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
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Dear reader,

It is always a proud moment to see another issue of our undergraduate philosophy journal published – or maybe I should just say it's a moment I'm grateful to be a part of given that the editors did all the heavy lifting. However, witnessing the publication of this issue of *Sophia* makes me feel particularly grateful and also proud of all our student volunteers. Everyone who worked on this did it without any recompense and in addition to their school work, their jobs and their family obligations. Putting out a call for papers, reading lots of submissions and making decisions about them, and working with the authors to edit their paper is hard work in the best of times. However, the (ongoing) pandemic is not the best of times. It took about two years to publish another issue of *Sophia*. It wasn't for lack of trying. The current editing team built on the work of previous editors who ran into obstacles that delayed the publication. I want to thank those previous editors in addition to thanking the current excellent editing staff. I also want to thank the authors for their patience – both those whose work got published in this issue and those who hopefully will try again another time. This issue is the result of passion and dedication that shows a true commitment to philosophical scholarship, to UVU, and to the department of Philosophy and Humanities. It thus gives me tremendous joy to write this introductory note to this fine collection of essays. I hope that the readers will find some pleasure and insight in reading these essays representing a wide range of different approaches, thinkers and schools of thought. I hope readers will agree that this shows that the heart of philosophy is still beating strong at UVU and our surrounding communities.

Warmest regards,

Dr. Thomas H. Bretz
Assistant Professor of Environmental Philosophy, UVU
Faculty Advisor for *Sophia*

Anaxagoras' νοῦς: A Motive Force Existing Among Things

- Madeline Brenchley -

"Mind, which always is, is very much present now where everything else is, in the vast surroundings and in both the things that have been aggregated and those that have been separated."

"ὁ δέ νοῦς, ὅς ἀεὶ ἐστι, τό κάρτα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν ἴνα καὶ τά ἄλλα πάντα, ἐν τῶι πολλῶι περιέχοντι, καί ἐν τοῖς προσκριθεῖσι καί ἐν τοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοις."

-Anaxagoras of Clazomenae

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, born in 500 BCE, fled from civil strife in his native land and ended up in Athens, wherein he began philosophizing at the age of 20.[1] He was the first of the presocratic philosophers to clearly posit a motive force: νοῦς, a force which sets into motion all existence from out of a mixed, infinitely divisible state of stagnant togetherness.[2] While fragments of Anaxagoras' state that νοῦς is motive force—revolving and causing the motion of all existence their explanation of the nature of νοῦς is more difficult to pin down. We are left wondering how exactly νοῦς relates to its surroundings—is it a material or immaterial force? In order to shed light on this question, I do not perform a detailed analysis of Anaxagoras' fragments. Rather, I focus on Anaxagoras' particular use of a single preposition: I explore the etymology of the word ἐν. Specifically, I argue that "ἐν," when used by Anaxagoras in fragment B14, should not be thought of as a physical location within as Daniel Graham's and other translations suggest (i.e. νοῦς is in the things that have been aggregated and separated).[3] Instead, the use of "ἐν" in B14 indicates a subject's position in the presence of other objects: "ἐν = among".[4]

Using this alternate translation for ἐν as a type of 'Dative of Place,' I propose we translate B14 in the following way: Mind[νοῦς] which always is, is very much present now where everything else is, **among** the vast surroundings, **among** the things that have been aggregated and **among** the things that have been separated.

In order to support a retranslation of B14, I first demonstrate that prominent translations of B14—translating "ἐν" as "in"—allow for readers to conceive of Anaxagoras' νοῦς as that which can be **contained within** or **mixed with** other things. Interpreting νοῦς as contained within or mixed with other things is problematic insofar as Anaxagoras explicitly describes νοῦς as "unmixed with other objects" and, "alone, autonomous, and boundless in itself".[5] Translating "ἐν" as "in" obscures the boundless and autonomous character of νοῦς or, at the very least, propagates confusing implications regarding the relationship of νοῦς to the surroundings it incites into motion. To provide support for a retranslation of B14's "ἐν," I look at three fragments from Anaxagoras' contemporaries, Euripides and Empedocles, which use the same sentence construction as Anaxagoras' B14: 'nominative singular subject + ἐν + dative plural object.' What is significant about these contemporary fragments is that translators of these Euripides and

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1 - Nietzsche, *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers* 94
2 - "...before these things were separated, when they were all together..." Graham, 281, B4(b).
3 - Graham, 293, B14.
4 - Liddell, *English-Greek Lexicon*.

5 - Graham, 291, B12.

Empedocles fragments do not equate "ἐν" with 'in.' Instead, they translate "ἐν" as **among**," interpreting "ἐν" as the 'Dative of Place' which indicates a nominative singular subject's position **among** dative plural objects. I use the translation paradigms for Empedocles' and Euripides' equivalent sentence constructions to support a retranslation of Anaxagoras' B14. By existing **among** other things rather than "in" other things, Anaxagoras' νοῦς more clearly exists as unmixed, autonomous, and boundless in itself.

The Motive Role of Νοῦς:
The Standard View

Anaxagoras conceives of a world made up of countless stuffs that neither come to be nor pass away but, rather, exist eternally.[6] Unlike Parmenides, his predecessor, these eternal and countless things are in motion rather than stagnant. But, let us not get ahead of ourselves: before motion occurred, all things were stagnant: "before these things were separated, when they were all together".[7] At some non-specified moment, "νοῦς began to cause motion ...as a result of everything being in motion there was a separation".[8] Herein lies the importance of Anaxagoras' νοῦς, as an original and powerful motive force. The early separation had ripple effects. Picking up momentum, things began to separate further and further depending on their qualities—hot and cold, dense and light, dark and light, dry and wet. Theophrastus informs us that things were not separated out into isolation, but rather, "like things travel[ed] toward each other".[9] What results from like-things being attracted to one another is that the world appears as we know it. Even within the aggregation of like-things, there remains some portion of other things: "Everything else has a portion of everything... but each one [thing] is and was most manifestly those things of which it has the most".[10]

For example, water has some portion of other "things" in it, but when water appears to

us as wet, it is because water is mostly comprised of wet things. In B14, Anaxagoras uses the word "προσκριθεῖσι," translated as "aggregated," to describe this phenomenon of combination. Like separation, the aggregation of like things requires the influence of νοῦς. Let us refocus our attention: it is clear that νοῦς influences things, separating and aggregating them due to its own motion, but how does this influence happen? In other words, how does νοῦς relate to its surroundings?

Clarifying the Difficulties that Arise
from Translating B14's "ἐν" as "in"

According to Anaxagoras, νοῦς is not like the rest of existence. He states that "Everything else has a portion of everything, but **Mind**[νοῦς] **is boundless, autonomous, and mixed with no object, but alone in itself**".[11] Unlike everything else, νοῦς is not mixed with other portions of things. In the same fragment, he goes on to explain that, "the things mixed with it[νοῦς] would hinder it from ruling any object in the way it does when it is alone by itself".[12] Here we have Anaxagoras' explicit distinction between νοῦς and all other things: in order for νοῦς to be the revolutionary motive force that it is,[13] νοῦς cannot be mixed with anything else. The assertions Anaxagoras gives us in these fragments result in the central focus of this paper: νοῦς must remain unmixed, alone in itself, and boundless. Yet, many translations of B14 obscure the essential solitude and boundlessness of νοῦς.

Graham translates B14 as follows: "Mind[νοῦς], which always is, is very much present now where everything else is, **in** the vast surrounding and **in** both the things that have been aggregated and those that have been separated".[14] In Greek, the fragment reads: ὁ δέ νοῦς... ἐν τῶι πολλῶι περιέχοντι, καί ἐν τοῖς προσκριθεῖσι καί ἐν τοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοις. Using Graham's translation as

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6 - Ibid. 285, B14.
7 - Ibid. 281, B4(b).
8 - Ibid. 293, B13.
9 - Ibid. 293, A41.
10 - Ibid. 291, B12.

11 - My emphasis; Ibid. 291, B12.
12 - Ibid. 291, B12.
13 - Get it, a pun!
14 - My emphasis; Graham, 293, B14.

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our key example[15], ἐν translated as "in" could suggest a location within other things. Yet, if νοῦς is in other things, isn't it mixed with those things? If not, it is at least contained within those other things. Allowing for νοῦς to be in the same location of other things—mixed with or contained within those things—clouds our understanding of Anaxagoras' νοῦς. Νοῦς, we must remember, is both **alone in itself** and **boundless**. As that which is alone in itself, νοῦς cannot be mixed with the things that it sets into motion; moreover, as that which is boundless—without confines or borders—νοῦς cannot be contained within the things that it sets into motion. Therefore, although it is not directly misleading, translating B14 "ἐν" as the preposition "in" at the very least obscures our understanding of the difference between Anaxagoras' νοῦς and the things which it incites into motion.

Demonstrating Alternative and
Era-Appropriate Translation Paradigms
for the Sentence Construction:
'nominative singular subject + ἐν +
dative plural object'

In order to escape the imprecise implications that arise by translating ἐν as "in," I suggest that we look at Anaxagoras' contemporaries to discover an alternate, era-appropriate translation paradigm for the portion of Anaxagoras' B14 fragment that reads, "ὁ δέ νοῦς... ἐν τοῖς προσκριθεῖσι...".[16] In other words, throughout the rest of this essay, I elaborate Greek sentences given by other ancient thinkers in which a **nominative singular** subject relates to a group of **dative plural** objects through the preposition ἐν: 'nom. sing. subject + ἐν + dat. plur. object.' I then note the translation paradigms for these equivalent sentence constructions to inform and support a retranslation of Anaxagoras' B14.

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15 - Translating the "ἐν" within fragment B14 as "in" is not Graham's choice alone. The following collections also translate the "ἐν" within fragment B14 as "in": *The Loeb edition of Early Greek Philosophy*; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield's *The Presocratic Philosophers*; Curd & McKirahan's *Presocratic Reader*; and John Burnett's *Early Greek Philosophy*.
16 - My emphasis; "Mind[νοῦς] is... in the things that have been aggregated," Graham, 293, B14.

Born in 484 BCE, roughly sixteen years after Anaxagoras, Euripides was a contemporary of Anaxagoras, living in Athens until 408 BCE.[17] According to Diogenes Laertius, Anaxagoras was philosophizing in Athens in 480 BCE. Offering an amendment to Diogenes Laertius' Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Nietzsche claims that Anaxagoras stayed in Athens for 50 years, thereby leaving in 430 BCE.[18] Regardless of their precise dates of residence, it is clear that Anaxagoras and Euripides shared geographical and temporal proximity in Athens.

While Euripides was a Tragedian, scholar John Dillon claims that Euripides was also well known for discussing "philosophical doctrines, both ethical and 'physical'".[19] Dillon argues that the philosophical doctrines which were hidden in the contents of his plays were, in fact, particularly influenced by Anaxagoras himself. Diogenes Laertius also establishes a relationship between Euripides and Anaxagoras, describing Euripides as being Anaxagoras' student.[20] While the specific influence that Anaxagoras had on Euripides is up for debate, both Anaxagorean testimony and Euripidean fragments make it clear that the two thinkers lived within Athens around the same time and that each discussed physical and philosophical doctrines to some degree.[21] The temporal, spatial, and probable philosophical proximity between the two thinkers can lead us to value the etymological paradigms that Euripides uses as tools for translating Anaxagoras' fragments in an alternate, era-appropriate manner.

