

CRESCAT SCIENTIA


JOURNAL OF HISTORY



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CRESCAT SCIENTIA

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Mailed manuscripts should be sent to: Crescat Scientia c/o Dr. Keith Snedegar, Utah Valley State College, Department of History and Political Science, 800 West University Parkway, MS 185, Orem, Utah 84057 Phone: (801) 863-8487 Fax: (801) 863-7013.

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CRESCAT SCIENTIA

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Dear Reader,


I invite you to explore the contents of the UVSC Journal of History. Students in the first class of graduating history majors at the College established this journal as a venue for their historical thought and writing. In its fifth year, the Journal remains an enterprise sustained entirely by student work.

Chris Davey has taken on the responsibilities of editor-in-chief for 2007. After reading through the journal, you're bound to agree that he has done an admirable job of selecting papers that represent the expansive range of student historical scholarship here. To be sure, department faculty and staff have done their part to encourage these efforts, but any reckoning of value must credit the students themselves for the genuine quality of their achievement. I think it is substantial.

Join me in congratulating Chris, his editorial staff, and especially the contributing authors, on the publication of *Crescat Scientia*, Volume V.

May knowledge grow!

Keith Snedegar




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Ultimately responsible for the success of this journal are the hard working and accomplished students of UVSC who submitted papers for publishing. Partly for their ability and skill in retelling the stories and lives of our human family's past, and also for their courage in putting their works out to be read as part of an on-going community of discussion about History. Gratitude is especially extended to Marisa Dore and Andrew Israelsen who have not only worked with the editorial staff but also found time to submit to the journal.

Further contributing to the function of this publication are the many faculty members who have aided in the publicizing of the journal and petitioning for submissions. Particularly valiant in assisting this year's edition were Dr. Alex Stecker, Dr. Kathren Brown, and Dr. Janae Haas. Special thanks go to Dr. Keith Snedegar, our faculty advisor, for his consistent willingness to help and support.

Thank you.




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History is knowledge of the past that wields the power to define our lives. Control of that knowledge is given to all who take the time to understand the events, movements, and actors performing on the stage of history. As part of this great retelling of the past historians bear the responsibility to accurately and fairly articulate the evidence before them. How we presently define our past, will be essential in the future's reflection of today.

Crescat Scientia's fifth edition is a bearer of this great task of casting the mold of history. This publication has enabled students of UVSC to contribute greatly to a world of understanding. The 2007 edition hopes to do the same, and more. The important issues of the past addressed herein allows one to further establish our picture of the past, trying to capture that ever illusive perfect picture of what has gone before. May this year's edition add to a growing tradition of this student-driven publication and to the successful execution of the duty and reasonability we have as historians in this challenging and exciting age.

Christopher P. Davey
Editor-in-Chief

THE DECLINE OF NASSER'S EGYPT

ANDREW ISRAELSEN

Gamal Abdul Nasser served as the President of Egypt from 1956 until his death in 1970. Disenchanted and dissatisfied, as were many Egyptians of the time with the current monarch, King Farouq, and the presence of Imperialist Britain, Nasser helped form a radical military group known as The Free Officers, whose goal was obtaining political power. The group achieved this goal on July 23, 1952, in a complete, nearly bloodless revolution, deposing King Farouq, and setting the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in the newly created political vacuum. Nasser, an extremely charismatic and ambitious leader was elected President along the creation of a state constitution and the abolishment of the RCC in 1956.¹ The presidential rule of Gamal Abdul Nasser was one of great initial triumph and popular support, which declined and eventually collapsed through a series of poor political decisions, inadvisable policy, and military defeat.

Nasser experienced huge initial success and public support with the ousting of the British whose imperialistic presence had long been a source of frustration to Egypt, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Nasser dissolved all political parties early in his rule, forming a socialist state which was successful in many senses, in relieving the poverty which had been ubiquitous under the former regime. Nasser's new state bourgeoisie focused on "capital-intensive development patterns on a capitalist model rather than

¹ Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 90-91.

labor-intensive patterns on a revolutionary socialist model such as was being initiated in China.”² The USSR became a fast ally with Nasser’s new socialist Egypt, due to their need to extend their influence outside of the eastern bloc, and Egypt’s need for weapons and military technology. Nasser’s new base of power was soon threatened from a tripartite attack by England, France, and Israel at the Suez Canal, an action condemned by The United States and the Soviet Union, who forced the countries’ withdrawal from Egypt. Egypt was at a newfound height, both politically and socially, and was looked to as a model by the other Arab states. “Egypt, with Nasser as its representative, was riding high on the crest of national and international popularity following the Suez Canal and other nationalizations, and the staving off of defeat at the hands of Britain, France and Israel.”³

Nasser’s initial popularity was universal among the Arab states; he was viewed by Arabs throughout the Middle East as a hero, an iconic leader of almost demi-god status. His rise to power, and decisive expulsion of Imperialist westerners fostered an extreme respect and devotion throughout the Arab community. A speech given in 1954 in Alexandria following an attempt on his life illustrates his charisma and ability to gain loyalty and support. “My countrymen, my blood spills for you and for Egypt. I will live for your sake, die for the sake of your freedom and honor. Let them kill me; it does not concern me so long as I have instilled pride, honor and freedom in you.”⁴ Nasser was a strong proponent of Pan-Arabism, another factor that drew support and respect among the Middle Eastern countries, and called vocally and insistently for the formation of a united Arab state, to stand together against Western aggression and imperialism. This led several other Middle Eastern countries to view Nasser’s new Egypt as a rallying point around which to consolidate.

² Peter Johnson “Egypt Under Nasser” *MERIP Reports No. 10* (1972), 4

³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴ Kamarava, 92.

Nasser's cry for Arab unity was heard by Syria especially, which was enduring a strained and coup-ridden presidency, as well as facing hostility from America's Imperialistic Eisenhower Doctrine, as well as attacks on their border by Turkey. Syria had been growing closer politically to a Nasserist government, and had experienced several attempted military coups during the mid 1950's. They were also, like Egypt, involved with the Soviet Union, in arms trading as well as a degree of assimilation of political ideologies. As Peter Woodward states concerning Syria at the time: "Since France had been forced out of Syria in 1946 the country had experienced both civilian and military regimes without achieving any long-term stability."⁵ In short, Syria was without solid leadership or direction, and many factions within the country, most notably the military, hoped a union with Nasser's Egypt would improve conditions. In 1957, a military faction of the Ba'thist party in Syria approached Egypt, asking for unification of the countries. This was a move that was very inadvisable for Nasser to take, as Syria was so unstable, and the political situation so complex. The proposal caused Nasser great trepidation, due to his lack of experience in the Arab world as a whole, and especially his unfamiliarity with the social-political landscape of Syria.⁶ And yet, despite his uncertainty regarding the union, Nasser, by his own doctrine of Pan-Arabism was forced into the union, if he was to keep legitimacy in the eyes of the Arab world as a whole:

Mehran Kamrava states:

Ever since 1955, and especially after the tripartite invasion of his country, Nasser had positioned himself as the protector of the interests of the Arab 'nation', the region's chief guardian against imperialism. With Syria threatened from all sides and with the plea for unity coming from within Syria itself, Nasser could not possibly reject the proposal.⁷

⁵ Peter Woodward, *Nasser* (London: Longman Group, 1992), 64-65.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 66-70.

⁷ Kamarava, 111.

The union between the two countries was announced February 1, 1958 and the United Arab Republic, or UAR was formed, with Nasser to be its President. The union was voted on by a plebiscite, and approved by "99.99% in Egypt, and 99.9% in Syria."⁸ Some stipulations of the union were the "dissolution of Syrian political parties to form an Egyptian-type unitary national political front"⁹, as well as "The merger of Syrian and Egyptian governmental, economic, legal, commercial and military services, with diplomatic missions in Damascus to be reduced to consular status."¹⁰ The union was problematic from the start, with Syria suddenly finding itself as little more than a vassal state of Egypt, viewed by Nasser as a step into his larger goal of complete Pan-Arabism. Most of the Syrian political leaders, including former President of Syria, Shukri Quwatli, were forced into resignation, or placed in positions of lesser importance under the new, largely Egyptian cabinet.

Nasser quickly lost, in the eyes of the Syrian people, especially the higher classes, the iconic status that he had previously held, as his political and economic reforms, always more beneficial to Egypt than Syria took effect upon a nation who had been hoping for a mutually beneficial political alliance rather than an outside governing body. The Syrian administration resented the newfound difficulty of running their bureaucracy, as policy decisions now had to be approved in Cairo before implementation could be possible. Nasser also put into place, much as he had in Egypt, a stringent political intelligence system, placing Abdul Hamid Sarraj, a Syrian, and one of the strongest original proponents of the Egyptian-Syrian union in charge. Sarraj was ruthless in his surveillance, and gained widespread unpopularity throughout Syria, even as he became one of Nasser's most trusted advisors in the development of the northern region of the UAR, i.e. Syria. The Syrian upper classes were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the way their country was now being

⁸ Robert Stephens, *A Political Biography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 275

⁹ Dan Hofstadter, *Egypt & Nasser: Volume 2, 1957-66* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1973), 36.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.

run, basically, without their involvement. Woodward states: "The police state was growing there [Syria], as it had in Egypt, at the expense of the politicians who felt that it was they who had made the union possible."¹¹

Despite the growing unrest of the Syrian politicians, and army officials who felt they were receiving the short end of the stick in comparison to their Egyptian fellows, Nasser held onto the UAR, determined to see it succeed, as the beginning of his long-dreamt of Pan-Arabism. He was convinced that his popularity among the common people of Syria, and his legendary status due to his success years ago at the Suez Canal, would be enough for him to retain power over both countries. He was mistaken however, and Syria as a whole was chafing more and more under his rule. Kamrava states: "The heavy hand of the Egyptian bureaucracy, Nasser's penchant for personal political control, and his ill-advised plans to implement statist economic policies in Syria as he had done in Egypt only heightened popular Syrian anger against the unification process."¹² Syrian dissatisfaction reached a head in September of 1961, when the military marched on Damascus, and dissolved ties with Egypt. This was a serious blow to Nasser both on a personal and a political level. It was a glaring defeat to Nasser's dream of Pan-Arabism, and one that could not be blamed on outside sources, but only upon Nasser's poor policy, and lack of understanding of the Syrian needs and expectations. Nasser briefly contemplated landing troops in Syria to affect a takeover of the country, ensuring the continuation of the UAR, but quickly abandoned the idea, merely holding onto the name UAR as the name of Egypt, as if to retain some shred of dignity regarding the whole affair.¹³ Following Nasser's failure in Syria, Egypt became embroiled in the civil war of Yemen. Nasser's failure in Syria seemed to drive him to an almost frantic need for some diplomatic victory, something to revive the glorious status he had achieved after

¹¹ Woodward, 72.

¹² Kamrava, 112.

¹³ Ibid., 112.

Suez. The leaders of most of the other Arab states were becoming disenchanted with Nasser, as Kamrava puts it:

Nasser, the Pan-Arabist was finding himself increasingly isolated from the rest of the Arab world...Nevertheless, his anti-imperialist rhetoric and his charisma still resonated with the Arab masses, and it was because of this continued popularity among aspiring Arab revolutionaries that he and his country were drawn into the Yemeni civil war.¹⁴

Desperate to win back some credibility in his role as protector of the Arab world, and ideologue whose Pan-Arab dreams held the respect of the Middle Eastern world, Nasser plunged yet again into the affairs of another country, yet again with disastrous results.

Yemen had been under the rule of a series of absolutist Imams for nearly a thousand years, an isolated and conservative people. The Imams had ruled under the eyes of the Ottoman Empire, and for a short period, the presence of British imperialists. Nasser already had some ties to Yemen, and had been joined in a loose tripartite alliance with Syria formed on the same day as the UAR, known as the United Arab States.¹⁵ In 1962, a Yemeni military faction attempted a coup of the royalist government hoping to establish a "progressive, republican regime."¹⁶ Seeing a chance for a quick and decisive victory, and the possibility of reestablishing himself in the eyes of the Arab world, Nasser sent Egyptian troops to Yemen the day after the attempted coup. The war was not in any way the simple victory that Nasser had expected, and turned into a long drawn out conflict lasting nearly five years. The war turned into a struggle in many ways between Egypt, on the one hand, fighting for the revolutionary military Yemenis versus the royalist regime, backed by Saudi Arabia, who feared that a revolutionary victory in Yemen might threaten Saudi Arabia's own monarchical system, and instill thoughts of revolution into their

¹⁴ Ibid., 112.

¹⁵ Stephens, 384

¹⁶ Kamrava, 113.

¹⁷ Ibid., 114.

people.¹⁷ Robert Stephens illustrates Nasser's main concerns in this quote: "Nasser was probably more concerned with his campaign against Saudi Arabia and against the British in Aden than he was with internal changes in the Yemen."¹⁸ Although at the height of Egypt's involvement, there were nearly 70,000 Egyptian troops fighting in Yemen, the war turned out to be inconclusive, and Egypt finally withdrew completely from Yemen late in 1967. The struggle had turned into a personal obsession for Nasser, who should have realized the ultimate hopelessness of victory and made a tactical withdrawal long before he did. In his many hopes concerning the Yemeni civil war, and the role it could play in furthering Egypt's goals and his own personal agenda, Nasser was bitterly disappointed. A long, drawn-out, ultimately futile war in which Egypt was not only committing large amounts of time and manpower, but was also fighting against other Arab nations did little to further Nasser's goal of Pan-Arabism, and indeed did great harm to his regime in general. It was yet another defeat, longer and more costly in terms of military power than Syria had been, leaving Egypt open and militarily weakened to the increasing amount of Israeli attacks that would soon explode into open conflict.

As Nasser and Egypt was embroiled in the struggle in Yemen, and military tension increased between Egypt and Israel, the social conditions inside Egypt were also beginning to deteriorate for Nasser. Economically, Egypt was in trouble, cotton production was "hardly any greater in the mid-sixties than it had been fifty years earlier. Imports of wheat went from 15,000 tons in 1955 to 300,000 tons in 1956, and by 1967 were at 3,000,000 tons."¹⁹ The Egyptian economy became more and more dependent on the USSR, not only for military and technological supplies, but also for basic economical needs. And as cotton was all that Egypt really had to export, and the cotton industry was not doing particularly well, Egypt found itself relying ever more heavily on outside economic aid.

¹⁸ Stephens, 385.

¹⁹ Johnson, 8.

Johnson states:

The Five Year Plan (1960-1965) projected that by the end of the period development would be completely financed from inside the economy: but in reality outside aid multiplied from about LE 10 million annually in the Fifties to 100 million pounds in 1964...Public expenses which were to have been cut down, rose from 500 million pounds in 1960 to 1.2 billion in 1966. The number of state employees more than doubled, and the public debt went from 70 million pounds to 350 million pounds.²⁰

Nasser extended state control in almost all aspects, consolidating all major businesses and enterprises under state control in 1962, with "all smaller businesses obliged to accept 51% state participation in ownership and thus in administration."²¹ Nasser's attention and capital was being so heavily invested in the Yemeni struggle throughout the 1960's that the internal economic structure of his own country rapidly degenerated into heavy foreign and internal debt, as well as increasing dissatisfaction of the Egyptian people. In 1965, agricultural revolts began, and in 1966 workers at the Port Said dock went on strike illegally. This weakness, which was in many ways, a result of Nasser's obsession with Yemen, and seeming indifference to the state of affairs in Egypt, led Israel to begin a series of attacks against neighboring Arab countries in order to attempt to alleviate their own economic troubles of the time. These forays were also reprisals for the guerilla attacks directed against them by Palestine. First Jordan, then Syria were attacked by Israeli raiding forces, and the nations turned to Egypt, requesting defense against the Israeli aggression. Johnson states: "The Egyptian regime saw this as an opportunity to shore up its flagging prestige and to divert the attention of the Egyptian population from the increasingly bad economic situation."²² Thus, Nasser and Egypt along with him

²⁰ Ibid.,

²¹ Ibid., 7.

²² Ibid., 9.

entered into the conflict that would prove the final breaking point of Nasser's regime as the glorious revolutionary institution it had been, and the final failure that led to the end of Nasser's legitimacy in his role of Arab protector, and the dying days of his charismatic, yet problematic rule.

The reasons for Nasser's war against Israel, the struggle that exploded on June 5th, 1967, and came to be known as the Six Days War, are manifold, and not as simple as an outlet for Nasser's frustrated ambitions, as his involvement in Yemen had been. Ben D. Mor, of the University of Haifa discusses three decisions made in May of 1967 that altered the entire political landscape of the Middle East. "(1) The decision to place the Egyptian army on alert and move its forces into Sinai (14 May); (2) the decision to request the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) troops (16 May); and (3) the decision to blockade the Straits of Tiran (22-23 May)."²³ These were all part of a campaign of intimidation against Israel, while Nasser attempted to marshal his forces, in preparation of a war that he openly acknowledged Egypt was not prepared to face.²⁴ The mustering of Egyptian forces and movement into Sinai was seen as an aggressive action, although Nasser's probable hope was simply to intimidate, that, along with the request of UNEF peacekeeping troops set the stage for open war between Egypt and Israel. The decision to close the straits of Tiran against Israeli shipping was in many ways the final straw for Israel, an act they "vowed not to tolerate."²⁵ Ben Mor quotes Meir Amit, who acted at the time as head of the Israeli intelligence services as saying: "Until May 23, I thought there was a possibility for maneuvers, that there is a leeway for alternatives. But when Nasser closed the Straits, I said; 'This is it, there is no way to avoid war.'"²⁶

²³ Ben Mor, "Nasser's Decision-Making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A Rational-Choice Explanation," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1991): 359.

²⁴ Kamrava, 117.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 117.

²⁶ Mor, 359.

The Six-Day War erupted on June 5th, 1967, early in the morning. According to Robert Stephens: "[The War] was virtually won by Israel within the first three hours, perhaps even in the first few minutes. But before it ended, six days later, there was much hard fighting and thousands of lives were lost."²⁷ The Israeli forces began that Monday morning with a series of decisive, crippling air raids on Egypt's own air bases, virtually destroying the entire Egyptian air force in a matter of hours. "Out of some 340 serviceable Egyptian combat aircraft, 286 machines, including all the Egyptian medium bombers were destroyed during the first day's assault."²⁸ Most Egyptian runways and air force facilities were also destroyed in the sudden attack. As the short and incredibly one-sided war continued, Israel destroyed a staggering amount of Arab aircrafts, attacking Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, totaling a claimed 418 at the end of the second day of the war.²⁹ The Israeli attack was performed expertly, with a land assault beginning half an hour after the destruction of Egypt's air force began. Israel did not limit her attack to Egypt, and following the virtual annihilation of Egypt as a serious immediate threat, they turned their attention to the West Bank in Gaza, attacking the Jordanian forces controlling that region. With their superlative air power, they quickly overcame Jordan's resistance, and captured the city of Jerusalem. By day five, two days after Nasser had realized defeat, and agreed to a UN-sponsored cease-fire, and three days after Jordan had done the same, Israel turned its attention to Syria, attacking the Golan Heights, home of Syria's strategic missile batteries, overwhelming the Syrian resistance and capturing the heights on June 11.³⁰

The Israeli victory was overwhelmingly complete, Egypt's military crippled and disgraced. Mehran Kamrava states: "For Egypt, the 1967 War meant the end of Nasserism. This was not an event that the Egyptian president could somehow turn into a victory. It was a defeat through and through."³¹ The Egyptian state bourgeoisie

²⁸ Ibid., 493.

²⁹ Kamrava, 118.

³⁰ Ibid., 118.

