les chefs coutumiers et traditionnels à l'honneur'. *maliweb.net*. <https://www.maliweb.net/societe/cite-ministerielle-a-bamako-les-chefs-coutumiers-et-traditionnels-a-lhonneur-2935171.html> (November 19, 2021).
- Migdal, Joel S. 2001. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/state-in-society/EE7F2D0E3C5EFCA1F1210C120FC1B7B8> (November 19, 2021).
- Migdal, Joel S., and Klaus Schlichte. 2005. 'Rethinking the State'. In *The Dynamics of States*, Routledge.
- MSF. 'Mali: "The Worst Thing Would Be to Get to Konna Too Late" | MSF'. *Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International*. <https://www.msf.org/mali-worst-thing-would-be-get-konna-too-late> (November 19, 2021).
- Müller-Crepon, Carl. 2021. 'State Reach and Development in Africa since the 1960s: New Data and Analysis'. *Carl Müller-Crepon*. http://www.carlmueller-crepon.org/publication/state_reach_development/ (November 19, 2021).
- Noyes, Alexander, and Janette Yarwood. 2013. 'The AU Continental Early Warning System: From Conceptual to Operational?' *International Peacekeeping* 20(3): 249–62.
- Obarrio, Juan. 2011. 'Traditional Justice as Rule of Law in Africa'. *Sriram, Martin-Ortega and Herman (eds), Peacebuilding and Rule of Law*: 23–43.
- Okoye, Ada O. 2004. 'The Rule of Law and Sociopolitical Dynamics in Africa'. In *Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Development in Africa*, eds. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza and Philip J. McConnaughay. University of Pennsylvania Press, 71–80. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhjj0.7> (November 19, 2021).
- Osaghae, E. 1994. *Ethnicity and Its Management in Africa: The Democratization Link*. Lagos: Malt House Press Ltd.

- Piombo, Jessica, Naazneen H. Barma, and Naomi Levy. 'The Puzzle of International Intervention in Conflict-Affected States'. *Minerva Research Initiative*. https://minerva.defense.gov/Owl-In-the-Olive-Tree/Owl_View/Article/2041841/the-puzzle-of-international-intervention-in-conflict-affected-states/ (November 19, 2021).
- Polo, Sara, and Kristian Gleditsch. 2016. 'Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War'. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343316667999> (November 16, 2021).
- Rodet, Marie. 2018. 'Rapprochement Entre Justice Traditionelle et Justice Etatique Au Mali: Pourquoi Une Perspective de Genre Est Essentielle'. *School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*.
- Rose, Richard, and Doh Chull Shin. 2001. 'Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies'. *British Journal of Political Science* 31(2): 331–54.
- Rothchild, Donald, and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds. 2019. *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*. New York: Routledge.
- Rupesinghe, Natasja, Mikael Naghizadeh, and Corentin Connen. 2021. *Reviewing Jihadist Governance in the Sahel*. <https://www.nupi.no/en/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Reviewing-Jihadist-Governance-in-the-Sahel> (November 15, 2021).
- Sahlin, Michael. 1977. *Neo-Authoritarianism and the Problem of Legitimacy: A General Study and a Nigerian Example*. Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren (distr.).
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. 'What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition'. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 814–58.
- Scharf, Wilfried, and Daniel Nina. 2001. *The Other Law: Non-State Ordering in South Africa*. Cape Town, South Africa: Juta.
- Scott, Alan, and Anna Marie Smith. 2009. 'Guillermo O'Donnell (1996), "Illusions about Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, 7, Pp. 34-51.' In *New Critical Writings in Political Sociology*, Routledge.
- Skelton, A., and M. Sekhonyane. 2007. 'Human Rights and Restorative Justice'. In *Handbook of Restorative Justice*, eds. Gerry Johnstone and Daniel W. van Ness., 580–97.
- Spruyt, Hendrik. 2017. 'War and State Formation: Amending the Bellicist Theory of State Making'. In *Does War Make States?*, Cambridge University Press, 73–97. <http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85045256752&partnerID=8YFLogxK> (November 19, 2021).

- Sriram, Chandra Lekha, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman. 2010. *Peacebuilding and Rule of Law in Africa: Just Peace?* London, UNITED KINGDOM: Taylor & Francis Group. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/princeton/detail.action?docID=592914> (November 15, 2021).
- Staniland, Paul. 2012. 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders'. *Perspectives on Politics* 10(2): 243–64.
- Straus, Scott. 2015. *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership and Genocide in Modern Africa*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Thies, Cameron G. 2005. 'War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America'. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 451–65.
- Thurston, Alexander. 2020. *Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel : Local Politics and Rebel Groups*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108771160>
- Thurston, Alexander, and Andrew Lebovich. 2013. *A Handbook on Mali's 2012-13 Crisis*. Northwestern University Institutional Repository.
https://arch.library.northwestern.edu/concern/generic_works/6108vb43j?locale=en (November 15, 2021).
- Tobie, Aurélien, and Grégory Chauzal. 2018. *State Services in an Insecure Environment: Perceptions among Civil Society in Mali*. SIPRI.
<https://www.sipri.org/publications/2018/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/state-services-insecure-environment-perceptions-among-civil-society-mali> (November 15, 2021).
- Tobie, Aurélien, and Boukary Sangare. 2019. *The Impact of Armed Groups on the Populations of Central and Northern Mali*. SIPRI. <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/other-publications/impact-armed-groups-populations-central-and-northern-mali> (November 19, 2021).
- Tripp, Aili Mari. 2015. 'Women and Power in Postconflict Africa'. *Cambridge Core*.
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/women-and-power-in-postconflict-africa/E27094811790564894080B202C0C254F> (November 15, 2021).
- United Nations Development Programme. 2017. *Journey To Extremism In Africa – Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment*. Regional Bureau for Africa.
<http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/> (November 19, 2021).
- Ursu, AE. 2018a. 'Between Ideals and Needs: Is Malian Customary Justice Incompatible with International Human Rights Standards?'

- Ursu, AE. 2018b. 'Finding Justice amidst Insecurity: Policy Initiatives to Strengthen Customary Justice Systems and Mitigate Conflicts in Central Mali'.
https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=irtMC8EAAAAJ&citation_for_view=irtMC8EAAAAJ:YsMSGlbcyi4C (November 15, 2021).
- US Department of State. '2018 - MALI 2018 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.Pdf'.
<https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Mali-2018.pdf> (November 19, 2021).
- Vermeersch, Elise, and Elena Dal Santo. 2020. *UNICRI :: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute*. <http://unicri.it/news/violent-extremist-offenders-article> (November 19, 2021).
- Wing, Susanna. 2021. 'How Mali's Fifth Coup since Independence Differs from Previous Coups'. *The Washington Post*.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/28/another-coup- mali-heres-what-you-need-know/> (November 15, 2021).
- Zezeza, Paul, and Philip McConnaughay, eds. 2004. 'The Rule of Law and Sociopolitical Dynamics in Africa from Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Development in Africa'.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhjj0.7?refreqid=excelsior%3A9cbff424d6ded5f4000afad7c c9a8f77&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents (November 15, 2021).