From lines 735-755 of Euripides' Orestes, the character Orestes talks with his friend Plydies. Plydies has seen the citizens of Taurus assembling and has heard the news of their intentions—they have set out to kill Orestes and his sister, Iphigeneia. When prompted by Plydies, who hopes to better understand why people have set out to kill Orestes, Orest-

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17 - O. Taplin, "Euripides".
18 - Nietzsche, 96.
19 - Dillon, "Euripides and the Philosophy of His Time".
20 - Graham, 275, A1.
21 - Dillon, 50.

es explains that it is Menelaus, the brother of his father and his own uncle, who has incited the townspeople to kill both him and his sister. The plot of this play does not directly relate to Anaxagoras in content. However, line 754, in which Orestes describes the character of his traitorous uncle, provides us with an important etymological insight. In Greek, the fragment reads: "οὐ γὰρ αἰχμητὴς πέφυκεν, ἐν γυναιξὶ δ' ἄλκιμος".[22] We are concerned with the "ἐν γυναιξί" portion of this fragment. Gilbert Murray translates this instance of 'nom. sing. subject + ἐν + dat. plur. object' as follows: "No, for he was not born a warrior, though strong **among women**!".[23] Although this fragment uses the preposition ἐν, note that Menelaus is not in women—not mixed with them nor contained within them. The LSJ (The Liddell and Scott Jones English-Greek Lexicon) recognizes the legitimacy of translating this instance of "ἐν γυναιξί" as "**among** women." It is cited as an example of "ἐν with DAT. OF PLACE," indicated in the 5th subsection of the dictionary entry as meaning "in the number of, among".[24]

Euripides provides us with another example of this alternate translation paradigm for ἐν in fragment 703 of an fragmented Euripidean text.[25] According to the LSJ, the Greek reads: μή μοι φθονήσητ', ἄνδρες Ἑλλήνων ἄκροι εἰ πτωχὸς ὢν τέτληκ' ἐν ἐσθλοῖσιν λέγειν.[26] This instance of a 'nom. sing. subject + ἐν + a plur. dat. adjective' is cited within the same LSJ section as the previous Euripides fragment we examined, both being instances of "Dative of Place," broadly meaning "among".[27] The Loeb edition of Euripdes' Fragments translates Euripides fragment 703 as follows: "Don't feel resentment towards me, my leaders of the Greeks, if **I** have dared to speak **among nobles**[people]

when I am a beggar".[28] In this translation paradigm, the dative plural adjective "nobles [ἐσθλοῖσιν]" is being used substantively. Here, Euripedes uses a dative plural substantive adjective in place of a dative plural noun within the 'nom. sing. subject + ἐν + dat. plur. object' sentence construction. In other words, a subject can exist **among**[ἐν] a dative plural adjective. This Euripidean usage demonstrates that the sentence construction we are exploring is somewhat flexible. Taking this Euripidean example one step further might allow us to utilize the same translation paradigm for a retranslation of Anaxagoras' B14. Similarly to Euripides' use of the dative plural adjective, Anaxagoras relates a dative plural participle ("things that have been aggregated"[29]) to a nominative subject, νοῦς, through the preposition "ἐν." I argue that we pay close attention to this Euripidean usage of 'nom. sing. subject + ἐν + dat. plur. object' and allow it to inform our translation of the similar Anaxagorean sentence construction.

Bidding Euripides farewell for now, we meet another contemporary of Anaxagoras whom the LSJ cites as using "among" as a translation paradigm for a 'nom. sing. subject + ἐν + dat plur. object' construction: Empedocles. There is some debate over the birth date of Empedocles. Apollodorus lists him as being born in 475 BCE, while Neanthes lists him as being born in 492 BCE. Regardless, most thinkers agree that he died no later than 415 BCE, thereby overlapping considerably with Anaxagoras in lived years.[30] As for the geographical proximity shared between these two ancient thinkers, it is likely that they crossed paths in Athens. Empedocles was a traveler; he entered cities, announcing his godly presence while inviting citizens to come and revere him. In fact, both Nietzsche and John Burnet explicitly state that Empedocles likely visited Athens. Nietzsche, without explicit support for his claim, boldly states the following about Empedocles: "He appears...in Athens".[31] Burnet, citing the

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22 - My emphasis; G. Murray, *Euripidis fabulae*.
23 - My emphasis. The bolded words indicate the nominative subject, preposition ἐν, and dative plural object respectively.
24 - LSJ.
25 - Collard, *Euripides*, fragment 703.
26 - My emphasis; LSJ.
27 - This particular instance exists within a subsection of the section 5 LSJ entry for ἐν, specifically meaning "in the presence of.".

28 - Collard.
29 - "ἐν τῶι πολλῶι περιέχοντι" Graham, 292-93, B14.
30 - Nietzsche, 107.
31 - Ibid. 111.

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historian Timaios, states: "It is not at all unlikely that he visited Athens".[32] Aside from Burnet, we also have testimony that Empedocles lived in Athens. Graham reader text number 4, Suda, s.v. Akron, places Empedocles in Athens in order to compare Acron to him: "He [Acron] practiced as an expert in Athens at the time of Empedocles".[33]

As we know, Nietzsche explains that Anaxagoras lived in the city of Athens for 50 years and was philosophizing there at the age of 20 (in 480 BCE).[34] In this case, Anaxagoras would have been there from 480-430 BCE. Insofar as Empedocles went into Athens at some point within those fifty years—either before he was 55 years old or before he was 62 years old—it is likely that he crossed paths with Anaxagoras. Graham indicates the possibility that Empedocles was influenced by Anaxagoras: "Empedocles seems to have learned from Parmenides (and Anaxagoras?)."[35] Another ancient source further establishes not only temporal and geographical proximity between Anaxagoras and Empedocles, but a philosophical one as well: Diogenes Laertius tells us that Alcidamas said that "Zeno pursued his own ideas while Empedocles studied with Anaxagoras".[36]

Outside of the bounds of this paper, much has been written about the philosophical relationship between Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Regardless of whether or not these two thinkers were in direct communication with each other, their geographical and temporal proximity has linguistic implications. Empedocles and Anaxagoras communicated within the context of the same language at the same time, and near the same place, discussing physical and philosophical theories; they likely had similar linguistic tendencies and techniques. Specifically surrounding the central focus of this paper, we would like to see both thinkers share in their use of the 'nom. sing. subject + ἐν + dat. plur. object' sentence construction. Indeed, in Fragment B14,

Empedocles provides us with such an instance: "...καί Φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν,..."[37] Although the LSJ does not cite this instance of the 'nom. sing. subject + ἐν + dat. plur. object' sentence construction as an example, Graham translates this fragment using the 'among' paradigm: "and love **among** them."[38]

CONCLUSION

The Euripidean and Empedoclean passages cited in this essay—sharing a temporal, geographical, and potential philosophical connection with Anaxagorean texts—should inform our understanding of Anaxagoras' fragment B14. Accepting Euripides and Empedocles usages of the 'nom. sing. subject + ἐν + dat. plur. object' sentence construction, wherein both the LSJ and Graham translate "ἐν" as "among," we have found etymological support for a retranslation of Anaxagoras' Fragment B14:

Mind[Νοῦς] which always is, is very much present now where everything else is, among the vast surroundings, among the things that have been aggregated and among the things that have been separated.[39]

Avoiding the difficulties that follow from using "in" to translate "ἐν," this retranslation clarifies and preserves Anaxagoras' explicit distinction between νοῦς and all other things: νοῦς—while "**among**" other things—remains unmixed, autonomous, and boundless.[40]

- Madeline Brenchley -

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32 - Burnet, 203.
33 - Graham, 337, *Suda, s.v. Akron*.
34 - Nietzsche, 95.
35 - Graham, 427.
36 - Ibid. 333, A1.

37 - Given by Graham as "(B17) + Strasbourg Papyrus a(i) + a(ii)"; Graham, 350, B17.
38 - My emphasis; Graham, 351, B17.
39 - My translation, my emphasis.
40 - The implications for this alternate translation may allow for us to conceive of νοῦς as a motive force that incites motion externally.

The Completeness of Aristotle's Logic

- Colby Gardner -

...considering Aristotle's logic to be complete in its own sphere allows for the perpetuation of his logic alongside, and not in rivalry with, other logical systems.

Concerning the most recent progress of logic, much of it occurred between the time of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970). Its foundation, however, was established millennia before by Aristotle (384-322 BC), who secured himself the title "The Father of Logic" when he became the first to develop a formalized system for constructing and appraising arguments. This system, referred to as syllogistic or categorical logic, has survived the passage of time and remains a viable form of argumentation. Nevertheless, it has shown its effectiveness throughout history.

One such individual is German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In his Critique of Pure Reason, he infamously writes that "Since Aristotle . . . logic has not been able to advance a single step, and is thus to all appearance a closed and complete doctrine".[1] This single quote, more than the logical system it is referring to, has been the target of intense criticism. Some have interpreted Kant as meaning that the entirety of logic has been utterly realized in Aristotelian logic, thus it cannot advance a single step.[2] Others have argued that Kant meant that, given the information available at that time, logic could not advance until further substantial discoveries were made. In either case, these interpretations are concerned

with whether Aristotle's logic is complete—and if so, in what sense.

In what follows, I will explore these two interpretations to determine the implications of each. For if by the first interpretation, Aristotle's logic is utterly complete, then no other system of logic (e.g. Truth-Functional, Predicate) is necessary. On the other hand, if by the second interpretation, Aristotle's logic was complete only in its own sphere, then there is substantial value in allowing it to coexist alongside other ancillary logical systems. Exploring this dilemma will hopefully provide clarity on the role of Aristotelian logic in modern logic.

For the issue at hand, an essential distinction to make is whether Immanuel Kant considered logic to be a body of knowledge or a philosophical instrument. Historically, some logicians (e.g. Stoics) maintained that logic was a part of philosophy, whereas others (e.g. the school of Aristotle) considered it a valuable hermeneutical tool. Immanuel Kant, as argued by Huaping Lu-Adler, viewed logic as a science, requiring its own separate study. As such, Aristotle's logic would be "complete in the quantitative sense, in having not omitted anything that *ought* to be included in logic proper".[3] It would not be complete in the qualitative sense as it could receive

1 - Mosser, 36.
2 - Lu-Adler, 6.

3 - Ibid., 6.

improvement on the "exactness, determinateness, and distinctness".[4] To this, Lu-Adler adds that Kant believed Aristotle's logic to be complete in content only, not with respect to its formalized display or presentation. In fact, Immanuel Kant notes that the style of Leibniz's and Wolffius' logical systems were both more appealing and refined than Aristotle's.[5] As Kant's devotion to Aristotelian logic was primarily due to its content, it is reasonable to assume that Lu-Adler's claim that Kant viewed his logic as a science rather than an art or tool is well supported.

This seems to lend credence to the latter of the two interpretations. If the former were to be correct, a contradiction would arise: Aristotle's logic *cannot* advance a single step, yet it *can* in ways of presentation. Then again, Kant stated that logic, as a whole, has not been *able to* advance. This then raises a modal question: If logic has not been able to advance, must it then follow that it cannot advance? Intuitively, concluding this requires a fallacious understanding of modal logic, where a simply possibility does not entail a necessity. Because of this difference, the contradiction is only superficial and not semantically true.

Nevertheless, in his second preface to his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes that logic (since Aristotle) "has not had to retrace any step" and "has also been unable to take any step forward".[6] Thus, to avoid the aforementioned modal fallacy, Kant must not only prove that it has not advanced, but also that such progression is impossible according to its already-complete nature. Such a proof is informally outlined by Lu-Adler:
(a) Logic deals solely with the form of thinking.
(b) It includes nothing other than the formal rules of thinking in general.
(c) Consequently, its content is quickly exhaustible.
(d) Aristotle's logic has not left out any of those rules.

Therefore, (e) to this extent, it is complete. According to (e), the content of Aristotle's logic comprises the entirety of logic in general. If Kant were to adopt this proof and empirically prove (d), it would follow that the nature of logic—irrespective of time—would have been complete since its formal development by Aristotle.

That being said, proving (d) is a difficult task and one only presumed by Kant. In reality, there are several forms of thinking which do not conform to Aristotle's logic. In categorical logic, all statments contain either an affirmation or a denial.[7] For instance,
All humans are mortal.
Some men are wise.
Some men are not wise.
No humans are immortal.

However, consider disjuncts:
Either the sky is clear, or it is cloudy.
Neither the door is closed, nor the window is open.