³¹ Kamrava, 121.

clamored for Nasser's resignation, and on June 9th, he "spoke to the nation over radio and television. On the screen he appeared a broken man. His features were drawn and haggard, his voice half choking and hesitant."³² He announced his resignation, handing all power over to a pro-American technocrat by the name of Zakaria Mohieddin.³³

However, despite the end of Nasser's regime as it had been, and the death of his status as the charismatic hero who had saved the day at Suez, the protector of the Arab world, he was to serve as president for three more years. Following massive demonstrations in the street, and popular clamor for his return to office, Nasser withdrew his resignation on June 10, 1967. Peter Johnson poses the question:

Why did the people pour out onto the streets to support the man whom they hated, who had duped them in the past, who had erected an economic system which exploited them, and a political system which repressed them, who had presided over the worst military defeat Egypt had suffered in this century? Simply, they supported him because they hated Mohieddin more than Nasser, and they had no choice between the two.³⁴

So, it was for no love of Nasser that the people clamored for his continued presidency, but simply an intense hatred of Mohieddin and the American imperialism they saw him as representing. Nasser continued on in the presidency, a broken man, a shell of his former, confident, idealistic self. He went through the motions of rebuilding the Egyptian army, under the close eye, and funding of the USSR. However, there was to be no retaliation against U.S. backed Israel, as some of the immediate terms and implications of the were that "Egypt, and hence, the Arab world [would] have to come forward and recognize the State of Israel, and that Egypt [would] thus have to come to closer terms with the United States."³⁵ Facing popular

³² Stephens, 506.

³³ Johnson, 9.

³⁴ Ibid., 10.

³⁵ Ibid., 10.

dissatisfaction, and military crises continuing throughout the Arab world, Nasser's health steadily declined, until on September 28, 1970, he died of a sudden heart attack. Kamrava states: "Despite several attempts to resurrect the Nasserism that he personified, it died with him."³⁶

Nasser's rule in Egypt was one of tremendous significance, and undying importance to the Arab world. During the early days of his rule especially, the glorious nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the decisive expulsion of the British from Egypt inspired Arabs throughout the Middle East to unite as far as it was possible, against western imperialism. Nasser's dream of Pan-Arabism, though never realized, has also never fully died out, and as Kamrava indicated, several other leaders have followed in his footsteps. His influence is undeniable, however his presidential administration, though so initially successful was full of poor decisions, unstable and volatile alliances, poor economic planning, and unrealistic ambitions. His efforts in the UAR and Yemen overstretched his and Egypt's capacities, leaving his people dissatisfied, and his military open to the thorough defeat in 1967 at the hands of Israel. Though a charismatic and motivating leader, the pragmatism of Nasser's policies fell sadly short of his lofty ambitions, and he died without ever having realized the destiny that he sought for himself, and the Arab world as a whole.

³⁶ Kamarava, 122.



A BREIF HISTORIOGRAPHY OF BLACK WOMEN WRITERS

M. MARISA DORE

This paper assembles a brief historiography of eighteenth and early nineteenth century Black women writers, because they have been one of the most neglected and often overlooked groups of writers. Due to the limited space, and time, this study is confined to the group of Black women writers prior to the Civil War. The scholars are both regular historians and/or literary critics. This is because of the nature of analysis required on writers. The historians will look at historical events or influences, which they feel may have affected the writers. Literary critics will look at other aspects such as different writing styles, or themes. It is important to know both sides to the writers' critiques. Both male and female perspectives as well as White and Black race viewpoints are included.

The prevalent themes discussed by the scholars mentioned in this historiography are sexuality, language, White vs. Black (racism), authenticity, and overall literary and historical value. These themes have received different levels of attention depending on the era in which they were evaluated. It is the aim of this paper to address the main points concerning these themes.

The scholars are divided into four main eras because of the similarities and historical events that are common during them. The first era will discuss scholars from the 1800s through the 1920s. Not much is recorded concerning the Black writers of this era. This is due to the lingering racism and effects of the "separate but equal" philosophy which prevented critics from truly considering the works of Black women. Because of this mentality, it would not be prudent

to group them with the next era. The second period will evaluate scholars' analysis from the 1930s through the 1960s. It is during this era that desegregation occurs. Moreover, scholars begin to evaluate Black writers, yet it will become apparent that they focused mainly on male writers during this time. The third era will explore critics' perceptions from the 1970s -80s. This was a time of preservation and reevaluation of Black culture. This era differed from the previous ones in the dedication that was given to writers of both sexes of the Black race. The last age will pertain to the 1990s until the present time in order to understand what is currently being discovered about the Black writers from before the Civil War.

1800-1920 Scholarship on Black Women Writers

The first critique, and only evaluation of nineteenth century Black women writers that will be mentioned due to the scarcity of material, comes from a Black feminist and writer, Mrs. N. F. Mossell, in her commentary on *The Work of the Afro-American Woman*, originally published in 1894. The first half of her book is a critique and chronicle of Black women who have been prominent up until the 1890s. The second half of her book includes excerpts from other Black writers as well as some essays she composed herself. It is in the critique of prominent Black women that Mrs. Mossell mentions the pre-Civil War Black woman writer Phillis Wheatley. Wheatley is the only writer from this period she discusses. Perhaps tongue-in-cheek, she indirectly addresses the male-female value by commenting that the first book published by a Black was "strange to say, from the pen of a woman...."¹ Later she addresses themes of racism and authenticity by writing, "Fearing, as often occurred in those days of bitter race-hatred, that the authenticity of the poems would be questioned, an attestation was drawn up and signed by a number of worthy gentlemen."² The last point Mrs. Mossell makes refers to

¹ Mrs. N.F. Mossell, *The Work of the Afro-American Woman*, with an introduction by Joanne Braxton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 54.

² Ibid., 55.

the literary and historical value of Wheatley's writings, "the point is often discussed whether the poems of Phillis Wheatley are of literary merit or simply curiosities as the work of an African child... Yet, scan as often as we will or may the verses of Phillis Wheatley, we claim for her the true poetic fire."³ Hence, Mrs. Mossell, although acknowledging that Wheatley was a talented Black writer, she does not delve into the subtleties of Wheatley's themes, sexuality, language, or historical value.

Another source that should have mentioned some Black women writers was in the 1913 review of African American culture by Black scholar and literary critic as well as historian, W.E.B. Du Bois. However, he does not mention any Black writers, male or female, other than to call William Wells Brown who wrote the fiction, *Clotel*, a historian.⁴

This concludes the scholarship on Black women writers of this first era. Materials are scarce from this period on Black women writers. Most of the scholars do not delve into the reasons why it is difficult to find criticism or evaluations on Black women writers. However, it would be worth more exploration to find out why this was so.

1930-1960 Scholarship on Black Women Writers

The second era of 1930s through the 1960s did not improve much in quantitative or qualitative research on pre-Civil War Black women writers. Literary scholar and writer, Christopher Mulvey, summarizes that during the 1930s -50s there remained a vast ignorance and negativity concerning Black novels, and the value of Black women's writings was not high. He cites a literary critic writer from the 1930s, Vernon Loggins, as stating, "When a noteworthy American Negro novel is written, it will probably be on the theme which (Frank J.) Webb attempted". Mulvey also quotes a 1940s

³ Ibid., 56.

⁴ Christopher Mulvey, *Freeing the voice, creating the self: the novel and slavery, in The Cambridge Companion to the African American Novel*, ed. Maryemma Graham, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 29.

literary critic and writer, Hugh Gloster, "William Wells Brown, Frank J. Webb, Martin Delany and Frances E.W. Harper...generally exhibit the methods and materials of Abolitionist propaganda."⁵ Mulvey's use of this quote implies that it appears to Gloster that abolitionist propaganda was therefore unexciting in a literary sense, as well as unimportant historically.

Also critical of early Black women writer's works, was a well-known Black scholar, anthologist, writer, and critic prominent through the 1960's, Sterling Brown. In his study *Negro Poetry and Drama* (1937), he commented that Ann Plato's essays published in 1841 were "without any literary value beside the writings of really educated Negroes like Daniel Payne, Charles Reason and Elymas Rogers."⁶ It is interesting to note that Mr. Brown's list of educated writers only includes males. In contrast to Mrs. Mossell, Brown belittled Phillis Wheatley's poetry as "sentimental and pious", and her place in American Literature was no "greater than that of a curiosity."⁷ However, Brown does give some reasoning as to why he feels Black literature, especially that of Black female literature, was mediocre. He explains, "many other Negroes fought in the antislavery crusade; several used stirring autobiographies, pamphlets, journalism and oratory in the battle. Creative literature, however, was the exception with them; an embattled people used literature as a weapon, as propaganda; not as exploration."⁸

Brown observed that male and female Black writers used a mulatto as their protagonists in literature. He felt this technique was used to show the evils of miscegenation as well as win sympathy from antislavery supporters.⁹ Unfortunately, the impression is, however, that Brown felt this was too "White" in style and did not celebrate Blackness properly.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ann Allen Shockley, ed., *Afro-American Women Writers 1746-1933: An Anthology and Critical Guide* (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1988), xxv.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Sterling A. Brown, *A Century of Negro Portraiture in American Literature, in Black Voices*, ed. Abraham Chapman (New York: A Mentor Book, 1968), 566.

⁹ Ibid., 570-1.

Another Black literary writer and critic, LeRoi Jones comments:

From Phillis Wheatley to Charles Chesnutt, to the present generation of American Negro writers, the only recognizable accretion of tradition readily attributable to the Black producer of a formal literature in this country, with a few notable exceptions, has been of an almost agonizing mediocrity.¹⁰

In support of this stance of mediocrity, the 1960s Black critic, writer and professor of English George Kent, claims that "Black women writers do not explore their characters with real depth, the 'problem' being they do not give a deep enough definition of their encounters with power and their responses to them."¹¹

Other than to degrade Black women writer's works below that of the Black men, these critics do not appear to investigate the themes of racism, sexuality, language, or authenticity in any depth. Their comments bring a few questions to mind. What makes a work mediocre? How does Kent define power? What themes do these critics think are important? According to the opinions of these critics, what should the early Black women have written? It is unclear on what grounds they are basing their devaluation of Black women's writings. Moreover, it would be interesting to find some female opinions from this same era and contrast them with the male opinions.¹²

¹⁰ LeRoi Jones, *Home: Social Essays* (New York: William Morrow, 1966), 105; quoted in Bernard W. Bell, *The Contemporary African American Novel: Its Folk Roots and Modern Literary Branches* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2004), 10.

¹¹ Ann Allen Shockley, ed., *Afro-American Women Writers 1746-1933: An Anthology and Critical Guide* (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1988), xxv.

¹² The book footnoted previously, *Black Voices*, also has many essays critiquing Black literature by Kent and others. Not one woman critic is provided in this anthology. However, their essays are worth examining for further expansion on the themes being discussed in this paper.

1970-1980 Scholarship on Black Women Writers

In the 1970s through the 80s, the tide began to change toward Black writings of the past with the advent of the Black Power and Civil Rights Movement. Equally influential was the creation of Black Studies. It is important to note the main questions that have occupied the minds of these scholars during their studies concerning Black writers. Addison Gayle, a Black scholar, writer and critic, in 1970 lists some of these questions very succinctly, "Was it Black or was it White? Was it African or American? Was it a proud development of an authentic slave tradition or a poor imitation of the Victorian novel of manners? Did it help or hinder the African American cause?"¹³ Hence, it was during this era that scholars began to explore the theme of authenticity in depth. Scholars considered other questions. Where did early African American fiction come from? Have the texts been misrepresented by the mediation of White helpers and editors? Have the African American writers been true to Black thinking and Black values? How much authority did the pre-Civil War women writers display?

The creation of Black Studies and the Civil Rights Movement brought a surge of support for Black women writers, and created an atmosphere of need for greater analysis of their early works. A Black feminist movement was also developing during this time and has gained in strength through the 1990s. Ann Allen Shockley assembled an anthology of African American Women Writers from 1746-1933 which was published in 1988. According to her introduction, she felt compelled to do this because White males who deliberately or inadvertently left the vast majority of Black women writers unmentioned compiled the bulk of anthologies of Black writers.¹⁴ These Black scholars such as Shockley, and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., were frustrated by the large number of early Black woman works tucked away in research libraries or pawnshops. Often only

¹³ Mulvey, 18.

¹⁴ Ann Allen Shockley, ed., *Afro-American Women Writers 1746-1933: An Anthology and Critical Guide* (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1988), xxii-iii.

one or two copies of a book existed. To try and correct this concern, and help expose the public to nineteenth century Black women's literature, the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, along with others, in 1988, published a set of thirty volumes. These volumes were works considered some of the most influential from Black Women writers.

Also in her introduction, Shockley criticizes prior critics for not recognizing that Black women's literature of the 1740s to 1930s was precisely a response to power. This was different from Kent and Brown's earlier analysis. She writes, "Women's responses to racism and sexism of both Black and White males, and the struggle for self-identity typify the depth [of power]."¹⁵ Power, in the sense that women were not powerless- they used literature to exhibit strength and fight racism and sexism, just as much as Black men. Black feminist, writer and activist, Barbara Smith, also supports this stance by writing, "the politics of sex as well as the politics of race and class are crucially interlocking factors in the works of Black women."¹⁶ Bernard Bell, a Black activist and literary scholar, argues against the mediocrity cry of these earlier scholars by noting that Black writers since the 1850s to the present time, "We bear witness to the complex rhetoric, politics, and poetics, especially intertextuality, of the representation of African American character and culture in the tradition of the African American novel."¹⁷

Perhaps one of the first feminist books on Black women writers was written in 1987 by professor of English and Afro-American Studies, Hazel V. Carby.¹⁸ She lists four themes that critics need to study more fully when analyzing Black women writings. These themes are a "confrontation of the dominant domestic ideologies and literary conventions of womanhood which excluded

¹⁵ Ibid., xxv.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Bernard W. Bell, *The Contemporary African American Novel: Its Folk Roots and Modern Literary Branches* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2004), 10.

¹⁸ Hazel V. Carby, *Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-American Woman Novelist* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

them from the definition 'woman'."¹⁹ This discussion includes an in depth look at the effect which the philosophy "true womanhood" had on Black women writers. She feels this dominant White perspective made it very difficult for Black women writers to accurately portray themselves and their struggles.²⁰ Second, she questions the existence of an American sisterhood between Black and White women.²¹ Third, she tries to refute the idea that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were only to be viewed in terms of great Black men writers. She argues that Black women also were influential and powerful writers.²² Lastly, she discusses the emergence of Black women novelists and the context in which they were produced.²³

Interestingly, three years later, another feminist writer Patricia Hill expounds on Carby's explanation of how "true womanhood" affected Black women writers. She mentions that the Black writer and orator Maria Stewart in 1831, challenged Black women to reject the negative images of Black womanhood. Stewart encouraged them to create new definitions of Black womanhood and to become educated in order to raise up independent and self-reliant posterity.²⁴

On a different note, Black professor of literature, writer, and critic, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., defends the value of Black women's writings by arguing the importance of Wheatley's writings in contrast to Brown's negative opinion of her, and he delves into the historical importance of her writings, which Mrs. Mossell did not.

Since the beginning of the sixteenth century, Europeans had wondered aloud whether or not the African "species of men," as they were commonly called, could ever create formal literature, could ever master "the arts and sciences."

If they could, the argument ran, then the African variety of humanity was fundamentally related to the European variety.

¹⁹ Ibid., 6.

²⁰ Ibid., 22-3.

²¹ Ibid., 6.

²² Ibid., 6-7.

²³ Ibid., 7.

²⁴ Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought*, Perspectives on Gender, Vol. 2 (New York: Routledge, 1990), 3-5.

If not, then it seemed clear that the African was destined by nature a slave. This was the burden shouldered by Phillis Wheatley when she successfully defended herself and the authorship of her book against counterclaims and doubts.²⁵

Hence, according to Gates, Wheatley was making a stand against slavery by being a published Black. A few years later, writer, literary scholar of women's works as well as professor of English, June Jordan, expounds on the Gates' theory on racism and she evaluates the literary methods used by Wheatley. She hypothesizes that Wheatley did make a stand against slavery, but that she had to do it using the only types of literary devices she had been exposed to- elite White male literature of England. The ideas were her own although the style was borrowed from the White elites. In poems such as "On Being Brought from Africa to America", "To S. M., A Young African Painter, On Seeing His Works", and "To the Right Honorable William, Earl of Dartmouth....", anti-slavery sentiments and celebrations of Black heritage abounded. To those who criticize Wheatley's poetic style and lack of obvious anti-slavery propaganda as a reason to ignore her Jordan writes:

...consider what it took for that young African to undertake such a persona, such values, and mythologies a million million miles remote from her own ancestry, and her own darkly formulating race! Consider what might meet her laborings, as a poet, should she, instead, invent a vernacular precise to Senegal, precise to slavery, and therefore accurate to the secret wishings of her lost and secret heart?...if she, instead, composed a poetry to speak her pain, to say her grief, to find her parents, or to stir her people into insurrection, what would we now know about God's darling girl? Who would publish that poetry, then?²⁶

²⁵ Mrs. N.F. Mossell, *The Work of the Afro-American Woman*, with an introduction by Joanne Braxton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), x.

²⁶ June Jordan, *The Difficult Miracle of Black Poetry in America...in Wild Women in the Whirlwind: Afro-American Culture and the Contemporary Literary Renaissance*, eds. Joanne M. Braxton and Andrée Nicola McLaughlin (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 27-28.

In summary, her use of imitating White poetic style should not render her invisible. It should render her a visible example of how a Black woman can overcome racial, physical, and cultural obstacles to stand as a witness of the equality of the White and Black races.

During the 1980s Gates also explored the Black language in detail. Some critics wondered whether it was possible to tell the Whiteness or Blackness of literature based on its structure and language. Gates hypothesized in his book *Figures in Black: Words, Signs and the "Racial" Self* that Black writers "created" a new style of writing by combining oral African tradition as well as standard Euro-American styles.²⁷ He explains that having some aspects of "White" styles does not make it "imitative" writing. Moreover, Black style does not mean that it was inferior.²⁸

In the next decade a feminist Black writer, Bell Hooks would come to a similar conclusion as Gates. She takes a brief look at Black vernacular and concludes that Blacks and Black writers created a new style by combining their oral traditions with the "new" English styles they were exposed to. This new style was not inferior to the traditional English style and should not be view as such even today.²⁹ Although the exploration of authenticity and of Blackness began in the late 1960s, it was after the 1970s that important discoveries concerning the authorship of certain novels were uncovered. Harriet E. Wilson and Harriet Jacobs who wrote respectively *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl* and *Our Nig* were confirmed the Black authors of these books in 1981 and 1983.³⁰ Previously these books

²⁷ Henry Louis Gates, Jr., *Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the "Racial" Self* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 184.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

Another interesting novel that discusses this topic is Berndt Ostendorf, *Black Literature in White America* (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982).

²⁹ Bell Hooks, *Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 170-1.

³⁰ Barbara Christian, "Somebody Forgot to Tell Somebody Something": *African-American Women's Historical Novels*, in *Wild Women in the Whirlwind: Afro-American Culture and the Contemporary Literary Renaissance*, eds. Joanne M. Braxton and Andrée Nicola McLaughlin (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 329, 331.

were thought to have been written by White women. Even Mrs. Mossell in 1894 does not mention their works in her list of Black Publications. Perhaps she also thought White women had written them and decided not to include them on her list.