In these two examples, no affirmation or denial is present, and no categorical statement can be formed. Truly, our minds sometimes entertain thoughts of disjuncts. Additionally, we think (and we often do) with conditions:
If I leave now, I'll be on time.
If I go to sleep now, I'll get 8 hours of sleep.

The reality of these two types of thoughts or logical statements is sufficient to disprove (d). As a result, this attempt to preserve the interpretation that the entirety of logic cannot advance fails.

As demonstrated, there is substantial evidence against Aristotle's logic as being complete in that sense. Furthermore, there are other definite limits to syllogistic logic—limits imposed by Aristotle himself. One such limitation is the restriction of his logic to categorical statements

4 - Ibid., 4.
5 - Kant, 4.
6 - Lu-Adler, 6.

7 - In Analytics Book I, Aristotle defines a premise as "A sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. This is either universal or particular or indefinite.", 24a16-17.

and syllogisms. In Prior Analytics, Aristotle defines a syllogism as follows:

> When three terms are so related to one another that the last is in the middle as in a whole and the middle either is or is not in the first as in the whole, it is necessary that there is a syllogism of the extremes . . . For if A is predicated of all B and B of all C, it is necessary that A is predicated of all C[8]

[9]The purpose of this restriction was mainly ontological. The ultimate goal (and thus its ultimate limitation) is its design to understand scientific demonstration. If a categorical statement fails to align with reality, then it cannot be incorporated into a demonstrative syllogism. In this way, imaginary or unrealistic hypotheticals such as the following would not be seriously considered, by Aristotle, to be a sound argument:
All unicorns are cute.
All cute things are small.
Therefore, all unicorns are small.

That is because with demonstrative syllogisms, their validity is contingent on its soundness. In other logical systems, an argument can be valid without being sound, though not vice-versa. The utility of such syllogisms, then, could only be in describing reality, discovering causations, and explaining effects—and nothing else.

On the other hand, Aristotle did allow for syllogisms which are not scientific or demonstrative in nature. In his own words, "Syllogism is the more general: the demonstration is a sort of syllogism, but not every syllogism is a demonstration" (Prior Analytics, Book I, Chapter 4, 25b29-31)). With this classification, he permits the symbolization of syllogisms which can be both unsound and hypothetical (or imperfect). This may be because Aristotle recognized that not all thought is coherent or sound since his logic, according to Kant, is aligned

with cognition. As well, some conclusions cannot be necessitated from their premises. Arguments such as these are referred to by Aristotle as "imperfect" because "necessity is not perfectly established from the original premisses; others are also needed" (Prior Analytics, Book I, Chapter 5, 27a16-18). For instance,

$$\forall x(Ax{\rightarrow}Bx)$$
$$\forall x(Bx{\rightarrow}Cx)$$
$$\forall x(Ax{\rightarrow}Cx)$$

Syllogisms of this form are those which "[need] either one or more propositions, which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms set down, but have not been expressly stated as premises".[10] In this specific example, C is a logical consequence of A but only if term A is somehow introduced to the argument.

It is interesting that Aristotle would extend his classification of syllogisms to include arguments of which the conclusion does not necessarily follow. This extension seems to contradict his original definition of a syllogism.[11] Yet, there are two restrictions imposed upon a syllogism which cannot be violated: (1) requiring logical statements which either affirm or deny and (2) requiring a shared middle term to connect the argument's extremes.[12] In all of these examples, both conditions have been met—even by imperfect or hypothetical syllogisms. As established, the form a syllogism assumes is relatively flexible, so long as it does not violate these fundamental restrictions.

With these limitations in mind, it is clear that the former interpretation of Kant cannot be correct. But what about the latter? Currently, there are logical systems and extensions which contribute much to syllogistic logic. Some examples of this are the introduction of disjuncts and propositional conditions (Truth-Function-

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8 - Aristotle, 25b32-39.
9 - Another definition of a syllogism is provided earlier on: "A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so", Aristotle 24b18-20.
10 - Aristotle, 24b-26.
11 - Refer to the quote 25b32-39. Also, an exploration of why Aristotle would extend the scope of his logic to include hypothetical or imperfect syllogisms would make for an interesting discussion but is tangential to the purpose of this paper.
12 - These two conditions are explicitly laid out in Chapter 4.

al), of quantifiers to propositions (Predicate), and of modal operators to propositional and predicate statements (Modal).[13] Having these advancements in our toolset, it is clear that syllogistic logic, as powerful and efficient it may be, is not the entirety of logic. Syllogistic logic is not extinct or obsolete, however. What Aristotle discovered over two millennia is still relevant today, except it only extends so far in the sphere of logic. The question that must now be answered is whether Aristotle's logic is complete in its own sphere. For, if it is, then not only is Kant correct in his analysis of Aristotle, but the latter interpretation of Kant is also correct.

One philosopher who subscribes to this interpretation is Kurt Mosser. He argues against the common interpretation of Kant that "For any given judgment, all the rules we need for that judgement to be syntactically well-formed are in place; not only is there no need for others, the sufficiency condition indicates that there can be no others".[14] Instead, he believes that the conception of Aristotle's logic should not be viewed as "committed to [such a] strong sense of completeness" and should only refer to a set of "necessary conditions." That logic since Aristotle is "a closed and complete doctrine" would be accurate and true if "complete" refers only to Aristotelian logic and not logic in general.

In its own sphere, Aristotle's logic can prove every valid argument which can be symbolized in a syllogism, barring those restrictions which were described above. As the latter interpretation claims, this is the reason why and the context in which his logic can be considered complete. Despite the indisputable fact that some statements and arguments cannot be symbolized categorically and syllogistically, respectively, it is sufficient that it can prove all those arguments which it intends to prove. In fact, Aristotle recognized the existence of other logical statements, including simple conditionals, but did not incorporate them into his logic because

they "do not, in general, draw their conclusions through predications".[15] Thus, Aristotle's logic can be seen as a finely crafted system with the primary purpose of scientific demonstration, and not as an attempt to capture logic as a whole.

In this paper, I have explored the implications of both interpretations of Immanuel Kant about Aristotelian logic. Because we could not prove the necessity of Aristotle's logic to be incapable of advancement, we discarded the interpretation that Kant viewed Aristotelian logic as being perfectly aligned with logic in general. Instead, we traced the implications of the interpretation that his logic was complete in its own sphere and thus could not advance in content. Ultimately, the conclusion we derived was that considering Aristotle's logic to be complete in its own sphere allows for the perpetuation of his logic alongside, and not in rivalry with, other logical systems.

- Colby Gardner -

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13 - Within Analytics Book XIII, Aristotle does present a basic analysis of modality, specifically of possibility and necessity, though only for categorical statements and not propositions in general.
14 - Mosser, 91.
15 - Ebrey, 186.

Temperance, Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, and the Role of Individual Variance

- Trevor Woodward -

It may not be intelligible, on Aristotle's account, how an agent can achieve all the moral virtues, including temperance, at once.

In much of the discussion surrounding Aristotle's theory of moral virtue, it is often emphasized that, for Aristotle, a moral virtue may be faithfully represented as a point near the middle of a spectrum of possible traits, where the traits on the spectrum are ordered by the degree to which they exemplify a certain passion or passions. On one end of such a spectrum is the "excess vice" trait, which corresponds to the highest-degree manifestation of the passion(s) in question. On the other end is the "deficient" vice trait: the lowest degree-manifestation of the passion. Courage, it is often said, is located somewhere "between" the extremes of foolhardiness and cowardice.

I will argue, however, that the moral virtue of temperance, on Aristotle's account, has the potential to upset this analysis. Temperance is unique in that, prima facie, it appears to range over all passions; all the states which may accompany pleasure and pain. I will argue that this appearance is erroneous, for it renders the concept of temperance unintelligible on Aristotle's account. I solve this problem by arguing that there are "temperance-candidate" pleasures and pains which form a proper subclass of the class of all pleasures and pains more generally. Temperance does not range over all the passions, but rather, a priveleged subclass of them. I then argue that the membership conditions for the class of temperance-candidate pleasures are, for Aristotle, to be determined on a case-by-case basis by appeal to the agent in question's socio-economic role in the ideal city state. I argue for this conclusion by interpreting Aristotle's famous case of "Milo the Wrestler" as an instance of how, for Aristotle, an agent's socioeconomic role may impact what determines whether they exemplify temperance. I close by giving an example of how this important refinement of Aristotle's view may affect one's judgments of virtuosity when applying virtue ethics to individual cases.

Aristotle's Theory of Moral Virtue: Background

Aristotle claims that moral virtue is the product of conscious habituation, i.e., one becomes morally virtuous though the repeated exercise of morally virtuous activities.[1] These moral virtues, Aristotle finds, are characteristics: "those things in reference to which we are in a good state in relation to the passions".[2] In other words, a characteristic is a standard by which one can determine the moral status of a passion. Passions are "those things that pleasure or pain accompany".[3] For example, suppose that I experience confidence and its associated plea-

1 - Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics", 1103a15-26.
2 - Ibid., 1105b23-27.
3 - Ibid., 1103a21-23.

sure in purchasing a large amount of stock in a failing company. Suppose further that I have all the confidence in the world that my investment was a good choice despite every indication to the contrary. For Aristotle, the way to find out whether this state of confidence is good or bad is to view it in reference to the moral virtues. As suggested in the introduction, the relevant passion in my case, confidence, is to be represented as an ordering of possible traits according to the extent to which they exemplify confidence. For Aristotle, my state of confidence is virtuous only if the trait it exemplifies is located near the middle of this ordering. In other words, my state of confidence must be located "between" the deficient vice of cowardice (the lower limit of the ordering) and the excess vice of courage (the upper limit of the ordering). I say moral virtues are "between" the excess and deficient vices, for Aristotle allows that a moral virtue may not be equidistant from the excess and the deficiency. For example, Aristotle finds that foolhardiness "seems more similar and closer to courage".[4] Nonetheless, it appears, my state of confidence is in excess; a courageous agent, presumably, would not have confidently invested large sums of money into a failing company. Hence, prima facie, Aristotle's account delivers the verdict that my behavior exemplifies foolhardiness; I am acting in a morally deficient manner by making my investment.

The crucial features to flag in the forgoing case are as follows. Attending every moral virtue is a passion or passions; every passion is "that which pleasure and pain accompany"; and whether one's behavior exemplifies virtue (more carefully: whether one's behavior at some time is habituating them in the direction of virtue) is determined by the extent to which that behavior exemplifies the passion(s) in question. Notice that, for Aristotle, passions are "accompanied" by pleasures and pains, in the sense that, presumably, a passion is not reducible to pleasures and pains. This is to say that, on Aristotle's metaphysics of passions, a passion is something "over and above" whichever pleasures and pains characteristically "accompany" it. I think that this feature of Aristotle's

4 - Ibid., 1109a9-11.

metaphysics of passions is intuitively correct. Confidence is not just a kind of pleasure; it's a kind of mental state (or: disposition, stance, etc.) which gives rise to a characteristic assortment of pleasures. This metaphysical point is crucial to emphasize, for the passions attending temperance seem to stand in opposition to it.

Temperance-Candidate Pleasure

In Book II, Aristotle introduces the moral virtue of temperance with the following remark:

> With regard to pleasures and pains—not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains—the mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such persons have received no name. But let us call them 'insensible.[5]

This characterization of temperance may seem untendentious. However, I claim, it does not immediately square with Aristotle's metaphysics of moral virtues and passions. Recall that, on Aristotle's account, to be a moral virtue is, inter alia, to be a standard of assessment for the propriety of one's exemplifying specific passions in certain circumstances. If that's right, then anything that doesn't serve as such a standard for at least one passion simply is not a moral virtue. In other words, being such a standard for at least one passion is a necessary condition on something's being a moral virtue. Now, prima facie, temperance meets this condition, for its associated passion is "pleasures and pains". But recall Aristotle's metaphysics of passions. Here, passions are not reducible to pleasures and pains; they are something "over and above" them. Passions are things which give rise to a characteristic assortment of pleasures and pains. But how can this be in the case of temperance? A passion is "that which pleasure and pain accompany". So is the passion of temperance—pleasures and pains—simply that which pleasure and pain accompany? If so, then the passion of temperance is really no passion at all, for pleasures and pains are nothing over and above pleasure and pain. Hence, temperance is not a moral virtue, for there is no passion attending it. This is an absurd result.

5 - Ibid., 1107b.

In sum, the moral virtue of temperance is not, by Aristotle's own lights, a moral virtue, for it does not, prima facie, have a genuine passion attending it. That said, I will argue that the account can be fixed: there are passions attending temperance, but one must be careful in spelling out what these passions are.

The first step to repair is the following: instead of interpreting Aristotle as saying that "pleasures and pains" are themselves the passion(s) of temperance, one can instead interpret him as saying that every "state" which is accompanied by pleasures and pains is one of the temperance passions. This is to say that temperance is a standard of assessment for all passions. This move is a step in the right direction, but it immediately runs into a major problem: if temperance ranges over all the passions, then it may be unintelligible how an agent can exemplify all the moral virtues at once.

Consider the passion of confidence. Recall that Aristotle finds that courage, the moral virtue with respect to confidence, is located much closer to foolhardiness on the spectrum of confidence-ordered traits. Presumably, the high degree of confidence required for courage gives rise to a correspondingly high degree of confidence-pleasure: the characteristic pleasure of confidence which accompanies it qua passion. However, on the present conception, temperance is a standard of assessment to which one's confidence is also subject. For temperance ranges over all the passions. But if that's right, then the high degree of confidence required for courage exemplifies intemperance—specifically, self-indulgence. For temperance, by definition, calls for a middling amount of pleasure. On this conception, to be courageous is to be at least somewhat intemperate with respect to one's confidence-pleasure. It seems one must choose between perfect temperance and perfect courage; to fully pursue the one is to at least partially neglect the other.

This result is to be rejected, for it is inconsistent with the eudaimonic aspirations of Aristotle's theory of moral virtue. To habituate oneself according to Aristotelian ethics is to attempt to live the good life; it is not to pursue one of several co-equal alternative forms of life. It is not to choose between a courage-oriented good life or a temperance-oriented good life. Hence, the present conception of temperance will not do, for it entails a tension with the Aristotelian's higher-order commitments about eudaimonism.

The second step toward repair is to restrict the present conception; it is to say that temperance ranges over some, but not all, the passions. This move seems intuitive, for confidence pleasure, in normal circumstances, seems like it should be exempt from the considerations that determine whether one is temperate. To be confident is to experience a great deal of pleasure, but it is not, prima facie, to experience the kind of pleasure that makes one self-indulgent. Moreover, it seems that Aristotle anticipated the need for such a restriction. Recall that he introduces the virtue of temperance with a bit of hedging: "With regard to pleasures and pains— not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains—the mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence".[6] The important feature here is the qualification: "not all of them, and not so much with regard to the passions." In other words, there are a number of pleasures and pains whose associated states, for Aristotle, are not subject to assessment according to the virtue of temperance. If this is right, then it seems to raise a very important question: Which pleasures and pains, and their associated states, are subject for their assessment to the virtue of temperance on Aristotle's account? If I wish to be temperate, then which passions must I exemplify to a middling degree in my life and actions?

In what follows, I will argue that there is no general answer to these questions in the following sense: the passions that temperance ranges over, for Aristotle, are to be determined on a case-by-case basis by appeal to the agent in question's socioeconomic role in the city-state. I will argue for this claim by appeal to the case of Milo the Wrestler.

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6 - Ibid., 1107b.

Milo the Wrestler

For readers of Aristotle, the case of Milo the Wrestler is likely quite familiar. The account is as follows. Suppose that ten pounds of food is an excess, and two pounds of food is a deficiency. The mean of moral virtue is not necessarily the arithmetic mean of six pounds—for Milo, a strong, successful wrestler, that would not be enough food, and for a non-wrestler, that would be far too much.[7] It seems uncontroversial that the case of Milo the wrestler demonstrates this much: that Aristotle believes that one's moral virtuosity as at least partially determined by their role in the city-state. Presumably, if Milo were not a successful wrestler, or if the city-state saw no value in wrestling, then Milo's abnormal food consumption would make for a vice.

However, I wish to extend the case of Milo to answer the question of the forgoing section: Which pleasures and pains, and their associated states, are candidates for temperance on Aristotle's account? My claim is this: for Milo the wrestler, the passions over which temperance ranges do not include the pleasures attending food consumption. In order to secure the possibility that Milo can be fully virtuous, the notion of temperance to which he is subject must differ from that of the average citizen. To determine whether an agent is temperate is not to assess them according to some universal notion of temperance; it is to first assess their role in the city-state, to then carefully determine which passions are called upon in extremes by that role, and, finally, to assemble an agent-specific standard of temperance which excludes such passions from its scope. This claim is, vacuously, an inference to the best explanation for the problem of temperance articulated above; I know of no alternative explanations, and I hope to show by example that my contention succeeds in accounting for the explanadum.

Suppose I am trying to determine the moral virtuosity of Avery. Avery is so laid back that they "never take offense at anything." I will treat one's "taking offense" to mean one's feeling and expression of visceral anger in circumstances in which their beliefs or character is unjustly called into disrepute. In regard to the passion of anger, Aristotle views the mean of moral virtue to be that of "gentleness".[8] The vice of deficiency, unirascibility, occurs when one fails to feel and express anger in the appropriate contexts, and results in a "slavish" reaction when treated with insolence.[9] The vice of excess, a certain irascibility, occurs when one shows excessive anger in inappropriate contexts, and results in vengeful, shortsighted retaliation efforts15. The excess vice of anger is more contrary to the mean, Aristotle finds, as it occurs more often and "harsh people are worse to live with".[10] The prima facie assessment of Avery might be that they lie on the deficient vice of "unirascibility." It would seem that if Avery is to "never take offense at anything", then they are failing to express anger in the appropriate contexts.

Such an assessment, of course, has failed to weigh the importance of information about Avery's individual-specific role in the city-state. Suppose that Avery works as a public servant. Suppose also that this specific public servant position requires, above all else, a resolve to never express anger in any context, regardless of how difficult or insensitive the demands of the clients may be. In this case, Aristotle would be committed to calling Avery morally virtuous, since their individual work, in stride with the Milo example, standardly interpreted, requires an especially small amount of anger to achieve the mean of moral virtue.

It is crucial to emphasize that, In Avery's case, their passion of anger is assessed according to a universal metric. To be unirascible is, by definition, to express a low degree of anger in contexts in which that reaction is inappropriate. This much is true for all agents; individual variance seeps into the analysis only in order to determine the contexts in which expressions of anger are appropriate and inappropriate.

In sharp contrast, consider whether Avery is temperate. If being temperate requires

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7 - Ibid., 1106a35-1106b7.

8 - Ibid., 1125b26.
9 - Ibid., 1126a3-10.
10 - Ibid., 1126a30-31.

that one exemplify a middling degree of anger and its associated pleasures and pains, then Avery cannot be perfectly temperate insofar as they exemplify gentleness. Due to Avery's socioeconomic role in the city-state, the standard of temperance to which they are subject simply cannot be said to range over the passion of anger; for otherwise, Avery would be insensible on pain of their complete lack of indulgence in the passion of anger. And given that, on Aristotle's metaphysics of virtues and passions, the moral virtues are partially constituted by the passions they range over, it follows that Avery's measure of temperance is sui generis. One who does not occupy a role akin to Avery's—a role that calls for an abnormally large or small degree of anger expression—is subject to an entirely different standard of temperance. It is not a matter of context or appropriateness; it's a matter of being assessed according to resembling, but distinct, standards of assessment. It is for this reason that, on my analysis, Aristotle's account of moral virtuosity is radically individual-specific. It is not quite true to say that there are universal virtues according to which all agents are assessed for their moral goodness; for we are not all subject to the same virtue of temperance.

Conclusion

Given the example above, I conclude that Aristotle's qualification in his introduction of temperance—"not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains"—is best interpreted as intending to exclude precisely the sorts of pleasures that, in individual cases, are called upon in extremes for other moral virtues. Otherwise, it may not be intelligible, on Aristotle's account, how an agent can achieve all the moral virtues, including temperance, at once.

Most commonly, the Milo the wrestler case is interpreted merely as a companion to Aristotle's central argument for moral virtue—a bit of conceptual space for air to facilitate specific application. Instead, I have argued that the case yields a form of radical individual-variance. As such, it is imperative that individual-specific work be emphasized as a necessary consideration when evaluating virtue ethics cases, as well as the most textu-

ally motivated solution to the "determination of temperance-candidate pleasure" problem. My interpretation of the case of Avery reveals that individual work determines not just how certain virtues apply to an agent; it also determines the very content of at least one of those virtues—temperance, for Avery, is likely not the same as temperance for you and I.

- Trevor Woodward -

"Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle" as an Art Object

- Tallulah Farrow -

Klein's work received much media attention and was seen as somewhat scandalous for the way it challenged the traditional notions of art... many did not understand it as art...

One of the foundational questions of aesthetics is what can be considered art. Common conceptions of art as it is taught in primary, secondary and even tertiary schools are often centred around material objects. While some academic conversations around niche genres of art include immaterial projects, such as the conceptual art movement, the common understanding of art in western society is still very much related to a work's existence as a physical object. In aesthetics, like in other fields, there is enormous power and wisdom to be gained from challenging traditional ideas and exploring less mainstream ideas. Given that art plays such a large role in the formation and documentation of culture and that digital spaces, as opposed to material ones, are becoming increasingly important as social and cultural hubs, it seems necessary to make a case for why immaterial and conceptual art should become more widely accepted as art. While it is impossible to show in this essay alone why *all* immaterial works are artworks, it is argued here that the specific immaterial piece, "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle," by Yves Klein should be considered a piece of artwork. By comparing the essential aspects of "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle '' with the essential aspects of two paradigmatic cases of artwork, the reasons why Klein's work should be considered art will be shown. These essential-like qualities will be determined based on personal observations and research about the

artworks. Ultimately, through this enquiry ideas for further consideration of other immaterial pieces as art will be contributed.

Immaterial works can be considered as a part of the broader and well-established conceptual art movement which emerged during the mid 1960's and ended in the 1970's. During this post-war era, the art world saw the emergence of abstract expressionism, surrealism, minimalism as well as fauvism in response to the intense capitalist and communist propaganda that existed everywhere during the Cold War. These movements of art shifted the focus away from the aesthetic object of art, transforming art from a commodity that was created and sold under a capitalist and institutionalized regime to a representation of more radical expressions of the ideas of artists, free from commodification. An important concept that emerged out of this movement was found in *The Dematerialization of the Art Object* by Lucy Lippard. She argued that art has entered a phase of pure intellectualism which could result in the complete disappearance of the traditional, material art object and develop into a new form of dematerialized or "post aesthetic" art. This "post-aesthetic" phase of art was thought to involve the disintegration of traditional material art forms and would center around a liberation of ideas.[1]

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1 - Barcio.

The Dematerialization of the Art Object can be understood as a record of this movement in which "art no longer relied solely upon its physical embodiment within a specific object [and] rather, art could become a lexical definition, a set of instructions, a spoken word, or even a mere idea".[2]

Despite immaterial art's acceptance in some artistic circles, the general conception of art is only really considered to exist in the material realm. Though philosophers are yet to agree on a single definition for art, common, everyday discussions about art in western society and throughout history have largely excluded immaterial works. The question of whether "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle", an immaterial work that came out of the conceptual period, should actually be considered art is then a difficult question to answer definitively. Despite this difficulty though a compelling case as to why you should think it is art will be put forward.