Black feminist critic and writer, Barbara Christian, theorizes that because Harriet Wilson wrote in a fluent, strong-voice that did not cater to the accepted stereotypes of the time, that the very authorship of *Our Nig* was then called into question. This authenticity questioning was effective in suppressing the novel from being printed and read by others. The stereotypes, which Wilson did not cater to, were the lack of racism of Northerners, Black men devoted to women of their race, White women did not have sexual relations with Black men, and that White women were the natural allies of the Black race.³¹ Even the title itself, which refers to the derogatory word nigger, challenged its readership to reevaluate commonly accepted stereotypes. Gates writes that Wilson, "trying desperately to sustain herself and her son- wrote from an intimate experience a bold indictment of northern White racism and of hypocritical abolitionists of both races, apparently hoping that liberal White northerners and her 'colored brethren' might 'rally around' her and purchase her book."³² Instead, this method backfired and did not sell well at all, and the reasons are not clear why this was so. Maybe, as mentioned previously, the fact that her publisher Rand & Avery were not known as regular publishers of novels may account for the scarcity of this novel as well as its obscurity.³³

Now that many scholars are aware of the correct authorship of these novels, many have reassessed their opinions concerning Black women writers of the Civil War era. Previous and new critics

³¹ Christian, 331-2.

³² David Ames Curtis and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., *Establishing the Identity of the Author of Our Nig, in Wild Women in the Whirlwind: Afro-American Culture and the Contemporary Literary Renaissance*, eds. Joanne M. Braxton and Andrée Nicola McLaughlin (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 54.

³³ *Ibid.*, 68.

were reevaluating the question of whether the Black novels imitated the White style so much that they were not truly African American literature.

One of the literary critics who felt that Black women wrote to White standards, thus imitating White style is Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, professor at Emory University, women's scholar and writer. She writes:

The 1850s could plausibly be represented as the flowering of slavery as a social system—as a designed and crafted society that self-consciously defended the bondage of the African American people... This climate encouraged the publication of firsthand accounts of slavery by Black writers most of whom viewed their literary efforts as an important contribution to the abolitionist struggle. Yet the racism of many Northern readers, as well as their own discretion, also encouraged them to create protagonists who met white expectations of respectability.³⁴

Using Harriet Jacobs' novel *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl* Fox-Genovese expounds on how Jacobs used at least five White expectations of respectability. First, Jacobs distances herself from the situation by using a pseudonym and a narration that distinguishes the "me" from the "them". She places a huge distance from herself and the slave community. Second, her book contains hardly any references to the history in Southern society. Her history is restricted to family and personal history. Third, Jacobs focuses on Northern society and values such as artisan talents, mulatto heritage, speaking pure English, and true womanhood. Fourth, she blames the corruption of morals on the effects of slavery and the majority of racism on the South (even though racism abounded in the North).

³⁴ Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "Slavery, Race, and the Figure of the Tragic Mulatta, or the Ghost of Southern History in the Writing of African-American Women," *Mississippi Quarterly*, Vol. 49, Is. 4 (Fall 96): 5.

Lastly, she represents Linda Brent as having more in common with the educated White women than with the illiterate and abused slave women of the south. Although her character endures grave hardships and dangers, the protagonist has great strength and downplays any suffering. To show any sign of weakness would have delegated her to as poor a role as the rest of the Black slave women.³⁵

Along with the questions of authenticity, professor of English, writer and Black woman's scholar, Joanne Braxton, notes another weakness that had been occurring to mislead previous scholars. This weakness was found in the way that publishers printed books. She gives the example of Charlotte Forten who was a cultured and educated free Black from Philadelphia. Forten kept five journals from 1837-1892. As she reached her teenage years, she began to notice that despite her education and background, most establishments in her hometown excluded her because of the color of her skin. She was not able to circulate in the dominant White culture, nor did she fit in well with the Black culture because of her privilege and class. Because of these circumstances, Braxton supposes that Forten began to keep a journal in order to "become a private (and therefore defensible) 'territory' of the mind and a retreat from the racism and sexism of the dominant culture."³⁶ Since Forten primarily used her journal as a means for personal self-healing, privacy as well as a small fear of the potential retributions of a White readership kept her from having them published. However, she did submit a small portion of her diary entries of her experience on the Sea Islands to a personal male friend, who submitted it for publication in the *Atlantic Monthly* published in 1864.

Author Lyde Cullen Sizer differs in the opinion about Forten's reason for keeping a journal. Sizer writes that Forten had this published because she wanted to challenge the stereotypes of the lazy,

³⁵ Ibid., 7-8.

³⁶ Joanne M. Braxton, *A Poet's Retreat: The Diaries of Charlotte Forten Grimké, in Wild Women in the Whirlwind: Afro-American Culture and the Contemporary Literary Renaissance*, eds. Joanne M. Braxton and Andrée Nicola McLaughlin (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 73.

ugly, colored brute who was inferior in everyway to the White race. Forten was arguing that it was racism and degradation, not lack of talent, which was impeding the colored race.³⁷

Braxton continues to explain that the rest of Forten's brilliance remained invisible until a version of four of her five manuscripts were published as *The Journal of Charlotte L. Forten, 1854-62* in 1953. Sadly, Braxton noticed that this version contained numerous errors and omissions, which made it very difficult for a scholar to get an accurate portrayal and interpretation of her works. Her fifth manuscript was not published until 1988.³⁸ Since it took so long to have most of Forten's work published and it contained many errors, it is not surprising that some twentieth century scholars viewed Black women literature so negatively. If all of Forten's journals had been correctly published before the coming of the 1900s, their perception perhaps would have been improved.

1990-2006 Scholarship on Black Women Writers

During this era, authenticity and authorship came into prominence by scholars, especially after another novel, Hannah Craft's *Our Bondswoman*, was confirmed in 2001 to be the work of an escaped slave. Christopher Mulvey expresses what may be a common opinion for many other scholars at this time, "It is proper to treat that manuscript as authentic, but it is so newly found that it is also proper to retain the possibility that it might prove to be otherwise."³⁹ In essence then, it will continue to occupy a sense of invisibility until its authenticity has become more widely accepted. Mulvey does point out that one reason why *Our Bondswoman* may have disappeared was that one of the few African American printers who quickly went bankrupt may have published it.⁴⁰

³⁷ Lyde Cullen Sizer, *The Political Works of Northern Women Writers and the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 162.

³⁸ Braxton, 71-2.

³⁹ Mulvey, 17.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 21.

Another "discovery" occurred in the past few years to bolster the opinion that Black women were producing important writings before the civil war. Historian Erica Armstrong explains that before Black women's novels began to be published, some of the elite, or wealthy, free Black women kept "friendship albums" between the years of 1830-50. Friendship albums were passed from one Black woman to another in Philadelphia. The women who had an album passed to them would read what had been written before and then would be required to add an excerpt of their own. It could either be a commentary on an issue such as racism, or a poem written about love, friendship or death. There are four albums remaining in existence, which belonged to Amy Cassey, Mary Forten, Martina and Mary Anne Dickerson. Armstrong theorizes that these friendship albums provided a private and guarded way to discuss the issues of slavery and racial discrimination while allowing them to maintain social networks that geography would otherwise prohibit.⁴¹ She also writes, "Friendship albums helped women create and sustain long-distance relationships with the expectation that friendship would survive across time and space, simultaneously reinforcing and reforming nineteenth century notions of womanhood and respectability."⁴² The owners of friendship albums kept them from the White public as much as possible. As such, they never received the harsh criticism that the published Black novels endured later. They were, however, invisible because the White race was not fully aware of their existence or the content of their albums.

Writer, George B. Handley, also addressed the issue of authenticity, and Blackness or Whiteness, by hypothesizing that as the shift in the way that race was becoming defined during and after the Civil War, race pollution became an immense fear that prevented many Blacks from free expression. Therefore, many Blacks attempted

⁴¹ Erica R. Armstrong, "A Mental and Moral Feast: Reading Writing, and Sentimentality in Black Philadelphia," *Journal of Women's History*, Vol. 16, Is. 1 (2004): 2-3.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 15.

to enter the public arena by taking on or "passing" as acceptable White personas. He did not see that as negatively as Fox-Genovese had earlier.

- The act of passing clearly destabilizes the controlling mechanisms of white cognition of race since, like these novelists who write themselves into a white public, a person who passes defies the color line that presumably would have made his or her transition into a white world impossible. However, passing also is a capitulation to those very mechanisms and is thus potentially complicit with the prevailing ideology since it accepts de facto the color line. To the extent that these authors abandon representations of a lived and historically conditioned Blackness in the interest of exposing the social constructions of race, they leave behind viable forms of social, cultural, and racial difference within the national family, and their insinuation loses its revisionary force because of its apparent collapse under the pressure of white social power.⁴³

It can be interpreted that although Jacobs had to compromise greatly on her Blackness in order to enter the public eye, she nevertheless influenced the way that people socially, culturally, and racially viewed slavery. Her compromise on Blackness helped to blur the White perceptions of race, but also created an invisibility that would not allow a complete celebration of Black literature.

The Black feminist movement, which had begun in the 1960, was gaining strength during the 1990s allowing even more insight and exploration of the effect Black women writers had on

⁴³ George B. Handley, *Postslavery Literatures in the Americas: Family Portraits in Black and White* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 78.

⁴⁴ Hill, 6-7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

society. Two leading Black feminist writers are Patricia Hill Collins and Bell Hooks. In her book, *Black Feminist Thought*, Hill argues that Black women have been oppressed, exploited, and stereotyped. Black women had to fight all of these factors to the point that it was extremely difficult to produce literary thought. In addition, once they had produced something, they were often denied support by their same race or gender.⁴⁴ Because of the advancement scholars have made in the past century, Hill feels a reevaluation of Black intellectual thought should be done. She writes, "Reclaiming this tradition involves discovering, reinterpreting, and, in many cases, analyzing for the first time the works of Black women intellectuals who were so extraordinary that they did manage to have their ideas preserved..."⁴⁵ Hill reevaluating some of the Black women writers' works mentions some themes common among them. They are exploitation of domestic labor, comparison of middle class American families, control over Black women's reproduction, stereotypes of mammy or Jezebel, and standards of beauty.⁴⁶

Four years after Hill's book was published Bell Hooks also wrote concerning Black women. In some ways she backed up Hill's early suggestions. Hooks expresses gladly that the more recent scholarship has not looked at earlier Black women's works through the "bourgeois lens" so much. However, she still feels that the field is male dominated and open-mindedness is missing from critics.⁴⁷ Equally a problem to Black women writers is that White women viewed them as too angry to write critically and so the Black women felt betrayed. She also feels that current White women feminists are requiring Black women feminists to master their definitions of Blackness when they have not mastered what "Whiteness" is.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Ibid., 44-78.

⁴⁷ Hooks, 53-4.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 103-4.

During this past decade, more male scholars have begun to include a faint analysis of these early Black women in their analysis of literature. For example, scholar of Afro-American Studies, Dickson D. Bruce Jr. discusses Maria Stewart, which had been mentioned by Patricia Hill.

He comments:

Stewart's writings are particularly important for what they reveal about the role of gender in emerging abolitionist notions about respectability and improvement...She argued that women of African descent had a special obligation to be virtuous and conform to the rules of right conduct in their roles as wives and mothers...Stewart suggested that their influence would become examples of what Black womanhood could be.⁴⁹

Unfortunately, out of several hundred pages, there were only a few pages dedicated to exploring Black women writers in his book, and this does not give me the impression that his book is all-inclusive and objective toward gender. Again, the question can be asked, why is it that male scholars do not explore Black women writers in more depth?

It is incredible to view the changes in perspectives toward the Black women writers of the Civil War era. The obstacles, which these writers faced in order to publish their works, was daunting, and scholars are beginning to investigate them more earnestly than they have ever done. Respect for Black women's literature has increased dramatically since the 1930s. Themes of power, racism, sexism, language, and authenticity have been explored and are still being explored.

⁴⁹ Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., *The Origins of African American Literature* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001), 196-7.

Yet, despite the advances scholars have made interpreting and reassessing the early works written by pre-Civil War Black women, the studies have been inadequate in assessing their importance. More male critics need to include women in their writings. Scholars and critics need to define clearly what Black or White writing is and what the differences between the two are. In this manner, readers could have a clearer idea of why some of these critics are so negative of Black writers seeming "White". Despite these weaknesses, as time progresses and additional early Black female literature is authenticated, published and evaluated, Black women and their writings' invisibility will dissipate. The negativity toward their achievements will lessen, and we, as a better-informed public, will benefit even further from the increased insights.



THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFTERMATH OF THE BLACK DEATH IN ENGLAND

TIFFANY L. KNOELL

England was a nation already on the brink of disaster when the Black Death arrived in 1348.¹ Recurring famines, overpopulation, ever-expanding social and economic divides, and an increase in crime were all indicative of a society in crisis.² While Malthusian scholars view the Black Death as an overdue population correction, post-revision historians believe the Europe created by the plague to be empowered rather than utterly ruined.³ When the initial wave of the plague passed in 1350, various social groups who were previously on the bottom of the ladder found themselves temporarily in a position to improve their economic standing. On the other side of the social and economic divide were the clergy and the well-to-do, each of whom had their own struggles to face. The clergy would be dealt a blow by both pestilence and greed, while the upper classes found fewer workers and more demands. The increasing tensions between wealthy and worker and the new roles adopted by many rewrote many of the accepted and frequently unspoken rules of society and set the stage for the Peasants' Revolt in 1381 and the collapse of feudalism in the early 1400s.

¹ Simon Schama, *A History of Britain: At the Edge of the World? 3000 BC to 1603 AD* (New York: Hyperion, 2000), 222.

² Schama, 228.

³ John Aberth, *The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-1350, A Brief History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2005), 3.

The Black Death was considered by many in England to be one of the worst calamities in recorded history. Henry Knighton, author of the late 14th century text, *Knighton's Chronicle*, reached far into history to find a comparable scene of desolation:

There was no memory of so unsparing and so savage a plague since the days of Vortigern, king of the Britons, in whose time, as Bede records in his history of the English, there were not enough left alive to bury the dead.⁴

While rumors of plague had circulated in the Italian banking centers of London and alarming news arrived on ships along with trade goods, England was not prepared for the disease that would arrive in the Bristol ports around 1 August 1348 and aggressively sweep across the country.⁵ Thomas Walsingham described the devastation in England as being "so great that scarcely half of mankind was left alive", with "so much wretchedness...that afterwards the world could never return to its former state."⁶ While the actual death toll has been calculated as being closer to one-third of the total population of England, entire villages were being leveled by the plague. However, not every victim of the plague died from its effects; some had the mixed fortune of surviving the disaster. Survival of the Black Death was not always a blessing.⁷ While the pneumatic form of the disease was nearly 100 percent fatal, approximately 10 to 40 percent of those infected by the bubonic form of the plague survived their exposure. However, the long-term repercussions of survivors seeing friends and family die by the score were mental scars that lingered on in the minds of men for years.⁸

⁴ Henry Knighton, *Knighton's Chronicle*, 100-101; quoted in Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., *The Black Death Transformed* (New York: Oxford Press, 2002), 224.

⁵ Schama, 229-230; Rosemary Horrox, ed., *The Black Death* (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 1994), 62.

⁶ Horrox, 66.

⁷ Phillip Ziegler, *The Black Death* (Phoenix Mill, Far Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton, 1969) 161.

⁸ David Herlihy, *The Black Death and the Transformation of the West* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1997), 40; Ziegler, 161; Aberth, 23.

This scarring created disabilities that further unbalanced a society already out of equilibrium. In a world where the main unit of life was the village and the primary economic unit was the family, the devastation of, in some cases, up to half of the population left services unperformed and roles in society unfulfilled.⁹

In some regions of England, women stepped up to fill the employment gap left by men killed or disabled by disease. Prior to the Plague, the gender division of labor in rural areas was far less strict than commonly envisioned. Women were expected to work alongside their husbands instead of being restricted to the more "traditional" chores for their gender: milking cows, gathering eggs, and winnowing grain.¹⁰ In the period following the Black Death, women were an essential part of the agricultural labor force. They were not confined to secondary tasks, but, instead, were highly mobile and independent laborers, free from familial restrictions.¹¹ Statistical data from the period immediately post-Black Death demonstrates a rise in the mean age at marriage, indicating that women in some portions of England delayed marriage and childbearing to take advantage of a more favorable job climate.¹² Women were allowed to do everything but plowing, which represented either a fundamental shift in women's rights or the profound desperation for workers in this period. The second seems more likely, as there is some debate in the academic community as to how much freedom women were actually allowed.¹³ In spite of this debate, it should be noted that transters, or peddlers, were predominantly women, indicating a certain level of autonomy for working women in a post-Black Death society.¹⁴

⁹ Ziegler, 92, 182. Herlihy, 40.

¹⁰ PJP Goldberg, *Woman Is A Worthy Wight: Women in English Society c.1200-1500* (Phoenix Mill: Alan Sutton Publishing Limited, 1992), 127.

¹¹ Goldberg, 127.

¹² Aberth, 70.

¹³ Mavis E. Mate, "Daughters, Wives, and Widows after the Black Death: Women in Sussex, 1350-1535," Internet, available from <http://www.boydell.co.uk/51155340.HTM>, accessed on 8 Dec 2004.

¹⁴ Goldberg, 127.

The "new-found freedom of women" has been called into question due to lack of evidence. Based on wage reports, women's wages were not on par with wages for healthy adult men; rather, their wages were comparable with those of young men or older men.¹⁵ Those who chose occupations in towns rather than on the farm were relegated to lower-paying occupations, such as brewers or tapsters, and were often excluded from full guild membership.¹⁶ Despite this, women appear to have thrived, even to the point of violating labor laws designed to limit wages.¹⁷ According to court records dating to 1352, 24 percent of wage violations were committed by women.¹⁸ With this evidence in hand, it can be safely asserted that the lack of men created ample opportunities for women, particularly in towns.¹⁹

It has been said that the Plague "introduced a complete revolution in the occupation of the land".²⁰ The progressive depopulation provided by the Black Death left the peasant class with two advantages: plentiful land and scarce labor.²¹ A deficit of adult male labor may have seemed a handicap in light of the increase of land available, yet this was to the benefit of those survivors who either had smaller plots or no land at all prior to the Black Death, as even land lying fallow was of value and could be claimed if not owned by a landlord. In many cases, though, much of the land was still owned by members of the upper class. The shortage of workers allowed peasants an opportunity not previously seen in the history of peasant/landlord relations: the ability to demand higher wages and better benefits for families. In some cases, it was the tenant, not the lord, who could set the terms of occupancy for deserted holdings.²² This power of choice in the hands of the tenant created some problems for landlords, as

¹⁵ Sandy Bardsley, "Women's Work Reconsidered: Gender and Wage Differentiation in Late Medieval England" in *Past and Present*, No. 165 (November, 1999), 3-4.

¹⁶ Ibid..

¹⁷ Aberth, 91.

¹⁸ Ibid..

¹⁹ Aberth, 4.

²⁰ Ziegler, 187.

²¹ Ziegler, 188.

²² Schama, 236.

illustrated in a Durham manorial court record dating 1350-1355.²³ The record shows the difficulties faced by lords in finding tenants and then keeping them.²⁴ This confidence in their worth also led to more mobility among laborers.²⁵ An example of this would be the migration of workers from one landlord's property to another's if the benefits offered were more desirable. This also led to an increase of disappearances from villages. In an environment where "town air makes one free" was a common axiom, it seemed there were many who were willing to test the idea for themselves.²⁶

The immediate effect of the Plague was seen as wages twice those paid in years previous.²⁷ In some areas, this number was even higher, much to the consternation of landlords.²⁸ The Ordinance of Laborers (1349) and its follow-up, the Statute of Labourers, passed by Parliament in 1351, were attempts to cap the demands for higher wages for peasants as well as to regulate the mobility of workers.²⁹ The English government sought for economic stability and the landlords sought to turn back wages to pre-Black Death levels. The newly-introduced legislation made this possible, as it required that hired laborers and household servants accept the salaries and wages received in 1346.³⁰ It also placed limits on artisans and craftsmen, dictating that 1346 prices be charged for goods and services.³¹ Some landlords took full advantage of the opportunity to outbid the

²³ Horrox, 326-331.

²⁴ Ibid., 326.

²⁵ Ziegler, 191.

²⁶ Schama, 237. The idea of "town air makes one free" dictates that if a serf can live in the city for a year and a day, he was considered a free man. This idea did carry weight in courts of law.

²⁷ Ziegler, 190.

²⁸ Ibid..

²⁹ "Statute of Labourers, 1351," Internet, available from <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/seth/statute-labourers.html> accessed on 9 December 2004. Ziegler, 192. W.M. Ormrod, "The English Government and the Black Death of 1348-1349" in *England in the Fourteenth Century: Proceedings of the 1985 Harlaxton Symposium*, ed. W.M. Ormrod (Harlaxton: Boydell Press, 1986), 178.

³⁰ Aberth, 91.

³¹ Ibid..

competition to lure workers, but this sort of behavior was frowned upon by lawmakers and bailiffs intent on upholding the Statute.³² According to the labor laws, any landlord who offered higher wages were to be penalized alongside the peasants who accepted those wages.³³ Further, it appears that peasants who were offered higher wages were required, according to labor laws, to refuse the additional pay.³⁴ If they did not, they would be faced with strict penalties and possibly arrest.³⁵ This legislation would eventually lead to worker discontent that would simmer until the 1370s, at which time the situation would come to the rolling boil known as the Peasants' Revolt in 1381.

The upper class was faced with problems of its own. According to William Dene, chronicler at the cathedral priory of Rochester:

"...Such a shortage of workers ensued that the humble turned up their noses at employment, and could scarcely be persuaded to serve the eminent unless for triple wages. As a result, churchmen, knights, and other worthies have been forced to thresh their corn, plough the land, and perform every other unskilled task if they are to make their own bread."³⁶

Dene also describes those "well-endowed with goods and possessions" as being "yet without all service and attendance."³⁷ While these issues may seem frivolous in a modern light, more serious matters of infertility and disease took their toll on the gentry, becoming more "potent enemies" than anything else the noble class had faced to

32 Aberth, 69.

33 Ibid..

34 _____, "Wiltshire, England Assize Roll of Labor Offenders" in *The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-1350*, ed. John Aberth (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin, 2005), 92.

35 Ibid..

36 Horrox, 70.

37 Horrox, 70.

date.³⁸ While the Black Death was not as large a contributor to the mortality rate of the nobility as it was in the peasantry, it did have an effect on how they carried out business.³⁹ With labor at a higher cost, a decreased ability to retain workers, inflation affecting the cost of materials and selling price of goods, and an increased inability to pass lands on to their children, many nobles resorted to the only option available. In many cases, a lord's holdings were sold to the peasants who were given the ability to own land of their own.⁴⁰ This was not the fate of all landowners, some of whom found a wealth of talent in their own estates in the form of administrators. These individuals were able to make some estates profitable very soon after the first outbreaks of the plague, although this was certainly not the norm.⁴¹

The Crown was facing difficulties similar to those faced by the landlords and responded in much same fashion as the landlords: by insisting on the "preservation of its rights". Royal revenues were suffering due to the lack of agricultural workers to make holdings profitable and therefore taxable.⁴² However, it should be noted that revenues for the Crown recovered quickly and any real deficit in royal income was more than offset by income generated by currency reform.⁴³ This recovery was welcome as Edward III, monarch of England and instigator of the Hundred Years War, had military costs to consider as well as labor issues at home. The landlords would not have the guarantee of recovery enjoyed by the crown, leaving them to rely on the Statute of Laborers to preserve their standing.

Simon Islip, Archbishop of Canterbury, was troubled over issues not unlike those addressed in the Statute of Laborers.⁴⁴ Priests found themselves in high demand following the great loss of clergy

³⁸ Colin Platt, *King Death: The Black Death and its aftermath in late-medieval England* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 49.

³⁹ Platt, 49.

⁴⁰ Ziegler, 193.

⁴¹ Platt, 51.

⁴² Ormrod, 181.

⁴³ Ibid., 182.

⁴⁴ Aberth, 104.

and laity and were often lured to more lucrative positions, such as those in private chapels or chantries, from their congregations (and collections) diminished by plague activity.⁴⁵ The Archbishop refers to these priests as consumed by an “insatiable greed” and implemented procedures demanding that priests to “suitably provide before all else for the good governance of parish churches, prebends, and chapels whose care of souls is in jeopardy...with a salary...limited to those received in times past.”⁴⁶ He threatens severe censure against those who refuse to comply with the new procedures and promises disciplinary action against offending clergy should any request transfer into his diocese.⁴⁷ These threats appear to have gone largely unheeded, as John Thoresby, Archbishop of York, filed a complaint against chaplain Sir Adam Brantingham, for dereliction of his parish duties in 1362.⁴⁸ Thoresbury requested that “lawful and effective steps to compel the aforesaid chaplain, Sir Adam, to fulfill his duties.”⁴⁹

Morality was viewed as being under attack during this time period, as evidenced by the greed exhibited by even the clergy. The Black Death was explained by some as the act of a vengeful and angry God, whose wrath was incurred by the whole of Europe and the Middle East. In the introduction to *The Decameron*, Giovanni Boccaccio presented a picture of two types of Italians: the first, isolationists who embrace piety and avoid excess and outsiders as if either will bring the plague and second, those who embraced a philosophy of “eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die.”⁵⁰ These stereotypes could also be seen in England, although in *The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-1350*, John Aberth questions the existence of the truly depraved, believing them to be

⁴⁵ Ibid., 104-105, 107.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 105-106.

⁴⁷ Ibid..

⁴⁸ Horrox, 310.

⁴⁹ Ibid..

⁵⁰ Giovanni Boccaccio, “The Introduction to *The Decameron*” in *The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-1350, A Brief History with Documents* (Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2005), 75.

more of a literary device rather than based on an accurate historical observation, although he acknowledges the (temporary) ruin of many societal mores.⁵¹ The "morality issue" was, perhaps, not a matter of wild debauchery, but rather of a society attempting to comprehend a God who seemed to have turned His back on them. Nevertheless, medieval chroniclers claim a decline in spirituality among congregations following the Black Death.⁵² What can be said surely is that this period gave birth to the "cult of remembrance", an idea that, in England, would manifest itself in the purchase of chantries and an increase in requests for portraiture, which requests may have fueled secular patronage during the Renaissance.⁵³ The need to preserve one's memory in a time when entire communities were being erased was potent and certainly understood well by the Catholic Church, which found itself under increased pressure at this time.

The Catholic Church in England experienced an alarming drop in clergy. While the Black Death was ravaging the countryside, it took with it many monks, nuns, and other members of the clergy. Thomas Burton, a Cistercian monk at Meaux Abbey, Yorkshire, describes how many chaplains were unharmed long enough to perform last rites for the dying, but were then "swallowed by death in great numbers, as others had been before."⁵⁴ With a mortality rate of 45 percent in most parishes across England and a loss of 50 percent of priests in the parishes of Norwich, Winchester, and Exeter, it was soon discovered that there were simply not enough priests to attend to the needs of the dying.⁵⁵ In 1349, a general absolution was issued to England by Pope Clement VI, allowing forgiveness for the truly contrite who died from the plague in the three months following the

⁵¹ Aberth, 67.

⁵² Ibid., 95.

⁵³ Ibid., 4, 96. Chantries are explained on page 12, paragraph one of this paper.

⁵⁴ Horrox, 69.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 95.

publication; however, it appears this information did not reach Ralph of Shrewsbury, Bishop of Bath and Wells.⁵⁶ He wrote:

"Priests cannot be found for love or money...to visit the sick and administer the last sacraments of the Church. If none can be found, it is proper to confess to a lay person or a woman if no man is available."

The proclamation ran sharply counter to the established doctrine of the Catholic Church. The authority to hear confessions had been the exclusive province of the priesthood, and the step to throw open this sacred responsibility to the laity and, in particular, women, was a radical move on the part of the church. While this was certainly not meant to be a permanent situation, it did open up the idea of salvation being a "do-it-yourself project". It could be argued, then, that this single occurrence may have influenced others in the future such as John Wycliffe and others in the early Reformation movements, as the grip strictly maintained by the Catholic Church was proven to be fallible. Many, however, followed a more traditional path to Heaven, which led to the rise of chantries, or insurance policies, purchased in advance of one's death to either build special chapels for the deceased or to simply request masses to be chanted for the soul. The idea of a chantry was to shorten one's stay in Purgatory should their lives be halted suddenly by an attack of the plague. The purchase of early release from Purgatory would lead to other issues, such as the purchase of indulgences, which would be addressed by the Reformation.

⁵⁶ Horrox, 68-69.

⁵⁷ Schama, 232.

⁵⁸ Ziegler, 97.

⁵⁹ Schama, 23

⁶⁰ Schama, 238.

Peasant, prince, man, woman, layman and clergy were all affected by the Black Death; perhaps not in equal portions, but there were none who were not touched by this plague. In many ways, the Black Death helped those engaged in medieval life to shake out of their accepted routine and to examine other possibilities, if only for a moment in history. Peasants were able to dictate terms and even hold power over their masters allowing them, in some small fashion, helm their own destinies. Women began to assert themselves, making their own decisions regarding marriage and childbearing. Landlords and other nobles scrambled to retain their status, enacting legislation to bolster their positions. The Catholic Church became aware of some of the flaws in their clergy as priests fled the plague and then abandoned their posts for more lucrative positions elsewhere. Doors were opened for revolt and religious revolutions on a scale not frequently seen in years past. In short, the Black Death provided a turning point in medieval history that continues to resonate into the present day.



OPERATION SUNRISE: THE SECRET SURRENDER THAT ALLOWED THE BRITISH TO OCCUPY TRIESTE

JAY GLASMANN

The year was 1945. After years of bloody fighting and countless battles, the Second World War was rapidly approaching a dramatic conclusion. In Europe, the Nazi war machine had lost a gamble by throwing its last reserves at the Allied forces in the Battle of the Bulge. The Anglo-American forces were about to cross the Rhein and move into Germany proper. The massive Russian Red Army was preparing to encircle the Nazi capital of Berlin. Stories abound of the units involved in these famous battles. History books tell us that with the end of the war in Europe an ideological struggle appeared, known as the Cold War, as the Communist East and the Democratic West squared off ideologically for the next four decades.

This ideological struggle had been put on hold for the duration of World War II, as the East and West united to defeat a common enemy. But as the war was ending, both the Soviets and the West were positioning themselves for the resumption of this struggle. Lost in the stories of the great battles preceding the German surrender is the Italian front, which was doomed to secondary status with the decision to open a second front in France in 1944. Although Italy was of a secondary nature in military circles, it was to be of primary importance in shaping the post-war situation. America and Britain managed to gain the upper hand in the Italian area because of the successful conclusion of secret negotiations between a high ranking OSS officer and the top SS commander in Italy. Their story is the focus of this paper.

On April 29, 1945, terms were signed in Caserta, Italy, by the German forces in Italy with the combined U.S. and British forces, dictating the unconditional surrender of the German forces in Italy, effective on May 2, 1945. This surrender played an important role in the ending of the war in Europe and the Anglo-American occupation of Trieste, an important port providing easy access to Austria. The success of Operation Sunrise—the codename given by the Americans to the secretly negotiated surrender of the German forces in Italy—allowed the Western Allies to occupy the port of Trieste before it could fall into communist hands. Operation Sunrise succeeded because of a prevalent defeatist attitude among German military and political leaders in the Italian theater, the mistrust of the Soviets by both German and Anglo-American leaders, and the consistent actions for surrender of SS General Karl Wolff in the face of grave personal danger.

Since shortly prior to the Allied assault in Normandy, Italy had become a secondary front in Anglo-American war planning. The plan was to use the Anglo-American units already in place to draw and keep as many German units as possible in Italy and away from the Russian front.¹ After breaking through the German Gothic defensive line in fall of 1944, the Anglo-American offensive had become bogged down during the winter months.² The next major Allied offensive in Italy would not be until early April 1945. It was during the winter stalemate that contact between the German military and American negotiators began in Italy. There are vastly different reasons for why each side was willing to attempt negotiations.

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. 4, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), 742.

² Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., ed., *United State Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations*.

Vol. 4, Cassino to the Alps by Ernest J. Fisher, Jr. (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1977), 415.

German Defeatism

The defeatist attitude among German military and political leaders in Italy is evidenced by the number of peace feelers initiated, beginning in late 1944. These contacts with Allied military leaders and neutral middlemen were initiated by anti-Nazi German diplomats, leaders of German military units along and behind the front lines, and eventually by SS leaders, including that of SS General Karl Wolff.³ The important figures in the Italian theater whose attitudes played a role in Operation Sunrise were Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, his Chief of Staff General Hans Roettiger, SS General Karl Wolff, the German Ambassador to Italy, Rudolf Rahn, Luftwaffe General Max Ritter von Pohl, and General Heinrich von Vietinghoff.⁴

A defeatist attitude was not an uncommon occurrence among German military leaders in the final days of World War II. Wolff and Rahn believed that "Germany was completely and inevitably defeated as far as they were concerned."⁵ This belief led them to initiate contact with Allen Dulles in an attempt to bring about the surrender of the German Army in Italy. Allen Dulles was a high-ranking officer of the Office of Strategic Services, the OSS, working in Switzerland to gather intelligence on the Nazi government and German resistance groups. General von Pohl, who had seen the almost complete destruction of the Luftwaffe in Italy, knew the end was near and, according to Dulles, it was "not surprising that he became discouraged about the war's outcome before his colleagues on the ground."⁶ Roettiger had no military units under his direct control, but played a crucial role in convincing both Kesselring and Vietinghoff of the necessary part they must play in surrender. Before becoming Kesselring's chief of staff, Roettiger had been inactivated

³ Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi, *Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender* (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1979), 56.

⁴ Allen Dulles, *The Secret Surrender* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 83.

⁵ Jochen von Lang, *Top Nazi: SS General Karl Wolff, The Man Between Hitler and Himmler* (New York: Enigma Books, 2005), 274.

⁶ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 65.

due to “disagreements with Hitler over the conduct of the war in Russia.”⁷ These disagreements led him to believe that Germany could no longer win and that seeking a way to end the war was the only solution.⁸ The majority of the German generals in Italy recognized that continued fighting was hopeless. They were sick of the war and of Hitler, and were ready to consider surrender, although not unconditionally, and not with the Soviets. No member of the German military wanted to end up in Siberia, and a common theme in the German Army during the final days of the war was to hold lines as long as possible to allow more units to reach the Anglo-American lines before a capitulation.

Soviet Influences

The Soviets were to play a large if indirect role in most surrender negotiations near the end of the war, and Operation Sunrise was no exception. As the negotiations in Switzerland were nearing completion, a portion of the remaining German forces—Army Groups C, E, and G—were positioned along the Alpine corridors with orders to “hold out long enough to allow those forces retreating before the Russians to reach the American and British armies and surrender not to the dreaded Russians but to the Western Allies.”⁹ This was a strategy favored by Kesselring and played a role in his noncommittal position towards agreeing to surrender. Kesselring commented that a “premature surrender of Army Group C would create an untenable position for Army Groups Southeast and G north of the Alps.”¹⁰ This strategy of delaying surrender in order to move more German soldiers to the American front was not unique to the Italian front. General Eisenhower notes that “it seemed clear that the Germans were playing for time so that they could transfer

⁷ Ibid..

⁸ Ibid..

⁹ Fischer, 505.

¹⁰ Albert Kesselring, *Kesselring: A Soldier's Record* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1954), 341.

behind our lines the largest possible number of German soldiers still in the field.”¹¹ The final German surrender was a result of Eisenhower threatening to close the Anglo-American front and by force prevent any further German refugees from crossing their lines.¹² The threat of forcing all remaining German soldiers to surrender to the Soviets was enough to end German delaying tactics.

The Soviets also played an important role in the thinking of the Anglo-Americans in regards to Operation Sunrise. The supreme goal of the American military leaders as a whole was to end the war as quickly as possible with a minimum loss of life. This goal was to be accomplished “through cooperation with the Soviet Union.”¹³ At times the goal to minimize loss of life created conflict with the Soviets, who were demanding a second front to relieve pressure on the Eastern Front. Prior to the Normandy invasion, the Western Allies had been struggling in the Italian area. The Anglo-American coalition worried that only a massive reinforcement in Italy would break the stalemate.¹⁴ But a reinforcement of Anglo-American forces in Italy would delay the planned Normandy invasion which “might be a mortal blow not only to the prospect for postwar cooperation but also to the Allied coalition against Hitler.”¹⁵ One of the greatest fears of American policymakers at this time was that the failure to open a second front might possibly result in a separate peace between Hitler and Stalin.¹⁶ Further delays of the Normandy invasion might also result in the Russians “completing the liberation of Europe with only minimal American involvement.”¹⁷

¹¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1948), 426.

¹² Ibid..

¹³ Smith and Agarossi, 7.

¹⁴ James Edward Miller, *The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 68.

¹⁵ Ibid..

¹⁶ Miller, 69.

¹⁷ Ibid..

Besides the larger worries of Soviet influence in post-war Germany, the Anglo-Americans also worried that northern Italy would become a communist stronghold. The Anglo-American forces in Italy were worried that the military stalemate during the winter of 1944-45 would not be broken before the culmination of the war in Germany.¹⁸ During this time the Soviets were making progress into Austria and Tito's partisan forces were moving towards the Italian border. Churchill saw danger in allowing the communist forces to control too large an area. In a letter to President Roosevelt on April 5, 1945 he commented that,

We proposed and thought we had arranged six weeks ago provisional zones of occupation in Austria, but that since Yalta the Russians have sent no confirmation of these zones. Now that they are on the eve of taking Vienna and very likely will occupy the whole of Austria it may well be prudent for us to hold as much as possible in the north.¹⁹

As Anglo-American forces began to move into western Austria in late April 1945, the negotiations in Italy became more important due to hopes that it would allow British units to occupy Trieste before Tito's communist forces could arrive. Trieste was a strategic port that would allow the Anglo-Americans to have a shorter supply line to western Austria, thereby reducing Soviet communist influence in the region.²⁰ The Three Powers had agreed to specific demarcations in Austria, but the Anglo-Americans worried that without the port of Trieste, they would be unable to effectively supply the region. This in turn, they assumed, would allow the Soviets undue influence throughout the region. There were already examples of Stalin asking the United States to "recognize the various governments in eastern Europe" that had been set up in countries the Soviets had managed

¹⁸ Smith and Agarossi, 46.

¹⁹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Vol. 6, Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), 512.

²⁰ Geoffrey Cox, *The Race for Trieste* (London: William Kimber, 1977), 15.

to fully occupy.²¹ The Anglo-American forces would only be able to reach Trieste if the stalemate in Italy could be broken. Trieste was also important because there had been no agreement between the Soviets and Anglo-Americans on demarcation lines in the Balkan regions. Because of the stalemate in Italy, Operation Sunrise became an important tool that could potentially allow the Anglo-Americans to reach Trieste prior to Tito's communist forces and give the Anglo-Americans a position of strength in post-war discussions. Churchill worried that Tito's forces would be able to occupy and claim land that they reached prior to the Anglo-American forces. "Both the Americans and ourselves were not only determined to prevent any frontiers being settled in this manner before the Peace Treaty, but also intended to secure Trieste, with its splendid port, as the essential supply point for the future occupation of zones in Austria."²² Trieste held little or no military value in the defeat of Germany, but was a strategic point in the future confrontation against the Soviets.