It is now possible to describe "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle." The artwork is a performance by Yves Klein that occurred in 1959 involving a transaction between Klein and members of the public. It involved the sale of documentation of the ownership of empty space in the form of cheques in exchange for gold. This performance was inspired by Klein's fascination with the void. Klein established "ritual rules" to follow during the transaction. Each buyer could either pay the amount of gold agreed upon in exchange for a physical receipt and not actually acquire the "authentic immaterial work," or they could choose to take part in an elaborate ritual where they would buy the immaterial zone in exchange for gold and then burn the receipt.[3] By commodifying and selling the immaterial space, he gave material value to the immaterial or the void, verifying the existence of his "invisible" work. This work strays from traditional art forms in that the central focus of the work is not the physical receipt or the gold, rather the void that is being commodified. It is not the actual occurrence of the trans

action itself that is the important part of the work, but instead it is the idea that challenges the traditional monetary commodification of art as a material possession that is important. Understanding the process and intent of this performance allows for an argument as art.

To understand if "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle" should be considered art, the essential attributes of the "Mona Lisa" and "Für Elise" as paradigmatic examples of art will be discussed. Both of these works, despite being different types of art forms--painting and music--are widely accepted works of art. Of course, what should be considered essential properties of anything is up for interpretation. In their article The Essential Nature of Art, Bond outlines several conditions for what should be considered art. These centre around the intent behind the work as reflected in it, the relational value of the work to the audience, and the skill and creativity behind the work. They argue that "the creative process, the aesthetic properties of the object, the experience of the perceiver, and the institutional aspects of art, all belong to the essence."[4] Similarly, Lind defines art as "anything created to be a significantly meaningful, perceptually interesting object of experience."[5] Based on this, three conditions can be determined to contextualize a work as art, and these conditions are met by all three pieces. Each presents a clear intention that is reflected in the formal elements of the piece and manifested in the process of creating the work, establishes some sort of connection between the work itself and the audience, and involves an agreement that the piece is aesthetically enjoyable. Importantly, these themes are consistent with common language and discussion surrounding art in western society and therefore are a useful guide in discussing the essential attributes of the "Mona Lisa," "Für Elise," and "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle."

The "Mona Lisa" provides an excellent example of a work that is both generally considered to be a work of art and follows the essential

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2 - Hirshhorn Museum.
3 - Cras, 2-23.

4 - Bond, 177-183.
5 - Bond, "Nature of Art" 128.

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attributes of art. Painted in 1506 and currently worth around $800 million, the "Mona Lisa" is highly regarded for being very realistic and carefully executed. It uses subtle graduations of light and shadow and shows a "skillful handling" of the artistic technique sfumato.[6] Many art critics suggest that the formal elements of the work show da Vinci's complete understanding of the subject and argue that to complete the work would have required "inexhaustible patience."[7] It is clear from this that the piece is widely considered to be aesthetically pleasing and that there is some sort of agreement that the piece is aesthetically enjoyable.[8] Additionally, the detailed realism in the piece and the subtle detailed depiction of Mona Lisa's facial features creates a sense of connection between the woman in the painting and the viewer. Furthermore, the Mona Lisa has a clear intention that is reflected in the formal elements of the piece and is manifested in the process of creating the work. The soft facial features and the famous eyes of Mona Lisa are examples of the technical skill involved in creating the piece and speak to the artist's deep understanding of the subject. In all of this, it is clear that the "Mona Lisa" is both a piece of art, and the attributes outlined can be found in the piece.

Another well recognized example of art is the classical song "Bagatelle No. 25" more commonly known as "Für Elise" by Ludwig van Beethoven. This piece is particularly relevant to this discussion as it is both considered to be art and is immaterial. "Für Elise" has a very famous opening phrase which helped it to become recognized as an exceptional form of art around the world and across generations, and it is aesthetically appreciated by a large portion of the population. Many critics argue that it is the simplicity and clear intention behind the piece that makes it so brilliant. With its simple right hand melody and accompaniment of a series of broken chords in the left hand, the piece is not only catchy and aesthetically enjoyable, but also accessible to a wide range of audiences. The

piece features a "huge amount of tension and forward momentum to build up to a dramatic climax"[9] and eventually leads to a simple resolution that "gives the piece charm."[10] Another quality that defines "Für Elise" as art is the fact that it evokes a response from the listener, establishing that there is some sort of connection between the work itself and the listener. This is seen in the fact that the piece is so widely known and is considered by many to be a favorite piece. "Für Elise" as an immaterial piece of art fulfills all three outlined attributes of art.

Having established that the three conditions essential to works of art can and are found in widely accepted examples of art, it is now possible to examine these attributes in relation to "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle" in order to determine whether it also should be considered art. First, "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle" has a clear intention which is reflected in the formal elements of the piece and is manifested in the process of creating the work. Though the formal elements of the piece are not material, the transaction between the artist and the participant can be seen to be these elements. In every aspect of the transaction, including the 'Ritual Rules', the intention of the artist to deconstruct the traditional notions of commodified art is clear. Given that the transaction is somewhat like a live performance, the process of creating the work is the formal elements of the work. In this regard, the piece is art.

Second, "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle" clearly establishes a connection to the audience. Not only does the piece necessitate the engagement of an audience, but it directly challenges the concept of the audience's participation in that the work itself is a critique of the transactional commodification of art. In other words, when a person purchases a piece of the void in this context they are validating its existence as an artwork and are reinforcing that immaterial artworks have value. This purchase is a cyclical reinforcement of "Zone de

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6 - Zelazko.
7 - Richmann.
8 - Lind, 117-129.

9 - Classical FM.
10 - Ibid. "'Für Elise".

Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle" as a piece of artwork. The fact that someone is willing to purchase it may in fact be the very point the artist is trying to make. After understanding the centrality of the audience to both the formal elements of the piece as well as the idea behind the piece itt becomes clear that "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle" invokes a strong connection to its audience.

Finally, there is an agreement that the piece is aesthetically enjoyable. As discussed, this work is described as one of the earliest and more challenging examples of early conceptual art movement. In just three years, eight zones of the void were sold for significant quantities of gold and three elaborate rituals were performed.[11] This buying of the work is evidence of the fact that at least some found it to be aesthetically pleasing. Klein's work received much media attention and was seen as somewhat scandalous for the way it challenged the traditional notions of art. This scandal and media coverage is part of what cemented it as one of the earliest pieces in the conceptual art movement. While many did not understand it as art, it was considered aesthetically pleasing by some. This fulfills the third attribute of art.

Overall, the fact that "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle" is immaterial does not discount it as a work of art. When compared to other essential attributes of other paradigmatic examples of art, it fulfills these same attributes. Furthermore, music, such as "Für Elise," is considered to be art and is immaterial. This analysis does not extend to all immaterial works in general, but instead applies only to this specific piece. Similar work can be done, though, to determine the artistic value of other immaterial works.

- Tallulah Farrow -

11 - Cras, "Investment and Artistic Shareholding"

How Words Refer: A Response to Alfred Mackay's critique of Donnellan

- Conor Thomas -

Why must we be explicit about what we intend to refer to?...
Definitions of linguistic phenomena should be a result of linguistic norms rather than a precondition that our norms must adhere to.

When we talk, we expect the words we use to pick out and refer to objects in the world. If I am at a party and I say "The man over there with the wine glass," then I expect that my words will have the effect of picking out the man across the room who does, in fact, have a wine glass. But what if I have described him incorrectly? What if he is holding a glass of grape juice and not wine? Can I expect that my words, despite being incorrect descriptions, still refer to him? Two philosophers that disagree on the answer to this question are Keith Donnellan and Alfred Mackay. In his essay *Reference and Definite Descriptions*, Keith Donnellan distinguishes between two types of linguistic reference: attributive and referential. An attributive use is when we state a real property that something has, and pick it out. Referential, on the other hand, is when the words we use to pick out the object of our sentence are inaccurate. This would be like the case where the man had grape juice and not wine. Donnellan argues we refer in either case. Mackay's response to this work is a disagreement with Donnellan's characterization of the referential use.[1] In his view, Donnellan's referential use makes the need to use a correct "objectively referring expression" arbitrary. Mackay argues that we need to explicitly describe the thing we intend to refer to, in order to successfully refer. Because Donnellan's referential category involves no description, it does not refer.

In this essay, I argue that Mackay's interpretation of Donnellan's referential use is inaccurate. Donnellan's theory does not treat objectively referring expressions as arbitrary. Rather, Donnellan makes the claim that these descriptions can be flexible depending on the context of use. I will also argue that Donnellan's view is more representative of the way ordinary reference is intuitively thought to happen; it allows for the context of the situation to play a large role in what words we use to refer to. Finally, I will argue that Mackay's definition of reference is problematic.

Donnellan is concerned with how we are to understand definite descriptions in language. Using Bertrand Russell and P.F. Strawson's theories as a backdrop, he notes that definite descriptions are referring to an object that they are said to describe. But, as mentioned above, there seem to be cases in which what has been referred to does not match the description that has been given by the speaker. Yet, the object has been referred to nonetheless. So, Donnellan makes a distinction between two different ways we can use definite descriptions to refer. This first is the "attributive use." This is how

1 - Mackay, "Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty on Referring."

we typically refer to an object that is in correspondence with the definite description you use. For example, I might say, "The founder of Facebook died today." If I am using an attributive reference, I am saying whoever has the property of having founded Facebook died. I am pointing out a defining feature in the object I mean to refer to. I may not know who this person is or anything else about him, but I have successfully referred to him attributively.[2]

The second type, referential use, is ignored by Strawson and Russell, and yet is a regularly occurring phenomenon in language. The referential use occurs when someone uses a definite description that does not represent the object they are trying to point out. Rather it allows the audience to make a judgment about the thing being referred to. The reference is successful, despite the description being inaccurate. For simplicity, I will use one of Donnellan's examples (Mackay uses this same example to refute Donnellan). Suppose I enter the court of a man that I do not believe is a king, but an imposter. I might ask one of his servants, "Is the king in the courthouse?" His servants will know who I am talking about. My reference is successful despite me not actually believing that he is a king. Even the servants themselves do not have to believe the man is the rightful king to know whom I am talking about. They also might know that I do not believe he is the king, and I might know that they don't either. King does not have to be a word that anyone in this example would say fits the description of the object that has been referred to, but we are all able to identify that object. The referential use is not specifying an actual property, it is simply a tool that helps call attention to a certain object.[3] Reference occurs nonetheless.

It is the referential use that Mackay takes issue with. To him, there is no actual reference happening in Donnellan's king example (or any of his referential examples). But to Mackay, just making what you are talking about known to your audience is not reference. This would make reference too dependent on the audience,

and not dependent enough on the speaker and their words. So, Mackay argues that reference must involve a description of some kind. In his words, reference is "making knowable what we are talking about, by way of using an expression which correctly describes the object in question."[4] He uses Donnellan's king example to distinguish four elements that are important for reference in this situation. They are (1) the speaker's intentions; (2) what the ostensibly referring expression is (hereafter referred to as o.r.e.); (3) the object of intended reference; and (4) the audience. Mackay claims that Donnellan's referential use emphasizes (1) and (4), but "downgrade[s] the importance" of (2). Deemphasizing (2), as he argues Donnellan does, brings us to problems of reference being too dependent on the audience. So, a speaker calling a man a king while not believing he is king is not reference. Essentially, he thinks that Donnellan's view makes the preferred o.r.e. unimportant. Donnellan is saying that it does not matter what word you use, as long as everyone understands what you mean to refer to.[5]

The reason why Mackay thinks this is a problem is because it makes the words we use arbitrary. He illustrates this with a passage from Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*. In the passage, Humpty Dumpty uses the word "glory" to mean "a nice knockdown argument." When Alice points out that the word "glory" does not mean that, Humpty Dumpty says, "it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less."[6] Mackay says this is what Donnellan's view brings us to, and this makes natural language unworkable. We need a shared basis of the definitions of words to make language useful in communication. If we could just make our own personal definitions of words on a whim, then we could not use words to reliably transfer information or express ideas. Donnellan says that if I have a book and a rock on a table, and I, intending to refer to the book, say, "Bring me the rock on the table," then I have referred to the rock, not the book. Mackay sums up his issue with this in one sentence: "If one

2 - Donnellan, 285..
3 - Ibid.