Alpine Redoubts

As fighting progressed along the Italian front during 1945 American military leaders were facing another fear. The German Army was falling back on all fronts and their eventual collapse seemed inevitable. But Nazi propaganda was proclaiming the existence of military strongholds, or redoubts, which would continue to fight on and deny the Allies their hoped-for total victory.²³ Although Dulles had discovered no "real signs of serious preparation," he believed that "something in the nature of a redout [redoubt] is inevitable."²⁴ Kesselring described the Alpine Fortress as the "merest

²¹ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference*, ed. by Walter Johnson (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1949), 310.

²² Churchill, 551.

²³ Smith and Agarossi, 23.

²⁴ Allen Dulles, *From Hitler's Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942-1945* Ed. Neal H. Petersen (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 462.

make believe” and that based on supply levels and preparation the plan was “impracticable.”²⁵ Ambassador Rahn believed that “a final resistance in the Alps with all the abominable consequences for southern German and the German population in Tirol should be avoided.”²⁶ But the German Army was fighting hard along the Alpine fronts in Italy and Kesselring’s strategy of holding these fronts to allow open passage to the American lines was being misinterpreted by the Americans as the beginning defense of an Alpine Fortress.²⁷ Due to Anglo-American concerns about loss of life they dreaded a continuation of the fighting against fanatical Nazis in the Alps. Field Marshall Harold Alexander, leader of the Anglo-American forces in Italy, believed that “a long senseless struggle for an Alpine redoubt seemed but a natural concluding act for an Italian campaign which had consisted of one bloody, indecisive battle after another.”²⁸ This fear was used by Dulles as justification for dealing with the SS in hopes of achieving an early end to the fighting. He hoped that a negotiated surrender would “reduce the effectiveness of enemy plans for the German reduct.”²⁹

The Hitler Oath and the Stab-in-the-Back Legend

While a defeatist attitude was becoming more common among the German Army leadership in Italy, the actions of these leaders were very unusual. Individually acting towards negotiated surrender was typically avoided for two pressing reasons: personal loyalty oaths to Hitler, and a desire to avoid another 1918, or a

²⁵ Albert Kesselring, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1989), 277.

²⁶ Rudolf Rahn, *Ruheloses Leben: Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen* (Düsseldorf: Diederichs Verlag, 1949) 422. Translation by Jay Glasmann. Original text as follows: “Nur so war ein letzter Widerstand in den Alpen mit allen entsetzlichen Folgen fuer Sueddeutschland und auch fuer die deutsche Bevoelkerung Tirols zu vermeiden.”

²⁷ Fischer, 505.

²⁸ Smith and Agarossi, 23.

²⁹ Dulles, *Hitler’s Doorstep*, 468.

new 'stab-in-the-back' legend.³⁰ The loyalty oaths were extremely significant in the minds of German officers.³¹ The distinctive feature was that the oath pledged loyalty to Hitler, not to flag and country. This oath and its accompanying ceremony had similarities to the sworn fealty of medieval knights to their liege lords.³² Many of the German officers had been brought up in the Prussian military society and were very sensitive to such traditions and this oath presented a difficult matter of conscience.

Two of the first to act were Rudolf Rahn and Karl Wolff. Wolff's decision to act contrary to his oath appears to have been based partially on survival instinct and political calculation. Wolff was more loyal to himself than to Hitler. The fact that this opportunism appears in an SS officer rather than an officer of the German Army is not surprising. Leaders of the German Army were primarily from families from long military lines who had a strong tradition of soldierly honor.³³ Members of the SS were more interested in the power of the Nazi Reich and the fact that it was created to be more important than the military.³⁴ When he saw that Hitler's power was diminishing, Wolff sought the power and influence to be gained by working with the Americans. It is not surprising that Wolff would act to salvage life or fortune with the coming demise of the Nazi regime. During one of his early meetings with Dulles, Wolff was asked to describe his position on surrender.

³⁰ Smith and Agarossi, 50.

³¹ The literal translation of the oath is as follows: "I swear by God this holy oath that I will render unconditional obedience to the Führer of the German Reich and people, Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces, Adolf Hitler, and that as a brave soldier I will be prepared at all times to give my life for this oath." Allen Dulles, *Germany's Underground* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1947), 37-38.

³² Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 32-33.

³³ Fischer, 515.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

Dulles recounts it thus:

He started out by admitting that from the early days of Nazism until the previous year he had had faith in Hitler and had been completely attached to him. Now he realized that the war was lost and that to continue it was a crime against the German people. Therefore, as a good German, he felt compelled to do everything in his power to bring the war to an end.³⁵

The idea that a continued fight was a crime against the German people was not unique to Wolff, but still very few German Army officers moved towards negotiated surrender. This is likely related to the German Army's tradition of loyalty and their desire that Hitler be blamed for military failure.³⁶ Wolff was under no such compunctions, believing instead that to save himself, he must now worry about the German people and not Hitler.

Rahn, as a Nazi ambassador, did not have the same oath to struggle with and also seems to have acted based on an inner loyalty to Germany over Hitler. But Rahn and Wolff could not succeed in their hopes alone. Because Rahn had no direct official military authority and Wolff could only speak for the SS and military units not on the front lines, Wolff and Rahn moved to bring other German generals into their plan. Shortly after Wolff's first contacts with Dulles, Rahn met with Kesselring and "drew him into a discussion of the hopeless military and political outlook for Germany...telling him bluntly that the last moment had come to save the German nation from total destruction."³⁷ As Kesselring rose to leave, he told Rahn, "I hope that your political plans succeed."³⁸ Roettiger and von Pohl soon joined with Rahn and Wolff in pressuring Kesselring while they also met to discuss the results of Wolff's meetings with Dulles.

³⁵ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 97.

³⁶ Smith and Agarossi, 50.

³⁷ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 85.

³⁸ Rahn, 423. Translation by Jay Glasmann. Original text as follows: "Ich hoffe, dass Ihre politischen Pläne in Erfüllung gehen."

Although willing to discuss the idea of surrender and continued contact with Dulles, most of the conspiring generals were wary of actual surrender. This wariness was the result of a desire to find a way to avoid the creation of another 'stab-in-the-back' myth like that created by the Armistice. The German military had promoted the idea that they had not been defeated in 1918 but rather that they had essentially been 'stabbed-in-the-back', or abandoned, by the civilian government and population.³⁹ A major Nazi tenet "was the pledge that no matter what else might happen after Hitler seized power, there would not be another 'November 1918'."⁴⁰ The German Army was extremely pleased with this commitment. It is understandable then that after twelve years of the German Army trumpeting the level of Nazi commitment to the military that they would struggle to move against the government. German Army leaders were "paralyzed less by fear than by a conditioned belief that this would be the ultimate act of disloyalty and hypocrisy."⁴¹ Ambassador Rahn commented, "We wanted the war to end, at least in the Italian area....But this had to occur in a way to repress any 'stab-in-the-back' legend from arising."⁴²

Kesselring and Vietinghoff both worried that surrender would bring about a repeat of the Versailles treaty and that the German Army would be blamed for Hitler's failures.⁴³ When initially confronted with Wolff's idea of surrendering, Vietinghoff refused to participate because, "it would clear the Reich's leadership of responsibility for the collapse...and produce a myth in which Hitler was the martyr and the army was the assassin."⁴⁴ The swift and vicious retribution by Hitler against the members of the German

³⁹ Smith and Agarossi, 50.

⁴⁰ Ibid..

⁴¹ Smith and Agarossi, 50.

⁴² Rahn, 422. Translation by Jay Glasmann. Original text as follows: "Wir wollten den Krieg beenden, gewiss, mindestens hier im italienischen Raum....Aber dies musste in einer Form geschehen, die niemals eine neue 'Dolchstosslegende' aufkommen liess."

⁴³ Kesselring, *A Soldier's Record*, 332.

⁴⁴ Smith and Aragossi, 50.

Army who participated in the July 20th assassination plot was still present in the minds of these generals. Kesselring, for all his passivity towards the surrender negotiations and knowledge that the war was not winnable, "repeatedly dismissed as unfeasible any secret deal with the Allies, simply because Hitler was still alive (sic)."⁴⁵ The German Army did not want to be blamed for prematurely ending the war even though there was no longer any real hope of winning. It wanted the German people and the rest of the world to realize that Hitler was to blame and wanted to prevent his being made into a martyr.

Vietinghoff characterized another fear when he described that he was willing to surrender, but wanted honorable military terms so that, "he would not go down in history as a traitor to his country or to the traditions of his family and caste."⁴⁶ Vietinghoff's idea of honorable terms included not being interned in either England or America, and being allowed to return to Germany with belts and bayonets as evidence of an orderly surrender.⁴⁷ The military upbringing that demanded loyalty to Hitler was now in conflict with the desire for honorable surrender instead of pointless fighting.

The Role of SS General Karl Wolff

It was because of the wariness and vacillations of Kesselring and others that General Wolff played the most important role in Operation Sunrise. Wolff met with Hitler in early February 1945, and wondered aloud if it might be wise to seek a political solution parallel to military efforts.⁴⁸ Hitler did not openly reject the suggestion, and Wolff concluded that since Hitler "appeared to agree in general with what I had said that he was authorizing that something should be attempted, though without giving any specific directives."⁴⁹ After this meeting, Wolff sought contacts that would

⁴⁵ Ibid., 51.

⁴⁶ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 139.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 140.

⁴⁸ von Lang, 268.

⁴⁹ Smith and Aragossi, 67.

lead to negotiations with the Americans. Wolff sought contact with the Americans through Italian religious and business leaders with the false hope that this would allow Germany to focus its attention solely on the Soviet threat. He did not yet understand that only unconditional surrender was possible.⁵⁰

Initial Contact and Problems

Having established a connection with Allen Dulles, Wolff immediately proceeded to open negotiations for a potential surrender. Shortly afterwards, Heinrich Himmler and Ernst Kaltenbrunner, two other high ranking SS officers, accused Wolff of disregarding orders from Hitler and being a traitor for communicating with the Americans. Wolff initially justified his actions by quoting an idea popular with Hitler at the time, that being that any negotiations with the West "could be done in such a way that the alliance would disintegrate and the Western powers would join forces with Nazi Germany to fight the Soviet Union."⁵¹ When confronted by Hitler and Himmler, Wolff only mentioned a desire to drive a wedge between the Allies as a way to justify his actions. It is clear, though, that he never intended to use his contact for this purpose. During meetings with Rahn to plan how they would present themselves to Dulles, Rahn was adamant that they clarify to Dulles that "we are convinced that the Anglo-American/Russian alliance would last at least until the total military defeat of Germany, and that we do not want to foolishly attempt to drive a wedge between the Allies."⁵²

⁵⁰ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 124.

⁵¹ Smith and Aragossi, 71.

⁵² Rahn, 421. Translation by Jay Glasmann. Original text as follows: "wir seien ueberzeugt, dass die angelsaichsisch-russische Allianz mindestens bis zur totalen militaerischen Niederlage Deutschlands von Bestand sei und dass wir nicht den toerichten Versuch machen wollten, mit unseren Verhandlungen einen Keil zwischen die Alliierten zu treiben."

Dulles commented that:

From the very beginning I had felt that the only real danger which could come from my meeting with Wolff lay in some maneuver on the German side to use it to drive a wedge between the Russians and us. It would have been a simple matter for the Germans to let word leak to the Russians that some secret negotiations were going on in Switzerland, that the Western Allies were running out on them. If the Germans had an ulterior motive and Wolff was being used as a tool by Hitler and Himmler, this would certainly be the way the game would be played.⁵³

Dulles was quick to alert Field Marshall Alexander who officially notified the Soviets and invited them to send a representative who would be allowed to participate in any official negotiations.⁵⁴ Once Wolff returned from Berlin he then continued negotiations for the outright surrender of German forces in Italy. Although Wolff tried to justify his actions based on vague statements from Hitler, he clearly operated outside of any authority he could imagine, and took a major risk in his continued negotiations with Dulles.⁵⁵

Wolff's Authority and Position

Wolff also occupied an ideal position that made him the best situated to negotiate a surrender in Italy. Wolff's chain of command ran directly to Himmler with no middlemen, and in some instances directly to Hitler. Wolff's position in the SS was only superseded by Himmler, who named himself 'Reichsfuehrer' in order to keep his rank obviously higher.⁵⁶ Wolff had joined the Nazi party in 1930 and the SS that same year.⁵⁷ He had risen to a position at the head

⁵³ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 109.

⁵⁴ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 109.

⁵⁵ Smith and Agarossi, 71.

⁵⁶ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 59.

⁵⁷ Smith and Agarossi, 65.

of Himmler's personal staff by 1935.⁵⁸ Wolff worked at Hitler's headquarters from 1939-1943 until a falling out occurred between Himmler and Wolff due to Wolff's divorce. Wolff remarried soon thereafter, but Himmler used the divorce as an excuse to remove Wolff from Hitler's headquarters and place him in Italy.⁵⁹ As the SS general in Italy, Wolff controlled all police and border forces for the entire Swiss-Italian border.⁶⁰ This enabled Wolff and his authorized negotiators to cross the border for meetings with Dulles without suspicion. This position was also important for another reason. Wolff's position meant that "if any question of authority between SS police and military forces should arise in the North Italian area, Wolff could act as coordinator."⁶¹ This allowed Wolff to restrain Hitler's scorched earth policy as the German Army retreated before the Anglo-American offensive in April, 1945.

Wolff was also the political liaison for any Commander in Chief of the Italian area and as such he had influential access to both Kesselring and Vietinghoff. Kesselring noted this influence when he met with Vietinghoff, Roettiger, and Rahn prior to the official surrender of the German forces in Italy on May 2, 1945. Kesselring actually opposed the surrender from a military standpoint and ordered the arrest of Wolff and his co-conspirators. In his memoirs, he noted that, "I have never ceased to regret that Wolff, with whom I was associated for better or worse, was not present; he would certainly have put me wise.... I would probably have decided and acted differently."⁶² This comment implies that Wolff might have been capable of convincing Kesselring to break the loyalty oath that he so blindly followed from tradition and honor. Because of Wolff's absence, Kesselring "refused to take action until he was released from his oath to the Führer by formal announcement of Hitler's death."⁶³

⁵⁸ Ibid..

⁵⁹ Ibid..

⁶⁰ Dulles, *Hitler's Doorstep*, 467.

⁶¹ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 51.

⁶² Kesselring, *A Soldier's Record*, 341.

⁶³ Dulles, *Germany's Underground*, 39.

Fortunately, official notification of Hitler's suicide was received a few hours later and Kesselring rescinded the arrest orders and approved the surrender.

Controlling Hitler and Dulles

Wolff's actions required him to walk a fine line of intrigue. In his first face-to-face meeting with Dulles in February 1945, Wolff stated that "the time had come when some German with power to act should lead Germany out of war to end useless material and human destruction."⁶⁴ But during negotiations, Wolff had to constantly reassure Dulles and American generals that neither Hitler nor Himmler were behind his actions. Wolff knew that the Allies "would not even accept an unconditional surrender from him [Hitler]," and had been told often that "talks would immediately end" if they found Wolff to be acting on any instructions from Hitler.⁶⁵ Rahn noted this and commented that "the reports seemed to agree with the thought that from the outset we would need to play with completely open cards with Mr. Dulles."⁶⁶ As previously stated, the Anglo-Americans did not want to be accused of negotiating with Hitler because it would endanger the alliance with the Soviets. Yet Wolff, who met with Hitler at least three times between January and April 1945, reported that through his actions he was "opening the gates of the White House in Washington and the door to the prime minister in London for talks."⁶⁷ Hitler always reacted positively to these statements.⁶⁸ In this way, Wolff enabled himself to continue working toward a surrender, which is what he wanted, and both Hitler and Dulles were convinced that their wishes were being

⁶⁴ Dulles, *Hitler's Doorstep*, 468.

⁶⁵ von Lang, 288.

⁶⁶ Rahn, 424. Translation by Jay Glasmann. Original text as follows: "Die Aufzeichnung war von dem Gedanken bestimmt, dass wir von vornherein mit Herrn Dulles mit voellig offenen Karten spielen mussten."

⁶⁷ von Lang, 288.

⁶⁸ Ibid..

followed by Wolff. Wolff succeeded in concealing his true intentions from both Hitler and Himmler, neither of whom was stupid. At the same time, Wolff convinced Dulles that Hitler knew nothing of these negotiations.⁶⁹ If either of these two masters had not been convinced, the entire operation would have failed. What made Wolff's job easier was that both Hitler and Dulles wanted to believe Wolff. As the situation became more desperate for Hitler, he was willing to grasp at the positive nature of Wolff's statements, which coincided with Hitler's hopes at this point. Dulles was not as desperate for the surrender to succeed, but was willing to believe Wolff because he had no other information to contradict Wolff's accounts of his discussions with Himmler and Hitler.

Personal Fears and Conflict with Himmler

In spite of this, Wolff struggled at times to commit to decisive action. For all his boldness when meeting with Hitler, Wolff still feared for his life and the life of his family. This suggests that Wolff was merely an opportunist and that his actions were first and foremost designed to benefit himself in the post-war world. Wolff, himself, described his motivation in such a way that, "with the encirclement of Berlin, with the death of Hitler, with the Italian front completely cut off from the Reich, then he would feel he had complete freedom of action."⁷⁰ After a meeting with Himmler in late March 1945, where he was questioned very closely on his actions, Wolff feared being accused of treachery or high treason and hid in his house for two days.⁷¹ Himmler had "forbidden Wolff to leave Italy and indicated that he would check on Wolff's presence there almost hourly."⁷² During this time, Wolff refused any and all visitors and did nothing to contact Dulles in Switzerland about a previously arranged meeting.

⁶⁹ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 163

⁷⁰ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 180.

⁷¹ von Lang, 280.

⁷² Kermit Roosevelt, ed., *The Overseas Targets War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services)*, vol. 2 (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), 323-324.

Then Kesselring was transferred from Italy to be the new head of the German Army in Western Europe. Wolff feared that Vietinghoff, the new Commander-in-Chief of Italy, would not be as receptive to the surrender plans already being developed. Wolff disappeared in search of Kesselring in an effort to seek his definite approval of the plan so that Wolff could then pass it on to Vietinghoff.⁷³ Adding to his fears was a message from Himmler mentioning that Wolff's decision to move his family to Italy was a mistake, and that Wolff's family was to remain in Germany under Himmler's personal protection.⁷⁴ Wolff's family had become hostages.⁷⁵

This personal battle between Wolff and Himmler played a major role in the final outcome of Operation Sunrise. Himmler was not totally against the notion of surrender, but wanted the contacts to flow through him for his own personal prestige. Himmler knew that for some time "Wolff had been in better graces with the Führer and that he [Himmler] was deeply in 'Reich shit'."⁷⁶ He feared that Wolff might replace him as head of the SS and wanted to force Wolff back into the position of submissive subordinate. At first Himmler simply kept Wolff as far from Berlin as possible, which resulted in Wolff's appointment to Italy once Himmler had a valid excuse because of Wolff's divorce. With the rumor that Wolff was meeting with American contacts in Switzerland, Wolff's new family became the stranglehold Himmler tried to use to take control of the situation. This battle was eventually resolved when Wolff threatened to inform Hitler of Himmler's own desires to attempt surrender negotiations. Himmler, fearing for his life, refused to involve Hitler and left Wolff to continue on his way.⁷⁷

⁷³ Dulles, *Hitler's Doorstep*, 479.

⁷⁴ von Lang, 280.

⁷⁵ Ibid..

⁷⁶ von Lang, 287.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 288.

Final Negotiations

During Wolff's early April trip to Berlin, Dulles feared that Wolff would not return alive. Dulles did not know why Wolff had been summoned and guessed that somehow the surrender plans had been discovered and that Wolff was being called back to be executed. Dulles commented, "Without Wolff, the moving force in the whole operation, it seemed to us there would be no surrender, not now at least."⁷⁸ Dulles also knew of the planned Allied spring offensive and worried that time for the surrender was running out. After voicing his concerns to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he was ordered to suspend all negotiations and forbidden to have contact with Wolff or his representatives. Two days later, Wolff radioed that he would be sending two representatives with full powers to effect the surrender. Once Dulles managed to get his orders reversed, a formal surrender was signed on April 29, 1945, in Caserta, Italy.⁷⁹ This surrender was to begin officially on May 2, 1945.

Once again, Wolff was required to play a dangerous role in order to make the surrender successful. The news of the surrender had to be conveyed over battle lines hundreds of miles long that ran through some very rough and difficult terrain. At the same time there was not unified acceptance of the surrender within the German Army. The surrender terms required that all hostilities cease at 1200 G.M.T. and although the commanding generals of both the SS and the German Wehrmacht had signed the formal surrender document, lesser individual commanders had not been consulted and many refused to comply, choosing rather to continue fighting.⁸⁰ These

⁷⁸ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 156.

⁷⁹ James Srodes, *Allen Dulles: Master of Spies* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1999), 347.

⁸⁰ "United States--Germany--Great Britain--Soviet Union: Unconditional Surrender of German and Italian Forces at Caserta," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 39, no. 3, Supplement: Official Documents. (July 1945), 168-169, Internet, available from <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9300%28194507%2939%3A3%3C168%3AUSBUUS%3E2.O.CO%3B2-T>, accessed on 26 Nov. 2006.

younger commanders were fiercely loyal to Hitler and refused to obey the surrender orders. Wolff at one point had to “imprison several of them in a salt mine and ring his headquarters with tanks to keep from being arrested by his own field commanders.”⁸¹

The actions of the younger commanders were brought about by a telegram received from Kesselring ordering the arrest of Wolff and his co-conspirators. Kesselring reached Wolff by telephone during the standoff around 2 a.m. on May 2, 1945.⁸² Kesselring accused Wolff of “driving those soldiers facing the Red Army into Soviet captivity in Siberia” and “endangering the retreat of German troops from Greece and Yugoslavia.”⁸³ Wolff’s counterargument was that “only an immediate surrender would guarantee that western troops rather than the Communists would occupy the key position at Trieste.”⁸⁴ This conversation lasted over two hours and Rahn, who was present, described in his memoirs that “never before have I felt so completely lost and hopeless about our situation as during these two hours.”⁸⁵ Wolff eventually succeeded in convincing Kesselring to rescind the arrest order and approve the surrender.⁸⁶

The Spring Offensive

The surrender negotiations were only privy to a select few in Field Marshall Alexander’s staff. While the negotiations progressed, plans continued on the Anglo-American spring offensive. The Anglo-American offensive resumed in the first week of April, 1945.⁸⁷ Within two weeks, the offensive had broken into the Po river valley and the Anglo-American forces used the return to open valleys to

⁸¹ Srodes, 347.

⁸² von Lang, 305.

⁸³ von Lang, 305.

⁸⁴ Ibid..

⁸⁵ Rahn, 437. Translation by Jay Glasmann. Original text as follows: “Nie zuvor hatte ich so stark die ganze trostlose Verlorenheit und Hoffnungslosigkeit unserer Lage empfunden wie waehrend dieser zwei Stunden.”

⁸⁶ Ibid., 306.

⁸⁷ Fishcer, 459.

quickly advance and cut through the German lines.⁸⁸ These advances quickly turned the German retreats into disorganized routs and Alexander started to believe the negotiated surrender would not be necessary.⁸⁹ Wolff and Rahn knew the Anglo-American offensive would resume with the conclusion of winter and were eager to convince Dulles and Alexander that the surrender would occur and not to waste men and resources on unnecessary attacks. Rahn hoped that through Wolff they could convince Dulles that "in the future the Po line should only be the subject of minor fighting and that the Allied Command should indefinitely postpone their planned offensive."⁹⁰ While such a move would be understandable, the Anglo-Americans could not afford the chance that the surrender would be delayed long enough to keep them from occupying Trieste prior to Tito.

As the advance through the Po Valley progressed, the 2nd New Zealand Division was tasked to advance along the eastern Italian coast.⁹¹ They managed to cross the Po by April 26, 1945, only three days before the surrender documents were signed and a week before it was to take effect.⁹² At this time they had received no direct orders regarding any thrust towards Trieste, and "Field Marshal Alexander was still without any directive from London or Washington to do so."⁹³ Early on April 29, 1945, General Freyberg of the 2nd New Zealand Division received orders to advance with his mechanized troops towards Trieste as quickly as possible.⁹⁴ He did not know that later that day the surrender documents would be signed. These orders were "part of a new directive—not merely to defeat the Germans but

⁸⁸ Thomas A. Popa, *Po Valley 1945*, available online at <http://www.army.mil/cmhp-g/brochures/po/72-33.htm>, internet, accessed on 26 November 2006.

⁸⁹ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 165.

⁹⁰ Rahn, 424. Translation by Jay Glasmann. Original text as follows: "In der Hoehe der Po-Linie sole nur noch hinhaltend gekaempft warden und das Alliierte Oberkommando seine geplante Offensive bis auf weiteres zurueckstellen."

⁹¹ Cox, 121.

⁹² Ibid., 135.

⁹³ Ibid..

⁹⁴ Ibid., 137.

to forestall if possible the Yugoslavs' capture of Trieste."⁹⁵ Tito's forces entered the outskirts of Trieste on April 30, 1945.⁹⁶ They faced tough resistance from the German Army which had retreated to a small number of strongholds within the city. Freyberg's division faced only intermittent German resistance along their way because word of the impending official surrender had reached many of the German Army units in their path.

This lack of resistance allowed Freyberg to enter Trieste at on the afternoon of May 2, 1945. The remaining German strongholds had arranged to surrender to the Yugoslavs at the prescribed surrender time, but "realising that the British were near, had held on until the 22nd Battalion force had arrived on the spot at 5:30 p.m."⁹⁷ This action resulted in some hostile feelings between the New Zealanders and the partisan Yugoslav Army, but also allowed General Freyberg to assume control of the city.⁹⁸ Operation Sunrise had created the events that allowed Anglo-American units to arrive in Trieste and receive the surrender of the remaining German units and prevent Tito's forces from occupying the city.

Disagreement over Wolff

Not all agree that Wolff's persistence in negotiating was the real reason for the success of Operation Sunrise. The most pervasive argument presented for the German forces desire to surrender was the unforeseen success of the Allied spring offensive in Italy. The argument is that the German Army in Italy was already surrendering piecemeal because the front had broken and the Anglo-American forces were advancing rapidly. While the success of the Anglo-American advance played a role in the final move to sign the surrender, it was not the deciding factor in the final negotiations. Even Dulles commented that "it is one thing to negotiate and discuss

⁹⁵ Ibid., 152.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 184.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 187.

⁹⁸ Cox, 187.

while the guns are quiet, it is quite another to try to separate armies locked in active combat.”⁹⁹ As the front lines became more and more fluid, lines of communication were broken, making it more difficult to announce any surrender that might be signed.¹⁰⁰ This is why a three-day wait between the signing of the surrender and the official enforcement was required. The German Army needed the time to spread the word to all remaining units of the designated time to cease-fire and surrender their arms.

Critics also contend that the surrender of the German forces in Italy was unimportant because the actual war ended only a few days later. They contend that Wolff was acting for selfish reasons, attempting in reality to simply save his own skin.¹⁰¹ Wolff, understanding that the war was lost, hoped to avoid being tried after the surrender. Dulles was “prepared to let bygones be bygones and treat Wolff like a regular fellow as a reward for his surrender services,” but was thwarted by the rush of anti-Nazi sentiments that followed the end of the war and the discovery of Nazi atrocities.¹⁰² Wolff managed to avoid any popular trials and was quietly tried and acquitted in 1949, although he was tried once more by a German War Crimes Court in 1962, and sentenced to prison, where he remained until the mid-70s.¹⁰³ Wolff did receive some preferential post-war treatment, which could possibly have been part of his desire to cooperate so fully in seeking surrender. The faint hope for better treatment by the Allies, however, could not have been the driving factor behind Wolff’s continued persistence to achieve surrender. This paper has suggested that Wolff was an opportunist and behaved as such in many instances. But if Wolff was acting solely on selfish reasons of personal survival he would not have taken so many extreme chances to see the negotiations through to completion.

⁹⁹ Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 137.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 182.

¹⁰¹ Smith and Aragossi, 188.

¹⁰² Smith and Agarossi, 187.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 190.

When being confronted by Hitler, and in danger of losing his own life, Wolff would need more than simple selfish reasons for his continued communications with Dulles.

Another point of contention is that Wolff's initial intentions had not been to arrange a "secret surrender of the German forces of Northern Italy."¹⁰⁴ The argument is that if Wolff had truly intended to begin negotiations for surrender then sending two highly recognizable SS officers "would have been a step so foolhardy as to border on madness."¹⁰⁵ A true desire to negotiate would have resulted in Wolff sending less well known officers that would help Wolff avoid being caught. I believe that by sending the two easily recognizable SS officers Wolff made perfectly clear that he was serious about negotiations. The choice of two highly recognizable SS officers first of all made clear that Wolff had control of his forces and was not worried about being denounced, and secondly, because Dulles had information on these two officers he knew they really did have a connection with Wolff. If two less important representatives had been sent they most likely would have been ignored by Dulles.

Conclusion

Operation Sunrise played an important role in the ending of the war in Europe. The fact that the surrender was signed prior to the death of Hitler shows that the leadership of the German Army realized continued fighting was hopeless. These generals were helped along by the persistent actions of Wolff to negotiate a surrender of their armies in Italy. Wolff's ability to keep his true intentions secret from Hitler, to maintain control of his personal situation, and to freely cross the Swiss-Italian border allowed him to be successful in his desire to end the death and destruction around him. Wolff's actions, coupled with the prevalent defeatist attitudes of the German military leadership, combined to bring about the successful surrender of the German forces in Italy on May 2, 1945. The prosecution of the Anglo-American spring offensive, coupled with the successfully

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 70.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid..

negotiated surrender, allowed Anglo-American forces to reach Trieste at just the right time and occupy the city. By ordering the occupation of Trieste, the Anglo-American leaders would achieve an important strategic goal that helped set the stage for post-war negotiations with the Soviets and changed the directive of military units along the eastern Italian front from that of conquering the German Army to that of restricting communist advances.



GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY AND ROLES OF THE PASDARAN
IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN UNDER KHOMEINI

ZARIECK SMITHEY

In 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini came to power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This was one of the most shocking and unpredictable events in the Middle East primarily because the international community thought that the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was unshakable. By itself, the revolution appeared to be just another event in international politics, but when taken in context with the history of the Middle East, two characteristics are noteworthy.

First, never before had there been a state centered on Islamic Fundamentalism, and second, it was also the first time that all state power was found in the hands of the supreme spiritual leader of the people. "The government of Khomeini and his successors is based on a theory of government called *velayat-e-faqih*, literally meaning the guardianship of the religious jurist. The essence of the theory, developed and applied by Khomeini, is that one man with a thorough knowledge of Islamic law is designated as *velayat-e-faqih*, heir to the Prophet Muhammad and the Imams (Leaders)."¹

Khomeini's charismatic leadership not only gained him many followers before the revolution, but also continued to attract those who thought the true principles of Islam were lost under the

¹ Mohammad Mohaddessin, *Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat* (Washington, D.C.: Seven Locks Press, 1993), 17.

leadership of Reza Shah Pahlavi. This same type of leadership allowed him to stay in power until his death in 1989.

During that time he used his quaint leadership style coupled with his state power and his religious authority to promote and export Islamic Fundamentalism throughout the Middle East. Most of these actions were carried out by the Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami, or better known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). The IRGC was created on May 5, 1979 by a decree from Khomeini, and were charged with the responsibility of exporting and protecting the Islamic Fundamentalist revolution. The IRGC was also used by the Ayatollah to support and carry out his political, economic, or social objectives.

Given the wide and varying roles of the IRGC, any effort to understand their actions in relation to the Revolution must be viewed with the backdrop of Islamic Fundamentalism. It is, therefore, pertinent to discuss the principles of Islamic Fundamentalism in Iran during Khomeini's rule since those principles govern in all aspects of Islamic culture and society whether, political, economic and social.

Revisiting Islam

Despite Khomeini's extraordinary ability to attract supporters to his cause, it was ultimately the despotic, anti-Islamic, policies of Reza Khan Pahlavi and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah's of Iran, that led many Iranians to turn away from the government and look toward the Ayatollah for support and guidance. To facilitate suppression of Shiite culture, Reza Khan Pahlavi sought every opportunity to westernize the country and do away with Islamic traditions. He banned the veiling of women's faces and "in 1935 religious leaders called a protest against Reza Shah's ban of the veil for women and his order that men wear billed caps that would prevent them from touching the floor with their foreheads during prayer."²

² Stephen Kinzer, *All The Shah's Men* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 43.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was no different and continued to repress Islamic ideals and beliefs in favor of a more Western culture, and even "commanded that both sexes adopt Western dress."³ An unintended consequence of these policies and oppression was the increase of Islamic zeal throughout Iran. It was this passion that Khomeini used to stir up the people for a revolution. However, neither the people of Iran nor those closest to Khomeini knew that the Ayatollah would usher in an Islamic Fundamentalist theocracy centered on the principle of *velayat-e-faqih*.

The Rise of Khomeinism

Over the course of his exile from Iran, Khomeini issued several statements that were miscalculated to mean that he would not rule directly and that he would set up a democracy with a basis of Islamic law. Those who assumed this not only misunderstood the Ayatollah's idea of Islam, but also did not take into account the context of his surroundings. First, "the apparent nationalist tone of many of his statements from France was largely due to the advice of his Western-educated entourage there—Bani Sadr, Ghotbzadeh, and Yazdi."⁴ Second, "Khomeini's obsession, throughout his life, had been the survival of Islam, not just as a faith but as a way of life."⁵ Thus, it is clear as to why the policies of the Shah's angered the Ayatollah. It was equally clear that if a revolution were going to take place it would be centered on Islam since most of the programs implemented by Reza Shah Pahlavi dealt with institutionalizing Western values and traditions and prohibiting anything associated with Islam.

³ Robin Wright, *In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster 1989), 44.

⁴ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven & London, Yale University Press: 2003), 234.

⁵ Robin Wright, *In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster 1989), 46.

Therefore, “unlike Marxism, variations of which have been the dominant force behind revolutions elsewhere in the twentieth century, the use of Islam involved no conversions or reeducation. Khomeini used Shiite myths and beliefs to set the pace and to provide the flashpoints around which the revolution unfolded, just as he would use them again to provide the themes and justification for many of his theocracy’s actions.”⁶ From his perspective, Islam was “unique among the world’s major monotheistic faiths, it tenets include laws to govern politics and society as well as a set of spiritual beliefs. It covers business deals and banking, hygiene, marriage and divorce, defense and taxes, penal codes even family relationships.”⁷ These misconceptions ignored key elements that would later make up the framework for Khomeini’s fundamentalist regime. Khomeini would use his power and influence as a spiritual leader to turn Iran in to an Islamic Republic. Despite all of the support he gained by propagating the idea that Reza Shah Pahlavi was an enemy to the Islamic nation, what cannot be forgotten is that “the ultimate triumph of the Khomeinists was not only due to domestic factors but was aided by the impetus for national unity provided by the United States hostage crisis of 1979-81 and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88.”⁸ Once Khomeini seized power and established the rule of *velayat-e-faqih* he began to focus on carrying out every action according to the tenets of Islam, regardless of whether those actions pertained to his domestic, political, economical, or international goals of the new Republic.

Despite the overwhelming success of the return of the Ayatollah, there were still many who opposed the revolution and the establishment of an Islamic Republic. Recognizing the need for a force loyal for supporting, exporting, and enforcing the policies of Islam and the Revolution, Khomeini created the Islamic

⁶ Ibid., 59.

⁷ Ibid., 46.

⁸ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), 241.

Revolutionary Guard Corp out of a small band of devoted followers. "Recruitment began immediately through the mosques. It drew zealous volunteers from the poor and humble empowered by the Revolution. As the soldiers of Islam, the men of the Guards wore plain green fatigues without insignia, medals, or ranks."⁹ The role of the IRGC became more defined as the Islamic-based policies of the new government were adopted. In short, Islamic Fundamentalism provided an essential need for the Guards, and they would be used to enforce all segments (economical, political, moral, military, and international), of the Khomeini government.

The time in Iran just after the Revolution can best be described as anarchical. Although Mehdi Bazargan was appointed by Khomeini to be the head of the provisional government, there still existed a small power vacuum in the absence of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Also, many of Iran's minorities saw opportunity to gain independence. "When [Bazargan] took over, government authority was almost nonexistent, and some ethnic groups (Kurds, Turkomans) and leftists were in revolt."¹⁰ The revolution brought hope of independence for many ethnic groups that were spread throughout northern Iran. "Thousands of trained persons had fled, oil production was low, strikes continued, major industries were shut down, and unemployment and inflation were high. The government had to restore order and supervise a referendum, an election, and a constituent assembly."¹¹

Just after the revolution Khomeini used the IRGC to maintain his power and to control order. During the early stages, much of their time was devoted to putting down rebellions and opposition groups who still remained loyal to the government of the Shah. Not surprisingly, the most loyal group of followers of the Reza

⁹ Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation* (Dutton, New York: Penguin Group Press, 1996), 290.

¹⁰ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), 244.

¹¹ Ibid..

Shah Pahlavi regime was the Iranian military. "At the outset of the revolution, the guards [were] used to attack the Shah Pahlavi's forces and arrest the remnants of SAVAK and all those who planned, or were suspected of working against the revolution."¹² Further complicating the revolution was the breakdown of the police and other safekeeping forces and opportunities by boarder states to disrupt the success of Khomeini by promoting and supporting the actions of those wanting independence from Iran in "southern and western provinces, [mainly] Khuzestan and Kurdistan."¹³

The Economy and the Revolution

The desire for Iran to become more Westernized was the Shah's basis and reasoning for taking out loans from various international powers. He used this money to implement policies that were geared toward Westernizing Iran, and in time he hoped these programs would bring Iran into first world status. Most were ineffective and did not take in to account how those policies would affect the day-to-day lives of the Iranian people.

When Khomeini came to power, he inherited a failing economy set up by Reza Shah Pahlavi. The situation was worse than Khomeini expected. Much of the impact to the economy can be attributed to two important factors. First, there was Iran's inability to pay off international debts. There were simply too many. Chief among the debtors was the United States who had acquired a great dislike for Ayatollah Khomeini, and relations between Iran and the U.S. quickly deteriorated as a result of Khomeini's revolution. A substantial amount of debt owed to the U.S. came from two loans, one in 1946 in the amount of \$3.3 million and one in 1947 in the amount of \$22.5 million.¹⁴ These, however, were not the only

¹² Abbasa Zamani, "Revolutionary Guard Commander: "The Danger Comes from the U.S. Leftist Organizations," *MERIP Reports*, March-April, 1980, 28.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁴ Pollack, Kenneth M., *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2004), 83.

loans that Iran was given. There were also loans from Russia for approximately £3,000,000 and from England for approximately £750,000.¹⁵ Although these two loans were much earlier, 1906, these, taken together with the loans from America, still needed to be paid off.