4 - Mackay, 198.
5 - Ibid., 198-199.
6 - Ibid., 200.

can refer to a book using "the rock," then one can refer to a book by using any o.r.e., and so the actual o.r.e. becomes irrelevant."[7] This is a dangerous devaluation of language to Mackay, and to avoid the problems it would cause, he is led to conclude that accurate descriptions are the only things with power to actually refer.

In what follows, I will focus on two errors that Mackay makes in his argument. First, I will show that he has misinterpreted Donnellan's view. The referential use does not make all descriptors arbitrary; rather, it shows that successfully referring is a function of more than just our spoken language. This is more consistent with our intuitive notions of reference. Second, I will show that Mackay's attempt to constrict the definition of reference creates a problem of its own, and may even be an unnecessary restriction on reference altogether.

First, in his essay, Mackay quietly transitions from the view that referential use "downgrade[s] the importance" of o.r.e.s, to the view that referential use makes o.r.e.s "irrelevant." This is a significant step and not one that goes unnoticed. It is the conclusion he is brought to by comparing Donnellan's view to Humpty Dumpty changing the definition of glory and someone calling a book a rock. In these examples there is a clear miscommunication happening. We are not surprised when Alice had to question what Humpty Dumpty means by "glory," and we would not be surprised if the man who asked for the rock was brought a rock. But Donnellan does not say that any possible o.r.e. will work to refer to any possible object; he is simply saying that there are o.r.e.s that work to refer to objects they do not describe. Mackay does not see the difference here and thus creates a straw man.

Despite this, Mackay may be right that Donnellan has downgraded the importance of o.r.e.s. But Donnellan's model is more representative of the way we use ordinary language. Words are not spoken in a vacuum. The context of a given situation plays a major role in how reference occurs. In the above example,

not only was the o.r.e. incorrect, but there was no possible contextual way for Alice to infer what Humpty Dumpty meant. The referential use shows that the minimum requirement for linguistic reference can be very small because of the way context factors into the description used.

For example, we sometimes choose to refer to things very generally -- so generally, in fact, that the definite description we use does not represent the object whatsoever. Suppose we have a scenario where there are three items on a table in another room: a book, a rock, and a lighter. I might refer generally, and say, "Bring me that thing on the table in there." Without context, it would be hard to know what is being referred to. But say I had just picked up what you know are my reading glasses, or say this is the time of day that I normally spend reading. Given this, you would know that the "thing" I am referring to is the book on the table. Now suppose that I had just taken out a pack of cigarettes. With this context, you would know to grab the lighter from the table, rather than the book. This is a linguistic norm we often adhere to, and we are frequently able to communicate this way. We make no attempt to refer in the way that Mackay suggests because we know that the context of the situation makes up for our lack of an explicit description. We have not mistakenly mis-referred by using a term as general as "thing." We have actually referred quite successfully if we understand the context that we are speaking in accurately.

However, Mackay is right that the words we use matter, and that the referential use may, in some scenarios, make it harder for my audience to know what I am referring to. If I attempt to refer to a man in white Nike shoes, but he is wearing white Adidas shoes, it is more difficult to know what's been referenced. Here I am making a distinction. In some cases (like the "thing" case), we can successfully refer with our use of vague terminology because of sufficient contextual clues. In other cases (like this white shoe one), confusion may arise if the context is not able to make up for the inaccuracy of the words used. This is especially

7 - Ibid., 201.

true given that in this example, the o.r.e. is not simply vague, but contradictory to the actual properties of the object. My audience may be looking for a large white check mark on someone's shoes, and be confused when they only see stripes. But even in this case, it is highly counterintuitive to say that no reference happened. We can imagine that enough information was given for my audience to eventually figure out who I was referring to, despite being wrong. Mackay's narrowing of the definition of reference neglects this intuitive notion. The idea that reference can happen only "by way of using an expression which correctly describes the object in question" is contrary to what we normally think of the power our language has to refer.[8]

Second, Mackay's definition of reference as an accurate description encounters philosophical problems of its own. No attempt is made in his argument to justify the definition. Mackay simply offers it in an attempt to save us from the chaos of devaluing the referring power that words themselves have. But giving his new definition without justification leaves him vulnerable to clear objections. For example, there are situations in which I might perfectly describe an object, but context is still needed in order to fully understand what I am saying. I might say, "Here is a thing with four equal lines, all connected and fixed at a ninety degree angle to one another." I have just perfectly described a square, and if I were sitting in my geometry class one would know I am referring to the theoretical shape. However, if I had said the same thing in my woodshop class, I might more reasonably be referring to the picture frame I was making. So, even when we do refer in an explicit and accurate way like Mackay says we need to, context changes what we might be referring to. It seems that language cannot be fully isolated from the situation we are in.

This prompts a more fundamental question about Mackay's view that we need to describe an object in order to really refer to it: Why? If language that is general, or even somewhat inaccurate, gets your point across to your audience, then why must we be explicit

about what we intend to refer to? In most of the cases I have outlined, the effect of referring is the same whether or not we provide an exact description. I can describe a book as a "thing" and rely on context clues to do most of the work of referring, or I can describe the thing accurately. The message is received and there is no difference in the end result of my language. Mackay's narrow definition of reference suggests that we are not referring in scenarios where our use of language does its intended job. This calls into question not only the accuracy but the necessity of delineating reference in the way that Mackay does. Definitions of linguistic phenomena should be a result of linguistic norms rather than a precondition that our norms must adhere to.

In conclusion, Donnellan's referential use gives insight into an intuitive ability that words have to refer to things they do not describe. Mackay misrepresents Donnellan's position, and neglects the role that context plays in helping our language refer. We do not have to be as explicit as Mackay would like us to be in order to refer. Also, he offers a definition of reference that pulls us farther from an accurate view of linguistic reference. This definition is not justified and begs questions about its own necessity. Much more care must be taken if we attempt to define a concept as broad as reference.

- Conor Thompson -

8 - Ibid., 198.

Debate and Dialogue: What Adult Philosophers Can Learn From COmmunities of Inquiry

- Rylan Garwood -

...the Socratic method must be replaced by a more intellectually honest and cooperative dialogical pedagogy which allows participants to comfortably change positions without the fear of appearing less intelligent.

When leading a classroom discussion, Philosophy for Children (P4C) practitioners seek to maintain the correct pedagogy. A notable approach is Lipman's community of inquiry, which encourages productive, dialogical, and peaceful communication.[1] Unfortunately, the community of inquiry pedagogy is scarcely utilized outside of P4C contexts. Instead, it is overshadowed by the famous Socratic method. In this paper, I will explore which qualities ought to be promoted not only within P4C discussions, but within academic philosophy as a whole. Then, I will determine which mode of communication is best suited for said qualities. I argue that the community of inquiry approach is more appropriate, intellectually honest, productive, and peaceful than the Socratic method.

Recently, I had the wonderful opportunity of leading several remote P4C sessions along with my coinstructors. The sessions were arranged through the help of the Biochemistry Literacy for Kids organization and Dr. Amy Reed-Sandoval at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I was consistently amazed by the intellectual capabilities of those who attended. Not only did they easily grasp the abstract concepts found within philosophy, but they also reached conclusions similar to some influential thinkers. For example, during a discussion about whether we had any innate skills, one of our students suggested that the acquisition of language is an innate skill, mirroring the contemporary works of Noam Chomsky.[2]

Throughout this paper, I will be inserting examples much like the one above in order to illustrate my argument. The examples will provide insight into the atmosphere of the P4C sessions and give realistic accounts of the strengths and weaknesses of the methods being discussed.

The Essentials of Philosophical Discussions

In order for a discussion to be truly philosophical and productive, it must have a handful of specific qualities. Most obviously, the discussion must be of a topic pertaining to philosophy; however, this is not enough. "Discussions" in which all participants merely share their views can be easily mistaken as "doing philosophy." This is not the case. While the discussion may have a philosophical topic, such as the nature of knowledge, the discussion itself fails to be philosophical until the participants focus on the *arguments* rather than the conclusions. In other words, participants need to be engaging in "meta-talk" by making statements about the discussion and the logical steps within it.[3] This "meta-talk" necessitates that there be momentum within the discussion—the discussion must be making progress. To paraphrase Lipman, the goal of the discussion is to walk, with each contribution acting as a footstep.[4]

1 - Lipman, 84-85.
2 - Chomsky, *Rules and Representations*.

3 - Kuhn, Zillmer, and Khait, 263.
4 - Lipman, 87: "In a dialogue, on the other hand, disequilibrium is enforced in order to compel forward movement. One cannot help thinking of the analogy with walking, where you move forward by constantly throwing yourself off balance. When

Our students began to expect the weekly discussions to have momentum and quickly became bored if everyone was simply sharing opinions. However, if it was to be declared that these discussions must be heading somewhere, a destination was established. As stated above, the goal should be more substantive than merely sharing views. Instead, to mirror philosophy as a whole, the ideal discussion operates in order to bring the participants closer to the truth. Therefore, the qualities that maximize the truth-finding potential of the discussion, such as revising previous contributions and eliminating views that do not hold, are highly desired.

In order for this to occur, views must be separated from individuals. This is not to say that we should not acknowledge that a person can hold a particular view; however, it is to say that, upon eliminating a subpar view, the person who held said view remains and continues to adapt to the mobile nature of the conversation. Thus, the ideal discussion involves an atmosphere in which participants are able to admit when their current view does not hold, as the discussion would be sacrificing truth-finding potential otherwise.

During one of the first sessions of our P4C course, our students were asked to agree upon a list of adjustable conversational rules for future discussions. They decided the following:

1. Speak your mind.
2. Respect other's opinions.
3. Tell others when you think their idea is better.
4. Tell others when you think that they are wrong.
5. Let others finish before you talk.
6. Be kind when you say something about someone's idea.

These rules show that our students were concerned with not only respecting each other, but

also truth-finding. Rules one, three, and four were created to promote honesty during conversations. As truth-finding is increased through the addition of unique ideas, it is encouraged that individuals do not feel forced to conform to the majority's thoughts within a discussion and honestly share their ideas instead. Rules two, five, and six also promoted truth-finding as well. As will be later argued, promoting cooperative practices and discouraging combativeness greatly increases truth-finding potential.

To summarize, philosophical discussions need to: be centered around a topic pertaining to philosophy, focus on meta-talk, always be in motion, be concerned with truth-finding, and eliminate any practices that hinder truth-finding potential. While this list is not meant to be exhaustive, it offers guidance towards a beneficial framework for discussion.

Finding a Mode of Communication

Now that the fundamental qualities for the ideal discussion have been illustrated, the mode of communication best suited to bring about these qualities must be identified. By "mode of communication," I am referring to the various instances within the broad category of "communication." For example, conversations, talks, chats, monologues, dialogues, and debates are all modes of communication. Since the ideal philosophical discussion is concerned with truth-finding, the appropriate mode of communication must be as well. This eliminates modes such as conversation where, as Lipman says, "the personal note is strong, but the logical note is weak."[5] Debates and dialogues are the modes of communication that most encourage truth-finding. While both are extremely popular within academic philosophy, they are marked by numerous differences.

Dialogues can be thought of best as brainstorming sessions that are concerned with sharing and learning from diverse views. In contrast to conversations, which are cooperative, dialogues are collaborative—there is a shared goal of answering a pre-established issue.[6] As an illustration, I began many of my sessions by

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you walk, you never have both feet solidly on the ground at the same time. Each step forward makes possible a further step forward; in a dialogue, each argument evokes a counterargument that pushes itself beyond the other and pushes the other beyond itself."

5 - Lipman, 87.
6 - Ibid, 88.

showing my students a short film before asking them to share any questions they might have had while viewing it. After this, I would ask a random student to pick one of the offered questions as our goal. The rest of the session was then spent attempting to answer said question. As well as this, dialogues are always in motion, developing as they progress through the analysis of arguments.[7] They also have many excellent qualities that promote truth-finding. For example, in order to function properly, many of my sessions required active participation, which can force a wide variety of views to be presented. This is necessary for truth-finding, as truth can hide in places hidden from myopic discussions. A truth-finding quality heavily advocated for by P4C practitioners and present within proper dialogues is equality. Individuals, such as Paulo Freire, have worried about the hierarchical structure of classrooms, stating that it devalues the useful views of the students by treating them as receptacles of knowledge instead of coinquirers.[8]

Hopefully, it is clear that dialogues share many qualities with the ideal philosophical discussion. Debates, on the other hand, fail to do so. They are the inverse of dialogues in many ways. Firstly, the goals are not equivalent. Where dialogues are concerned with finding an answer to a preestablished question, the goal of debates is to win. Specifically, the goal is to win by defeating your opponent. Thus, truth-finding is next to no importance within a debate. Even with no preestablished goal of finding the truth, debates still hold qualities that discourage truth-finding.

These qualities stem from the previously mentioned concept of having an *opponent*— something foreign to proper dialogues. Debates have the back-and-forth movement of conversations, but never have actual momentum, as a counter from an opponent must be followed by a defense *ad infinitum*. As there is no movement, debates consist of foot-stomping without taking any steps. In order to create movement, unsatisfactory views must be abandoned much like how the old position of a step must be abandoned for

a new, progressive step. This never happens in debates. Admittance of a faulty position would be contradictory to the goal of winning. Thus, debates create an atmosphere in which honestly evaluating views is akin to being defeated.

In his 1947 book, Martin Buber argued that, within debates, individuals are not "regarded in any way present as persons."[9] While I would agree that debates are dehumanizing to some extent, this view is not correct. Debaters must view their opponents as persons in order to defeat them. A stroll through a platform such as YouTube will reveal a plethora of debate clips in which one individual "destroys" or "owns" their opponent. From my experience, it is usually not the case that a convincing argument is generated. Rather, "destroying" an opponent involves responding with a snarky jab in which the debater merely reaffirms their position (usually by mocking their opponent's view). As the views of the participants within a debate are set before it begins, they are concretely connected to the participants such that, if one "destroys" a view, one "destroys" the person holding said view. If truth-finding is desired, it is of utmost importance that individuals have the ability to change their mind without the fear of defeat or being viewed as less intelligent.

When writing this paper and engaging in philosophical thinking in general, I am usually the creator and the critic of my own views. I may develop a theory only to construct a counterexample to my theory shortly after. In this sense, philosophizing on my own is akin to hosting a dialogue with myself. There is momentum, the goal of truth-finding, and the abandonment of views that fail to hold. However, and most importantly, I do not feel a sense of defeat. In fact, it is quite the opposite—I feel a sense of accomplishment. Although my original views usually fail to hold, the act of replacing them is not devastating, as I am a sort of coinquirer with myself and the dismissal of my views originates from my own volition.

Ideally, this is the relationship participants within a dialogue should have. As the pre-

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7 - Ibid, 87.
8 - Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.

9 - Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 22-23

established goal is concerned with truth-finding, abandonment of a lackluster view ought not to result in a feeling of defeat, but rather a shared feeling of accomplishment. During my sessions, it never appeared as though anyone felt defeated after realizing a potential issue with their theory. Instead, my students seemed to become engrossed in the pursuit of finding a solution to our preestablished question. This caused them to nearly *joyfully* abandon a theory in the presence of a more superior solution. For example, during a discussion about whether or not too much love could be a negative thing, many of the students were concluding that it *could* be through the use of hypothetical examples. However, one student brought up the point that, within the hypotheticals, it might not be the *love* that was causing any negative outcomes, but something about the *way in which* one individual was loving another. After this, nearly all of the students quickly concurred with these comments, completely contradicting the last ten minutes of unanimous discussion, and began imagining how the way in which one's love for another could be misguided.

DIALOGICAL PEDAGOGIES

Hopefully, it is clear that dialogues are a much more effective mode of communication than debates when concerned with the qualities of the ideal philosophical discussion. However, there are multiple ways in which to engage in a dialogue. Notably, the Socratic method and the community of inquiry approaches have been largely influential. While both share many qualities, there are important differences to highlight. When referring to the qualities of the ideal philosophical discussion, these differences determine whether or not said qualities are met. In the end, the Socratic method will be shown to be a less-pure form of dialogue than the community of inquiry approach.

The Socratic method involves analyzing the propositions given by the dialogical partner through the use of calibrated questions in order to develop a clearer understanding of a preestablished concept. Already, the Socratic method has many positive qualities. Firstly, Socratic dialogues usually refer to a topic pertaining to

philosophy. Secondly, meta-talk is nearly always the focus. As the Socratic method revolves around analyzing concepts within one's proposition, there is a focus on *how* a conclusion was reached. Finally, there is momentum within a Socratic dialogue. Views are consistently revised as needed in order to respond to the calibrated questions.

Unfortunately, the Socratic method has a few subtle, yet important qualities that limit its truth-finding potential. These qualities seem to stem from the lack of two, previously discussed concepts: dialogues ought to be non-combative and promote equality. The Socratic method fails to obtain these concepts by implementing qualities that are found within debates and monologues.

Martin Buber describes monologues as:

> disguised as dialogue, in which two or more men, meeting in space, speak each with himself in strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the torment of being thrown back on their own resources.[10]

Monologues act as if they are dialogical and promote equality, when they are in fact self-serving. Dialogues are always mutual—all participants are students. Monologues involve the opposite. The Socratic method is a form of monologue disguised as dialogue. The participants are not equal, rather there is a subject and an interrogator. By asking questions and claiming they "know nothing," interrogators are able to hide as lecturers in inquirer's clothing.[11] The calibrated questions of the Socratic method are often structured as questions but lack the interest of a genuine question. Instead, they are merely counterexamples hidden within the question itself, as the answer to the calibrated question knowingly functions as the counterexample.

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10 - Ibid., 22.

11 - It must be noted that the interrogators within Socratic dialogues further reflect the traditional, hierarchical pedagogy, for, in order to generate an effective, calibrated question, the interrogator must usually be well-versed within the given topic.

These counterexamples are easily used to guide the subject towards the desired conclusion. This raises a huge issue for P4C instructors when put into practice. As P4C instructors wish to promote equality and distance themselves from hierarchical models of education, it is in their best interest to avoid guiding their students towards a desired answer through the use of calibrated questions. Unfortunately, this is not limited to the Socratic method and can be found within communities of inquiry as well. For example, there are times in which the student-led dialogue flickers out and must be reignited by a question from the instructor. In one of my recent P4C sessions, I had my students view the Pixar short film, *For the Birds*. They had many excellent questions arise from their viewing, but eventually ran out of conversational material. I took the opportunity to ask them a question about the relationship between the birds within the film. Within the next three questions, I had guided my students towards a discussion about moral skepticism. Because *For the Birds* has very little or nothing to do with moral skepticism, this should show that an instructor can guide her students to whatever conclusion she wishes through the use of calibrated questions. This is not a matter to brag about, but it is a danger for equality, which, as mentioned above, is a danger for truth-finding.

The Socratic method also hosts the combative qualities of debate. Unlike communities of inquiry, the Socratic method often produces feelings of defeat within the subject being questioned. This is due in part to the hierarchical structure of the method. One participant is in the "hot seat," while the other is the interrogator. It must be mentioned that the interrogator is nearly always viewed as the victor. Euthyphro is never praised for his contributions. It is the intelligent Socrates who takes the credit as the truth-finder. As bell hooks states, "There is much obsession in academic circles about the ownership of ideas. Competition for academic regard leads individuals to have a desperate need to be seen as the 'one' who first thought of an idea."[12] It seems that academic philosophy

is especially plagued by a need to demonstrate how intelligent one is. This can be manifested in many ways. For example, it is rather curious how many philosophers just so happen to sit in front of their bookshelves during this time of remote learning. This form of competition can also be exhibited through elements of monologuing or lecturing, as if to show the vast knowledge one has acquired.[13]

CONCLUSION

When existing in the shadows of intellectual giants such as Kant and Hume, professional philosophers can often divert their attention from the truth and become more concerned with "fitting into" philosophy's immensely intellectual atmosphere. Philosophers are often regarded as individuals who ought to always have something innovative and wise to share. These expectations seem to have spawned an academic culture in which individuals are constantly attempting to demonstrate how intelligent they are. Instead of using professional philosophers as role models, future philosophers ought to be inspired by individuals like my students, who will gladly admit when they are mistaken in order to move closer towards the truth. To encourage this mindset, the Socratic method must be replaced by a more intellectually honest and cooperative dialogical pedagogy which allows participants to comfortably change positions without the fear of appearing less intelligent. While communities of inquiry have theoretical limitations as well, they are a correct step towards an ideal philosophical discussion.[14]

- Rylan Garwood -

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12 - bell hooks, *Teaching Critical Thinking: Practical Wisdom*, 47.

13 - Ibid., 65.

14 - I would like to extend many thanks to Dr. Amy Reed-Sandoval for her wonderful instruction and support. She is a source of inspiration not only in her excellent writing and teaching, but in her conduct as well.

Freire en la Frontera:
Philosophy Lessons from El Paso

- Iram Gonzalez -

The path forward demands a new pedagogy from teachers, one in which they stand on equal footing with their students... Reconnecting with the repressed culture serves as the first step toward recognizing oneself as fully human.

The Mexico-US border represents one of the most dynamic culture clashes globally, which presents unique challenges to schools in the region. Standing just a few meters away from el Río Bravo, Bowie High School serves students who live on both sides of the border. Here, Abraham Monteros teaches a Mexican-American studies course incorporating Chicanx culture and history in his classroom. Several of his lectures involve subversive and hidden histories of Mexican American culture, narratives that often counter the traditional Anglo-American beliefs. He gave me an opportunity to apply pedagogical theories to the real world, as he, too, incorporates philosophical concepts in his classroom. In my brief time with Mr. Monteros, I drew parallels with the philosophy of critical pedagogy, inspired by ideas like social justice and critical theory. Paulo Freire argues for a radical approach to education, and much of Mr. Monteros' class material echoes the work of Freire. First, the philosophical background of both Monteros' curriculum and Freire's framework will be explained to explore the applications of academic pedagogy. Next, within a tragic history lesson of a massacre, the classroom examined the various meanings of justice, along with finding inspiration from a local hero. Following that, the concept of fairness will be explored in another session, facilitated through a lesson borrowed from pedagogic philosopher David Shapiro. Students likewise investigated the nature of stereotypes through discussion and educational exercises. Each class session draws numer-

ous parallels to much of Freire's commentary on educational practices and outcomes. Despite the comparisons, some criticisms can be lobbied toward the application of a 20th-century Brazilian pedagogy onto contemporary American schooling. In the end, Freirean pedagogy can empower students from oppressed backgrounds to fully realize their humanity.

One should note the context of my essay, as Abraham's class provides a unique setting for the application of philosophy for children. As mentioned above, Mr. Monteros teaches a Mexican American studies course at Bowie High School, one of the oldest operating schools in El Paso. The student body is comprised of teenagers from both sides of the US-Mexico border, so the students are intimately aware of the topic of immigration. The ages of the students range from 16-18 years old, and some work to support themselves and their families. Much of the philosophy lessons discussed in this paper occurred via Zoom during the Spring of 2021, with me communicating from Las Vegas. The philosophical approach taken with the students was greatly inspired by the views of Matthew Lippman. He aims for an education that "enriches, enlightens, and liberates, that fosters understanding, strengthens judgment, improves reasoning, and imparts a clear sense of the relevance of inquiry to the enlargement of humanity."[1] Along these lines, I approached these classes with a similar intent. We sought to cultivate

1 - Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, 6.

an environment that enabled the students to develop their critical thinking skills and curiosity on their own terms. Philosophy for children, as we practiced, introduced abstract concepts through engaging lesson plans and relatable topics to assist in student reasoning and instilling a communal view of living. The principles in philosophy for children generally mesh well with the radical thinking of Freire.