Second, Khomeini had no urge to pay them off. He could have used some of the revenue's from Iran's oil to make payments, but that was either not a goal or it was so insignificant to the Ayatollah that he disregarded the obligation. There were far more important problems that needed his attention.

The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 took place against a background of major civil discontent with growing social and economic disparities, as well as popular anger with political repression. Rising support for the Islamist movement was tied closely to its promise to address the social and economic injustices of the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941-79).¹⁶

With the new Islamic government in place, scores of Iranians were expecting their lives to vastly improve. Although capitalism was seen as a purely Western idea, it, nevertheless, appealed to many of the Iranian population. This was particularly, true for the middle and lower classes, which, under the Shah, were continuously being oppressed by his bad economic platforms. Furthermore, Iran was constantly being taken advantage of because of its abundance of oil. Of course, nothing prepared the people for what was ahead and few realized a potential for Khomeini's economic plans to be much worse than the Shah's.

¹⁵ Ibid., 20.

¹⁶ Roksana Bahramitash, "Market Fundamentalism versus Religious Fundamentalism: Woman's Employment in Iran," *Critique: Critical Middle East Studies* (Spring 04), 36.

“Increasingly in the post revolution period, political and economical power was concentrated in the hands of the Khomeinists clergy and the bazaar bourgeoisie.”¹⁷ This is not surprising since many of the bazaar merchants were supporters of the revolution. Having been entrenched in pre-revolutionary opposition against Reza Shah Pahlavi, Khomeini could count on the Bazaars devotion to the cause in following the principles of Islam vis-à-vis the economy. This would, no doubt, include the refusal to sell Western clothes, movies, and other items of, predominantly American culture to the people in an effort to support the tenets of Islam. A majority of the factories and businesses were state owned and therefore state controlled. Unfortunately, a large portion of the lower classes suffered under the harsh policies, but still remained very loyal to the Ayatollah. “Soon after the revolution there were land seizures by peasants in some regions, and factory strikes and workers’ committees set up in urban areas, but the authorities, whether by compromise, persuasion, or force gradually brought such movements under control.”¹⁸

Khomeini’s economy suffered in other ways also, just prior to the revolution, the United States was one of the main trading partners with Iran. Receiving goods and services from the U.S. was a fundamental aspect of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s plans to not only Westernize Iran, but also to increase its power status in relation to other states in the Middle East. “Iran’s military budget registered astronomical increases reaching almost \$10 billion by fiscal year 1978-79 (beginning on March 21) and the country’s military purchases from the United States expanded even more rapidly reaching \$5.8 billion by 1977.”¹⁹

Khomeini felt that cooperation with the West was detrimental to the Islamic nation. For too long, Westernization hindered the rise of the Islamic Empire, and as a result, the Ayatollah ordered all deals

¹⁷ Ibid., 255.

¹⁸ Ibid., 255-56.

¹⁹ Khosrow Fatemi, “The Iranian Revolution: Its Impact on Economic Relations with the United States”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, November, 1980, 304.

with the West, especially the United States canceled. Consequently, "...one can surmise that the Iranian revolution resulted in a net loss of \$12.5 billion in military hardware sales, plus a residual loss of approximately \$1-2 billion in spare parts sales"²⁰ mostly from abandonment of import contracts from the United States. One unforeseen effect of this was it crippled Iran's ability to gain a decisive victory in the war with Iraq, which was also draining the economy. By the time the war with Iraq was well under way, the

...gap between the rich and the poor had, in fact, grown wider rather than been narrowed since the Shah's ouster. The cost of war combined with a world oil glut, had prevented development of the theocracy's social welfare programs. And the discrepancies between the revolution's grand promises and the harsh realities of living under its rule were beginning to be aired in the Iranian press and in parliament."²¹

This did not sit well with the population, especially the middle and upper classes, which began to strike and riot in various cities. Most of these outbursts were put down by the IRGC. The state's influence of domestic policy was endless. The state ruled everything, even when people could and could not work. One instance was the celebration of Khomeini's declaration of the government of God, honored by "parades and demonstrations."²² An example of the states control over the population's choice of when to work was when "a cabbie was one of many who joined the [celebration] after being stopped by Revolutionary Guards who asked why they were working instead of celebrating."²³

²⁰ Ibid., 306.

²¹ Robin Wright, *In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster 1989), 133.

²² Ibid., 105.

²³ Robin Wright, "Mullahs' Law: Think Our Way or Face Death," *The Sunday Times* (London), April 11, 1982

Enforcing the Sharia

The government of Khomeini was centered on the laws of Islam found in the Quran and the Sharia. Among the never-ending sets of laws, which range from religious duties such, as prayer and the Hajj, to secular duties, such as how to conduct business agreements, are the strict moral codes. "A main concern of the state from the first has been the regulation of behavior."²⁴ For some, the transition between the very Westernized Reza Shah Pahlavi regime to the exceptionally stern Khomeini regime proved difficult. As a result, certain measures were taken to ensure the laws of Islam were followed. "The enforcement of this cultural conformity lay with the institutions of the Islamic state. The Revolutionary Guards from the beginning of the revolution served the critical function of providing stability and order for the new regime, including its cultural agenda."²⁵ In just a short time, they became highly specialized and effective. As a result, they were renamed the Pasadaran and many of their duties were expanded to include civilian security and internal intelligence.²⁶

Domestic institutions and policies were continually enforced by the IRGC. Many Western habits and customs introduced by the government of the Reza Shah Pahlavi became illegal under Khomeini's rule because of Islamic Law. This included all forms of recreation such as watching movies, listening to popular American music, and drinking alcohol. The effects of these changes were greatly felt by the Iranian public. Local movie theatres closed, along with shops selling Western style dress and local bars and pubs were also compelled to close. Many were forced to shut down by the IRGC.

Over the course of time, many of the raids by the IRGC were not limited to those within the population who were in opposition to

²⁴ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press 2003), 257.

²⁵ Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation*, (Dutton, New York: Penguin Group Press, 1996), 337.

²⁶ Ibid..

Islamic Law. One of the main uses for the Guards was the elimination of Khomeini's political opponents, especially those whose views were more modern than his own. Many politicians the Ayatollah had once trusted were beginning to turn against him. As a method to confront, and remove any possibility of a coup, Khomeini ordered, "...raids by the Revolutionary Guards on the homes of a number of 'liberal' politicians who had at first cooperated with Khomeini revealed a series of 'horrors.' These houses turned out to be modern versions of Ali Baba's cave, with stocks of alcohol, caviar (which was forbidden under Islam), collections of objects that turned out to be 'sex aids' and piles of copies of playboy and erotic literature."²⁷ Many of these incidents solidified Khomeini's anger against those who were or could be potential enemies of Islam. His concerns about the rising powers of opposition sparked "a wave of executions [that] began and continued unabated for a whole year. On a single day (19 September) 149 people, mostly aged between sixteen and twenty-five, and including thirty-two women, were shot in Tehran's Evin Prison."²⁸

The Iran-Iraq War

The role of the IRGC was not limited to domestic affairs inside the borders of the State. They proved to be very useful in the conflict between Iran and Iraq from 1981-1988. As previously noted, just after the Revolution, there were still many loyal to Reza Shah Pahlavi. Much of this loyalty was found in the Iranian military. As a result of this, Khomeini organized the IRGC in an effort to produce a military force loyal to the Revolution. Because the rate of recruitment was so high, the IRGC quickly became a very large force comparable to that of the Iranian military.

²⁷ Amir Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution* (Bethesda, MD.: Adler & Adler Publishers Inc., 1985), 277.

²⁸ Ibid., 278.

Needless to say that when war broke out between Iran and Iraq, the IRGC was one of the first military units to aide in the fight against the Baathist regime. More interestingly, the Guards, time and time again, proved more successful at winning the war than Iran's regular military by consistently and successfully carrying out attacks on strategic Iraqi positions and strongholds. As the war waged on, their victories grew. This was probably due to their large numbers and growing capabilities. For example,

...in 1986 the Pasdaran (IRGC) consisted of 350,000 personnel organized in to battalion-sized units that operated either independently or with units of the regular armed forces. In 1986 the Pasdaran acquired small naval and air elements, and it has claimed responsibility for hit-and-run raids on shipping in the Persian Gulf. Darting out from bases on a chain of small islands in the Swedish-built speedboats equipped with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, the Pasdaran established a naval zone in the northern Gulf waters.²⁹

For Ayatollah Khomeini, the war with Iraq was not just about regional hegemony, though that was part of the equation. The war presented an opportunity for Khomeini to export the revolution. Since Iraq's population is made up of 65% Shiite, the Ayatollah thought that overthrowing the Iraqi government would unite the Shiites of Iran and Iraq, thus making it easier to establish an Islamic Revolutionary Government in Baghdad. "Khomeini, the faqih, had defined the war in apocalyptic terms which brooked no compromise, envisaged no retreat, and allowed no discussion of the issue. Only he could change the course of the nation. But having declared the war to be holy, he would not compromise for peace."³⁰

²⁹ Global Security, "Pasdaran", Internet, available from <http://globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/pasdaran.html>, accessed on 14 June 2006.

³⁰ Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation* (Dutton, New York: Penguin Group Press, 1996), 328.

Exporting the Revolution and Israel

For more than thirty years, the elimination of Israel has been an important aspect of Iranian foreign policy. It was no different during the reign of Khomeini. In fact, exporting the revolution was a way to keep the Jewish state in check. Given that the Arabs were struggling against Israel for freedom, common ground was found between the Palestinians and Iranians who united against Israel.

Exporting the revolution was a means to an end, the ultimate goal being the elimination of the Jewish state. Promoting Islamic Fundamentalism became a way of uniting and attracting Arabs to carry out the fight against Israel. "Initially Iran's message of revolutionary Islam, electrified by Khomeini's charisma, sped through the scattered Shia communities in the Sunni Arab world."³¹ This radical form of Islam seemed to unite Muslims throughout the Middle East, galvanizing their love of Khomeini and inciting their hatred of the West, in particular, the United States.

Recognizing an advantage, the Islamic Republic opened camps to give military training to hundreds of young Islamic zealots largely drawn from the states on the western side of the Persian Gulf and the Fertile Crescent, the Arab arc from Iraq to Lebanon. Financed by oil income and staffed by Revolutionary Guard, the camps taught recruits the rudiments of small arms, explosives, and simple rocket launchers.³²

Funding such efforts became very costly and soon began to be too expensive to keep up. This, however, did not slow down Khomeini's quest to rid the Middle East of Israel. As a solution to the problem, a new organization, called Hezbollah, was established, trained and supported with the help of the IRGC. Moreover, the Revolutionary Guards "supported the establishment of hizballah

³¹ Ibid..

³² Ibid..

branches in Iraqi Kurdistan, Jordan and Palestine as well as the Islamic Jihad in a number of other Moslem countries including Egypt, Turkey and Chechnya as well as in Caucasia.”³³ This allowed Iran to carry out their actions against Israel via Hezbollah and it also provided a way for Iran to support the Revolution abroad.

Conclusion

The IRGC was, perhaps more than any other force, instrumental in preserving the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini. It is clear that the 1979 Revolution in Iran would have been short lived if it were not for the creation of such an elite and influential group of soldiers. Indeed, the creation of such a group suggests Khomeini’s rule was not based on charisma alone, but on a deep understanding and a thorough vision of not only what the revolution stood for, but also how it was to be carried out and exported to the population of Iran and throughout the greater Middle East.

In all situations political, economical, or military the IRGC performed their duties with absolute precision. Even after the death of the Ayatollah on June 4, 1989 the Guards continued serve the needs of the Regime including guarding the body of the late Ayatollah from crowds of on lookers shortly after his death.³⁴ Today the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp is a vast organization that continues to function out of strongholds in Iran and Southern Lebanon. They continually give aid and training to other revolutionary groups who also want to see the destruction of Israel and help promote and spread of Islamic Fundamentalism throughout the world. For the foreseeable future, the Guard will continue to be a source of strength for the Iranian regime and will continue to carry out its clandestine activities.

³³ Al J. Venter, *Iran’s Nuclear Option: Tehran’s Quest for the Atom Bomb* (Havertown, PA:CASEMATE, 2005), 264.

³⁴ Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation* (Dutton, New York: Penguin Group Press, 1996), 334.



HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN NAZI GERMANY

BRIGETTE DEGREY

Human experimentation is an effective way to learn about the human body and how complex it really is. Human experimentation is essential in medical research; however, research without human subjects is limited. For most of the past century, it has not been possible to fully know how the human body will react to a drug without first testing it on human subjects. Although there are now regulations governing experimentation on humans, during World War II there was human medical testing in the Nazi-run concentration camps; by today's standards, there were no ethics involved in these tests. In fact, the end results and often intentions of these experiments was suffering and ultimately death. It can be compared to that of a horror film or book in which there is a Doctor Frankenstein type character involved in something grotesque. It was after the Nuremberg Trials that the Nuremberg Code was developed. The Nuremberg Code, developed in 1947, is used today as a basis for the ethics of medical human experimentation. As a result, today there are many people who say that the experiments that the Nazi doctors conducted have little or no scientific value, and their results should not be used. This paper will discuss the generation of Nazi policies of forced sterilization and euthanasia, progressing to medical killings and mass genocide. In doing so, the paper will discuss the different types of experiments performed on concentration camp prisoners, specifically those in Auschwitz, and the experiments of Doctor Josef Mengele. Finally, it will discuss the implications of the experiments that were conducted during World War II.

People may wonder, can a doctor, someone who has sworn by the Hippocratic Oath to help and not harm people, conduct maiming and murderous experiments on humans. When questioned about this by a Jewish doctor, Ella Lingens-Reiner during the war, one Nazi doctor, Fritz Klein, replied, "Of course I am a doctor and I want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind"¹ Nazi society revered doctors and gave them high-status positions. Hitler set the tone for many by declaring that doctors were the key to racial cleansing. Doctors and Nazi leaders believed medical practitioners had the knowledge and skills to help the Nazis in the creation of a master race and therefore a stronger Germany. The doctors who helped the Nazi regime were not coerced into creating better humans, they wanted to do it. In fact, German doctors were some of the first, in Europe, to dedicate themselves to the idea of racial hygiene. According to records from Germany "most of the 20-odd university institutes for racial hygiene were established at German universities before the Nazi rose to power, and by 1932 racial hygiene had become an orthodox fixture in the German medical community."²

The doctors were involved in the implementation of forced sterilization of people who were mentally or physically handicapped or people who suffered from diseases of the mind, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. Any mental or physical disability made a person a candidate for the sterilization.

In 1939-1940, the Nazis moved from a forced sterilization program to the Tiergartenstrasse 4, or T4 program. Euthanasia, in this case, was not what we think of when we hear the term today; it was not a mercy killing of sorts for people who were suffering

¹ Eric Katz, *Death by Design: Science, Technology, and Engineering in Nazi Germany* (New York: Pearson, Longman, 2006), 224.

² George J. Annas and Michael Grodin, *The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimentation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 19-20.

or in pain and wished to end their lives. Many of the people who were killed under the T4 program were not suffering, they were considered to be racially unclean and therefore unfit to live in the Nazi society. The number of people who were sterilized under the Nazi regime range from about 350,000-400,000, and it is interesting to note that it was the United States who provided the model for German sterilization laws. Over 15, 000 people had been sterilized in the United States by the end of the 1920s. The people who were sterilized were most often living in homes for the mentally ill. The euthanasia system created new categories of people that were "ill."³ These illnesses often lead to death of the person making the illness a problem of the state, which was considered to be a loss valuable labor resources.⁴

It was not only the physically and mentally handicapped who were made to suffer under the Nazi regime. The Nuremberg Laws, implemented in 1935, put many restrictions on the "unclean" Jewish people such as banning marriages between Jews and non-Jewish Germans, and stripping all Jews of their citizenship. After the implementation of the Nuremberg Laws, which caused the Jews to suffer for years, the Jews were then gathered together and sent to Ghettos where the living conditions were deplorable and many people died here because of exposure and disease due to overcrowding and close living conditions. The Jews were sent to camps from these ghettos where they were to be killed. The Nazis designed these concentration camps to systematically kill thousands of people at a time. German doctors realized that the camps provided huge populations of people whom they could use for whatever purpose they could imagine. Research shows "generally speaking, Nazi medical experiments fall into two categories: those sponsored by the regime

³ Arthur L. Caplan, *When Medicine Went Mad: Bioethics and the Holocaust* (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 1992), 30.

⁴ Michael H. Kater, "The Burden of the Past: Problems of a Modern Historiography of Physicians and Medicine in Nazi Germany," *German Studies Review* 10, (1) (February 1987): 34.

for a specific ideological and military purpose, and those that were done ad hoc out of allegedly scientific interest on the part of an SS doctor...But the categories overlapped. (Mengele's research on twins...grew out of specific scientific interest but was also strongly affected by Nazi ideology.)"⁵

There were a number of ways that a person could suffer and die in a concentration camp, all of them were terrible. Upon arrival at the camp, a person first underwent a selection process, often carried out unnecessarily by a doctor. The doctor decided at that moment who was fit for work and who was not, simply by looking at a person. If a person was unfit for work they went immediately to the gas chamber. If a person could work they went to the general population for hard labor. There was one Nazi doctor who performed all of the selections at Auschwitz: Dr. Josef Mengele, Angel of Death, the head doctor at the Auschwitz-Berkanu camp. He believed that it was his sole duty to rid Germany of the Jewish "disease".

While performing the selections, Mengele also looked for candidates for his terrible experiments. Although Mengele was not the only doctor to conduct experiments on the vast numbers of human guinea pigs in the camps, he was certainly the most notorious. One observer from a transport said of Mengele as he was involved in selections "he had a gentle manner and a quiet poise that almost always lay between the edges of smugness and the height of charm. He whistled a Wagnerian aria as he signaled right or left for prisoners."⁶

In his youth, Mengele received his doctorate of philosophy from the University of Munich and then went on to Frankfurt where he studied under the direction of Professor Otmar Von Verschuer, a specialist in the early field of racial science who was fascinated by twins. It was under the direction of Verchuer that Mengele also came

⁵ Robert J. Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (United States: Basic Books, 1986), 269.

⁶ Gerald Astor, *The Last Nazi: The Life and Times of Dr. Joseph Mengele* (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1985), 59.

to be fascinated by the phenomenon of twins and later use this as the basis for his research.⁷ During his studies at medical school, Mengele became involved with the Nazi Party. Mengele was part of the general SS, leaving to fight in the war after obtaining his degree; after he was injured on the Soviet front in 1943, he was sent to Auschwitz by the Nazi leaders in May of 1943 where he became the head doctor and where he could continue his medical research, specifically on twins. "Mengele was drawn to Auschwitz by the camp's potential for research, a laboratory chock full of human guinea pigs."⁸

The research that Mengele conducted involved a number of subjects whom he found at his disposal from the camp, it did not matter if the subject was Jewish or otherwise. Whenever a person with a genetic anomaly was found on a transport, either by Mengele himself or another SS guard, the person was saved from death, at least for the time being, in order for Mengele to conduct gruesome experiments on them. Twins and dwarfs were of considerable liking to Mengele, but especially twins. The twins "saved" at the transport were treated much better than general prisoners. They were allowed to keep their own clothes and they were also allowed to keep their hair. The twins were put into special areas of the camp where they received more food and better living conditions in general. According to Robert Lifton, Auschwitz was unique not only in the numbers of twins it could provide, but what it enabled one to do with the twins: each one of a pair of twins could be observed under the same diet and living conditions and could be made to "die together...and in good health"- ideal for post-mortem comparisons."⁹ In many cases, after the experiment was completed or after all the data Mengele needed was gathered, the subject was then killed usually with a phenol injection to the heart. The bodies could then be dissected, by prisoner doctors, and other SS doctors and studied. In every case, the bodies

⁷ Astor, 19.

⁸ Ibid., 91.

⁹ Lifton, 351.

of twins were dissected together so further studies into the genetics of twins could be gathered; thus if a twin died, the other was also killed for comparison. Dr. Mengele protected the twins and it seems that he even came to love some of them as a father would love a child. One prisoner, Tomas A., said of Mengele, "for us, the twins, [he was] like a papa, like a mama. For us. On the other hand he was a murderer."¹⁰ At Auschwitz Mengele used the general SS doctors' unit and he had three additional offices for his work with twins. In all these offices twins had special status. Often they were given a special number in the tattoo that included ZW (for Zwillinge meaning twins). Twins, mostly children, had special places to stay on the medical units, and often with the other inmates who were subjects of Mengele's experiments.¹¹

The twins in the camp soon realized that their lives had great value. They knew that if they did what was asked of them, they would live, they knew that the one thing that allowed them to live was the experiments of Mengele. They were not punished in the same ways, specifically with death as the other inmates of the camp. Compared to the other inmates of the Auschwitz complex, the twins were treated very well, especially by Mengele; he would give them candy and treats to gain their love and respect, and so they would allow him to conduct his experiments on them. Many twins surrendered themselves when they arrived at Auschwitz, with the hope that they might have a better experience.

Eva Mozes-Kor, a survivor of Mengele's experiments, described her experience. When she arrived at the Birkenau camp in March 1944 she was nine years old. She and her twin sister, Miriam, were dressed alike and one of the SS guards helping with the selection asked their mother whether they were twins. Their mother reluctantly said that they were because the guard told her that it was a good thing. There were about ten or twelve sets of twins who arrived on the same transport as Eva and Miriam. When she first saw Mengele,

¹⁰ Ibid., 356.

¹¹ Ibid., 348.

she knew right away that he was in charge because he was very neatly dressed. The hair of all the twins was cut short by the camp barbers and they were told that it was a privilege that they even got to keep their hair. They were also allowed to keep their own clothes on Mengele's orders, however, each had a large red cross painted on them, identifying who they were. When it was explained to them by some of the children, also being used for experiments, how the camp worked, the girls were in disbelief. They could not understand why the Nazis would want to murder people and burn the corpses. The girls were never told why they were in this special area of the camp. Eva stated after the war that there were two types of experiments that took place in the camp. The first were genetic experiments and the second were experiments with germs. In the experiments with germs, one of the twins was injected by a doctor with a certain type of germ and when it died the other twin was also killed by the doctors assisting Mengele so that an autopsy could be performed. The bodies were compared to see the differences in the sick body and the healthy body. Eva was one of the twins injected with a germ and she grew very ill. She did not want to be separated from Miriam, so she tried to hide the fact that she had grown sick with a fever. Her fever, however, was discovered by the doctors and she was taken to the hospital where she was given two weeks to live. Eva knew that if she died, Miriam would also be killed, and she was determined that that would not happen. Although she was never given any medicine Eva overcame the terrible pain and was reunited with Miriam.

The daily routine was regimented for the twins by Mengele just as it was for the rest of the camp. At 6 am they had to be ready for roll call, after which they received some food. Then they were taken to the lab where they were examined and measured and poked and prodded by the doctors like any common lab animal. Eva and Miriam stayed at Birkenau until it was liberated by the Soviets in January 1945. Orphaned, the girls traveled from camp to camp and eventually made it to what was left of their home in Portz, Romania.

In 1950, both girls emigrated to Israel, eventually getting married and having families. Eva feels that the data which the Nazis gathered from the experiments should not be used.¹²

Dr. Miklos Nyiszli, a Jewish prisoner doctor, who worked very closely with Dr. Mengele at Auschwitz, knew of Mengele's fascination with physical anomalies. On a transport that arrived in 1944 Dr. Mengele found a hunchback man who seemed to be in his fifties and his son who had a deformed right foot on which he wore a special shoe. These two men were brought by an SS guard to Nyiszli, which was unusual as he usually performed autopsies. Nyiszli spoke briefly with these men and learned a little of their lives; he also did a preliminary examination on them. He gave them food and tried to make them as comfortable as possible, even though he knew their fates. The two men were killed later and the prisoner doctor was told to dissect them, although the bodies were still warm. He did so, after which Dr. Mengele requested the skeletons of the deformed men so that they could be shipped to Berlin. Nyiszli said of the situation "the cases were banal, but could nevertheless very easily be utilized as propaganda in support of the Third Reich's theory concerning the degeneracy of the Jewish race."¹³ Due to situations like this and the way in which Mengele conducted his research, Nyiszli described Mengele's experiments as "pseudo science" and claimed that he was a criminal doctor.¹⁴

Mengele also conducted experiments to see if he could change the eye colors of prisoners from brown to blue. Mengele injected methylene blue into the eyes of certain prisoners causing severe pain and inflammation, but not changing the color of the eyes. Lifton states "The methylene blue injections are of a different order, not in their cruelty (which was usual) but in their extraordinary scientific naïveté- or, one might more accurately say their scientific corruption."¹⁵

¹² Grodin, 53-58.

¹³ Miklos Nyiszli, *Auschwitz: A Doctor's Eyewitness Account* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1960), 178.

¹⁴ Nyiszli, 175-183.

One anonymous prisoner doctor said of Dr. Mengele, "He wanted to be God-to create a new race."¹⁶ He wanted this so much that another anonymous prisoner doctor said that Mengele might twist his findings so that they reflected what he wanted it to be. She also said that if the finding was not up to the typical German standards, proving the racial inferiority of the subject he might not publicize it.¹⁷ Mengele did not get to create his new race or be a part of some grand scheme to discover the cause of multiple births. Once Mengele found out that the Soviets were near the camp, he collected all of his material and ran away. Dr. Josef Mengele was never found alive. There was a body found in Brazil believed to be Mengele's, but there is no way to be sure. Dr. Mengele was convinced that he was going to be famous for the work that he did, and he was correct. He became famous not because what he did was great and had a helpful impact on the world, but for the horrible and disgusting things that he did to other human beings.

The experiments at Auschwitz and on twins were not the only experiments on the unsuspecting camp victims. There were many other useless experiments that the Nazis were conducting at different camps around Europe. As was mentioned before, some experiments were conducted completely for militaristic reasons. Some of the most noteworthy were the experiments performed at Dachau, where humans were experimented upon to help the German military, specifically the air force.

In the experiments of high pressure it was tested how long an airman could survive if a plane crashed and the airman did not have a parachute. All of these experiments were conducted in a controlled environment, a decompression chamber on the ground. Doctor Rascher outlines a particular experiment saying:

¹⁵ Lifton, 362-363.

¹⁶ Ibid., 359.

¹⁷ Ibid., 357.

It was a continuous experiment at a height of 12 kilometers conducted on a 37-year-old Jew in good general condition. Breathing continued up to 30 minutes. After 4 minutes the experimental subject began to perspire and wiggle his head, after 5 minutes cramps occurred, between 6 and 10 minutes breathing increased in speed and the experimental subject became unconscious; from 11 to 30 minutes breathing slowed down to three breaths per minute, finally stopping altogether.¹⁸

This exact same experiment had to be conducted over and over again with much the same result. Typically the subject experienced horrible suffering. Immediately following the death of the test subject the body was dissected so it could be determined what was going on inside the body with such high pressure. Nazi Doctor, Siegfried Ruff who helped conduct these experiments and knew that men had died as a result, said in his sworn statement after the war, "Personally I should not regard these experiments as unethical, especially in wartime."¹⁹

There were two types of hypothermia, or low temperature, experiments that were conducted at Dachau and Auschwitz: wet and dry. The purpose was to determine whether there was an effective way of rewarming a German aviator if he had to parachute into the North Sea. At Dachau the subjects were submerged in freezing water with temperatures between 36.5 and 53.5 degrees Fahrenheit. During the experimental process, electrical measurements were taken of the temperature in the stomach and the rectum; the lowest temperatures read 26.4 degrees in the stomach and 26.5 degrees in the rectum. A fatality only occurred when the brain stem and the back of the head were also submerged. If the temperature reached 28 degrees

¹⁸ Arthur L. Caplan, *When Medicine Went Mad: Bioethics and the Holocaust* (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 1992), 233.

¹⁹ Alexander Mitscherlich, *Doctors of Infamy: The Story of the Nazi Medical Crimes* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1949), 11.

the subject died, even if there were attempts at resuscitation by the doctors.²⁰ The most effective way that rewarming was accomplished was by putting the subject in a warm bath. Rewarming by the method of human or animal bodies was also studied and seemed to work best when the subject was placed between two naked women.

The second type of low temperature experiment was called a "dry" cold experiment in which the test subject was made to strip down and stand outside for nine to fourteen hours at a time; in the cold temperatures. The results from this type of experiment determined the best way to rewarm the subject was a hot bath. The following chart taken from Mitscherlich shows the number of people who died as a result of these experiments.

The Nazis were also trying to make seawater potable, also to help the Luftwaffe, in case a pilot was stranded. The navy was interested in these experiments for the same reasons. At the time, the Luftwaffe had developed two ways that made sea water drinkable. One method removed the salt from the water making it drinking water, the second method just removed the salty taste from the water. The second method had to be tested to make sure that it was safe because the ingestion of high salt content can lead to poisoning. "It was agreed by the Nazis to conduct a series of experiments in which the subjects, fed only with shipwreck emergency rations, would be divided into four groups. One group would receive no water at all; the second would drink ordinary sea water; the third would drink sea water processed by the so-called "Berka" method, which concealed the taste but did not alter the saline content; the fourth would drink sea water treated so as to remove the salt."²¹ It was decided that the experiments would be conducted at the Dachau camp because there was a facility already available from other experiments that had been conducted there. The experiments were conducted on mostly German, Czech, and Polish Gypsies. The results of these experiments did not provide new information. The Germans already knew what

²⁰ Annas, 74.

²¹ Ibid., 77.

happened to a person when he drank sea water, the experiments only confirmed it. Many of the men in these experiments suffered terribly; and in some cases they were so delirious that they had to be tied to their beds by the medical assistants. The thirst was so great that the men would try to do anything to get some water, even drink the dirty water used for mopping the floors. The men who volunteered to be a part of this experiment were told that they would be given extra rations for doing so. The men only received these extra rations for a short time, but then this stopped when the experiment began. Once these men were given the sea water to drink, they were not given any food at all.²²

It was the goal of the Nazis to exterminate the Jewish people, but they realized that they could do this and gain valuable slave labor for the war industry. It was for these reasons that sterilization experiments were also conducted at Auschwitz and Birkenau.²³ These experiments were conducted mainly by Professor Clauberg and Professor Schumann who were trying to come up with the best way to sterilize hundreds if not thousands of people at a time. Supervised by Professor Clauberg, women received injections of chemicals into their cervixes causing inflammation and sterilization. This seemed to be the most efficient way to sterilize women. Clauberg said in a letter to Himmler that it would be possible to sterilize several hundred, if not 1,000 women in one day.²⁴ The Nazis tested other methods of sterilization. sterilization by medication and x-ray. The Nazis wanted to prevent the procreation of racially inferior groups, not limited to the Jews, while trying to get the most use out of them that they could.²⁵

²² Mitscherlich, 39-40.

²³ International Auschwitz Committee, *Nazi Medicine: Doctors, Victims, and Medicine in Auschwitz* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1986), 49.

²⁴ Mitscherlich, 142.

²⁵ Ibid., 132-133.

Block 10 in Auschwitz was one of the most notorious places in which sterilization experiments were conducted. This block was divided into special research areas depending on the doctor who conducted the experiment. Terrible rumors circulated the camp about Block 10; prisoners considered it to be a very evil place. The rumors claimed that Dr. Clauberg conducted artificial insemination experiments and many women feared having terrible monsters implanted into their wombs.²⁶ During the Nuremberg trial one survivor explained his experience as part of a sterilization experiment at Auschwitz:

I had been working on road construction and one night a block clerk asked for all able bodied Jewish men between twenty and twenty-four. I did not report. At the time there were twenty men selected and had to report to a doctor the next day. They returned to work the very same day. It was not known what was done to these men. The next week another twenty Jewish men were selected of the same ages. This time it was done by names in alphabetical order. I was selected to go. The survivor says, we were sent to Birkenau, the labor camp for women. We had to strip and our sexual organs were placed in a machine and we had to stay there for fifteen minutes. The sexual organs and the surrounding parts were heated up and turned black afterwards. During the next few days the organs discharged pus, with most of my comrades, and it was very difficult to walk. We had to keep working until we dropped. If you felt you were taken to be gassed. I only experienced a watery discharge. About two weeks later, October 1943, seven of us were taken to Auschwitz I. We had to walk this distance, it was very difficult to walk because of the pain. We were taken to a hospital building where we were operated on. We received an injection in the back which caused the lower part of the body to go numb but the upper half was normal.

²⁶ Lifton, 270-271.

During this operation both testicles were removed, I was able to watch the procedure in the mirror of the surgical lamp. Consent was never obtained, we were simply told when it was our turn. I was at the hospital for three weeks, after this time many people were sent to the gas chambers and I went back to work half-sick because of the fear of being gassed.²⁷

There are many survivor accounts similar to this in which the person who was a victim of the sterilization was not only left sterile, but horribly disfigured.

Yakoff Skurnick, also subjected to a sterilization experiment at Auschwitz, volunteered against his better judgment, in order to get out of a day of work. When he and the group of men first met with the doctor, Doctor Schumann, nothing extraordinary happened. Their genitals were simply placed under a green cone shaped machine. There was no pain for Yakoff and the others who were with him. It was a few months later when they were called back to the hospital block that the pain began. Each man was taken into the room and a sperm sample was taken then Yakoff's right testicle was removed. The same process was repeated months later, with the left testicle. Both times that the operation happened, Yakoff and the others were only given four days in which to recover, if one did not recover in the allotted time it meant death. After the first procedure Yakoff realized that he would never be able to have a family of his own. This was something that was extremely important to Yakoff, something that he would never be able to have and it was hard for him to bear.²⁸

The Nazis collected a number of Jewish skeletons that came from prisoners of the camps. This "experiment" did not have any scientific value. Professor Hirt was in charge of obtaining the subjects of this collection and he and Himmler had been in contact about this collection. According to Hirt and Himmler "The goal at that

²⁷ Mitscherlich, 139-140.

²⁸ Gene Church, *'80629' A Mengele Experiment* (Albuquerque: Route 66 Publishing, Ltd., 1986), 123-128, 150-160, 176-177.

²⁹ Lifton, 285.

time was to 'acquire tangible scientific research material' that would 'represent... a repulsive but typical species of subhumanity.'"²⁹ The Nazis were willing to do anything to show that the Jewish people were less than human; for them, that goal was accomplished. There appeared to be a problem in gathering just the skulls so the entire skeleton was used in this so called experiment. There were different shipments of people sent to the lab to be prepared, meaning killed and the skeleton readied for the museum. "It is said that 115 people were victimized in this way, all Jews (79 men, 30 women) with the exception of 2 poles and 4 central Asians."³⁰ The lab was destroyed and the bodies of the people that were being used for this collection were burned as the Allies advanced and the war was coming to an end.³¹

There was some light during the darkness of the Holocaust. Prisoner doctors who played such big roles in working with the Nazis and the other prisoners did what they could to help ease the suffering of fellow prisoners. Help was limited if a Jewish doctor blatantly disregarded orders from a Nazi doctor: he would not be allowed to live. There were also cases of prisoner doctors who conducted genuine research. There was a program of electroshock therapy developed by another Nazi prisoner who was a Polish neurologist. This particular doctor knew that the German doctors liked to have extraordinary things happen in their camps: because it reflected well on them because they published the results and gained the credit for the experiment.³² Prisoner doctors sometimes had chances to use their knowledge and skills, letting them feel like "normal" human beings. The Jewish prisoners took full advantage of the opportunity that they were given to conduct research, they knew that not all prisoners were so lucky.

³⁰ Ibid., 285-286.

³¹ Mitscherlich, 89.

³² Lifton, 298-299.

³³ Jonathan D. Moreno, *Undue Risk; Secret State Experiments on Humans* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1999), 54.

There were hundreds of other types of experiments conducted on the unsuspecting prisoners of almost every concentration camp: malaria experiments, sulfanilamide experiments, and bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration and bone transplant experiments. There are too many to discuss for the purpose of this paper. It is no surprise then, from 1946 to mid 1947, that twenty doctors and three medical assistants were tried at the Nuremberg during the medical trial.³³

In the opening statement of the prosecution on December 9, 1946, it was outlined that “the defendants in this case are charged with murders, tortures, and other atrocities committed in the name of medical science. The victims of these crimes are numbered in the hundreds of thousands. A handful only are still alive; a few of the survivors will appear in this courtroom. But most of these miserable victims were slaughtered outright or died in the course of the tortures to which they were subjected.”³⁴

It was in the name of scientific research that these crimes were committed. Some of the experiments had militaristic reasons behind them and those reasons were noted. As the prosecution stated later in the opening statement, “our proof will show that a quite different and even more sinister objective runs like a red thread through these hideous researches. We will show that in some instances the true objective of these experiments was not how to rescue or to cure, but how to destroy and kill.”³⁵ Telford Taylor was the chief prosecutor of the trial and said, “the defendants in the dock are charged with murder, but,” Taylor stressed, “this is no mere murder trial.”³⁶

³⁴ Annas, 67.

³⁵ Ibid., 70.

³⁶ Moreno, 57.

The trial of the doctors was a great shock for all people involved in medicine. It created a burden for further military medical research. The trial at Nuremberg set a precedent that affected medical research forever. The American jurists were so appalled by what they heard during the trial that they demanded that there be a code of ethics drafted to prevent anything like what happened in Germany from ever happening again. The Nuremberg Code, drafted in 1946, has ten parts and outlines specifically what needs to occur between doctor and patient for any type of medical experiment can take place. The Nuremberg Code became the prototype for similar codes, for example the Belmont Report, in the United States, to ensure that something like what happened in Europe during World War II does not happen again.

The Nuremberg Code

1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.

This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.

³⁷ Internet, available from <http://www.mazal.org/archive/documents/Franzblau/Franzblau01/FRA01.htm> accessed on 9 April 2007.

The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.

2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocureable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.

9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.

10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.³⁸

³⁸ Annas, 102-103



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Christopher Davey has attended UVSC since he arrived in the Utah from England in 2004. Studying as a History major he is particularly interested in the causes and results of genocide in the Twentieth Century. Chris is also involved in the college's Honors and Peace and Justice Studies programs. After completing his undergraduate degree at UVSC Chris hopes to continue his education with a PhD in History. This advancement will allow him to teach history at a university level, and continue his research. Chris owes much of the credibility of his accomplishments and happiness to his beautiful and supportive wife Karin.

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Andrew Israelsen is a 22 year old student at UVSC. He enjoys Classical and European history, as well as literature and philosophy. He has studied at MU and UVSC. He was recently married, and is living in Provo with his wife, Shannon. After graduating, he plans to attend graduate school, earn a PhD and teach history on a university level.

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