Furthermore, to understand the argument at hand, one should first be familiar with Freire's main argument in Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Although complex, Freire's thesis revolves around a rather straightforward goal. He summarizes his overall aim concisely, "a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity."[2] He avoids a detached and paternalistic framework for education, an attitude already impacting underprivileged communities. The Freirean pedagogy works on the same level as the oppressed, allowing individuals within the affected community to shape the direction of their education. A similar correspondence arises in Monteros' class, as he is a Chicano teaching Mexican American history. Traditional histories of Anglo-America dominate Texan high schools, so a Chicanx studies course defies the dehumanization of marginalized people on the border. Freire notes on the topic, "Dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity has been stolen, but also. . . those who have stolen it, is a distortion of the vocation of becoming more fully human."[3] The willful avoidance of this history in schools demonstrates the attempts by the US cultural hegemony to dehumanize Mexican Americans. Chicanx histories, then, become relegated to specialized topics in schools. Thus, the addition of cultural studies unites the abstract connotations of the classroom with the personal aspects of identity. These intimate details of one's life hold weight outside their day-to-day living, as American systems of law and justice maintain a frayed relationship with the identity of marginalized people.

In our first philosophy for children lesson, I related the topic of justice to the Porvenir Massacre. The tragic incident involved white Texas Rangers, the U.S. military, and local ranchers invading Mexican and Mexican American in Porvenir, Texas.[4] Fifteen men and boys died at the hands of these white men, who were blindly retaliating for raids from Mexico during the Mexican Revolution. The lesson plan included a basic introduction to philosophy and an exploration of the concept of justice. Our aim was to create a working definition of justice for the class so that a common understanding could be used in our discussion. Once the students reached a consensus, they then applied their definition to their recent lesson regarding the massacre. The topic hit close to home for the students, as the younger victims of the massacre were around the same age as the teenagers in the class. The theme of justice stood out as particularly relevant to the racial discrimination against Mexican communities in El Paso. Though the discourse was slightly hampered through Zoom's chat feature, the students reexamined their previous definition of justice through a new and personal lens. Their justice discussion highlighted aspects of community interactions I never considered, which in turn taught me about new possibilities for other social issues like police reform. In many ways, the students taught this guest instructor some lessons about living on the border, akin to Freire's demand that educators be learners as well.

The student discussion on justice became filtered through a Chicanx view, bringing the conversation closer to both their hometown and Freire's philosophy. Freire remarks on the supposed divide between objectivity and subjectivity, "one cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can exist without the other, nor can they be dichotomized."[5] The field of history typically presents itself as an objective study, as the research of historians depends on historical facts and records. However, Freire points out that ostensibly objective fields of study, such as history, nonetheless cover the

2 - Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 48.
3 - Ibid., 44

4 - Jasmine Aguilera, "Descendants of 1918 Porvenir Massacre Fight For Recognition".
5 - Freire, *Pedagogy*, 50.

deeply personal territory of the human experience. Philosophy lessons with the purpose of incorporating culture must contend with the "subjectivity and objectivity in constant dialectical relationship."[6] For example, the discussion on the Porvenir Massacre inevitably drew parallels with the 2019 El Paso shooting at a popular Walmart on the border. Much of the class, including myself, shared our previous experiences at that Walmart whenever we crossed the border. Rather than being blinded by the personal aspect, the conversation led to ideas concerning community-driven police reform. The students guided the lesson toward the topic of crime prevention and community protection, without the encouragement of any instructor. The students began asking for an objective transformation of their reality based on their subjective experience both at the hands of individual prejudice and suppressed history. Furthermore, the educators were brought to the level of students, enabling a more democratic relationship between teacher and student. This was done through examining examples from their community fighting for recognition and liberation.

Freire stresses the necessity for the oppressed to engage with their struggles toward liberation, and Monteros' class provides opportunities for students to find role models for positive resistance. Freire writes, "The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their redemption."[7] He argues the pedagogy, and overall struggle, of the oppressed must be driven by the same members of the community affected by systemic coercion. The people of any movement need relatable role models to guide and provide examples of worthwhile resistance.

In Mr. Monteros' class, students covered the 1917 Bath riots and other racial unrest at the time. As one journalist described the injustice, "For decades, U.S. health authorities used noxious, often toxic chemicals to delouse Mexicans seeking to cross the border into the United States."[8] Mexicans travelling the border at the time needed to undergo "disinfection" before accessing the American side. The travelers underwent kerosene baths and DDT sprays in an area that once belonged to Mexico and various indigenous communities before them. Several women were sexually assaulted as well, which led to discomfort among students in the class. The shared history of prejudicial repression helped tie my struggles as a Chicano with the lived experience of Monteros' students. In our search for fairness, the students and I found common ground in a local hero from El Paso.

In this reprehensible narrative, the students found a Chicana role model struggling for liberation, leading to an investigation of the idea of fairness. Carmelita Torres initiated the 1917 Bath riots, gaining her the title of "Latina Rosa Parks." The students witnessed the power of their culture, as the incident began with "a Mexican maid who crossed every day. . . to clean American homes."[9] I utilized Torres and the riots in our second lesson plan regarding fairness, originally from philosopher David Shapiro's Plato was Wrong! called the "Hand Dealt" exercise. Shapiro's activity explores the concept of fairness. He claims the activity "[gives] students an opportunity to assume different characters. . . and wonder about the most equitable way to distribute social benefits."[10] We extended the focal point of Shapiro's lesson to focus on the oppression of Mexican migrants like Carmelita, adding new dimensions to the student discourse. After assigning them randomized identities, we asked the students to wonder, from their character's perspective, "Is life fair?" Several students provided detailed responses to the unique challenges and opportunities presented to their characters, which shed new light on their previous definitions of fairness. We then randomly selected certain students to receive social benefits and harms, and more students opined on the fairness of aid and disasters. Some students gave an egalitarian view, but some held individualistic responses to questions about social aid. Although some students

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6 - Ibid., 50.

7 - Ibid., 54.

8 - Burnett, "The Bath Riots: Indignity Along the Mexican Border".

9 - Pham, "Injecting Racist Hysteria: Race, Not Symptoms: A Historical Analysis of Conceptualizing Mexico as the 'Diseased Carrier."

10 - Freire, *Pedagogy*, 177.

did not change their views, I brought an ethical and personal facet to a historical discussion.

The lessons in Mr. Monteros' class also started to take a personal note, as the class shifted toward the topic of stereotypes. Abraham displayed a video depicting how American media portrays Mexican Americans, as well as a few instances of overt racism. Students were asked to report the stereotypes that stood out to them, and the majority of the high schoolers concentrated on the comments regarding language barriers and accusations of being dirty. Furthermore, Abraham asked his students to write down stereotypes concerning Bowie High School, which suffers from discriminatory labels. The high schoolers frequently mentioned the idea that they only speak Spanish and that students at Bowie have low intelligence. Mr. Monteros spoke on the harmful effects inherent to such labels, as these students face discrimination on a daily basis. Abraham concluded that stereotypes, whether "positive" or negative, imprint biased and imperfect images on the minds of others.

The discussion of stereotypes reflects another aspect of Freire's humanistic thesis, the myths of the oppressed. Freire writes, "the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation."[11] Freire argues the oppressed must overcome false narratives imposed by the ruling class through a humanist and liberatory approach. Stereotypes and other related labels harm any progress made by the oppressed, as these false ideas place limits on the capabilities of individuals and communities. He continues, "this confrontation occurs through the change in the way the oppressed perceive the world of oppression."[12] The confrontation between the culture of domination and the oppressed reveals inaccurate myths and stereotypes about the oppressed. Addressing issues of prejudice allow one to prevail over the divisive framework of the oppressive class, which are sometimes readily adopted by marginalized communities. We must begin to ask in what ways can this community on the border readily adopt Freire's schema. Specifically, how can this specific subculture create noticeable reform and combat oppression in their own context?

Abraham's method of teaching mirrors the pedagogical strategy that Freire advocates. The Brazilian philosopher expounds in Pedagogy:

> Teachers and students (leadership and people), co-intent on reality, are both Subjects, not only in the task of unveiling that reality, and thereby coming to know it critically, but in the task of re-creating that knowledge. As they attain this knowledge of reality through common reflection and action, they discover themselves as its permanent re-creators.[13]

He advocates for an equal, open space for learning, wherein no one holds dominion over another person. Everyone holds the potential to learn and recreate knowledge, which serves to humanize a dehumanized population. The methods Abraham and I used thus offer the students ample opportunities to express themselves with like-minded peers. The cloud-based software Padlet gives students in the class a chance to express their emotions. We allow students to make comments through whatever means they are comfortable with operating in class, whether it be vocally, via Zoom chat, or direct message. Ultimately, the students dictate the direction of the lesson plans, as they lead the exploration of new ideas and themselves. They, through their own creativity, end up revealing more about their complicated and ever-changing world and ideas more than the instructors ever could. We were constantly reminded of how much we needed to learn to understand the complex struggles of the students. Thus, they were teaching us as often as we taught them.

A few issues arise when applying Freire's critical pedagogy to a social studies class in an American high school during a pandemic. Freire remarks, "I don't want to be imported or exported. It is impossible to export pedagogi-

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11 - Ibid., 54.

12 - Ibid., 54-55.

13 - Ibid., 69.

cal practices without reinventing them."[14] He wrote Pedagogy with a Brazilian audience in the mid-twentieth century, so his concept does not translate perfectly to the current American context during a pandemic. Online education has been difficult for all of the students due to a variety of reasons. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development reports a "lack of adequate preparation among teachers and students for the unique demands that online teaching learning pose."[15] Freire offers little advice concerning technological issues in education and much less on the personal sufferings of students in a global crisis. Because of the new terrain of online learning, educators must constantly adapt to the changing circumstances while remaining within the widely acceptable curriculum.

American culture remains less responsive toward a radical view like Freire's pedagogy. Due to the pressures of modern American schooling, students may not be interested in changing the education system. As one study observes, "Feeling unable to overcome academic difficulties or manage demanding school events can easily lead adolescents to develop burnout."[16] High schoolers already undergo strict demands from all aspects of their lives, and the pandemic has only heightened everyone's stress levels. Freire, for all his experience, never dealt with the issues of contemporary learning in the US, so today's students tread on unexplored territory.

There is still, however, a way to bridge the gap between Freire's philosophy and contemporary education in the United States. Farina et al assert, "These findings point up the key importance of fostering positive relationships at high school, especially between students and teachers."[17] The path forward demands a new pedagogy from teachers, one in which they stand on equal footing with their students. This

tactic becomes crucial in schools like Bowie, as the majority of these students come from oft-forgotten communities. As such, classes revolving around Chicanx culture affirm the human desire for recognition, as Freire put it, "the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their struggle to recover their lost humanity."[18] Reconnecting with the repressed culture serves as the first step toward recognizing oneself as fully human.

Freire's pedagogical framework works well in conjunction with courses dedicated to the lived experiences of a subculture, such as Mr. Monteros' class. Specifically, Abraham's syllabus expands on the notion of humanization, and the P4C activities refine the direction of liberatory practices. Monteros and I created lesson plans with the aim of working with the students, not with a particular result in mind. The class is structured around the culture of the predominantly Mexican American demographic of El Paso and our exercises regularly incorporate local history. The Porvenir Massacre, though shameful, presents an engaging opportunity to explore the concept of justice with an intimately close historical event. Likewise, the race riots of El Paso provide an example to apply ideas of fairness in an unfair world. Figures like Carmelita Torres help to break down the stereotypes often held against Mexican American youth, which guide students toward unveiling the world behind harmful myths about their heritage. Although from another era, the philosophy of Paulo Freire remains a key reference point for teachers and philosophers to stand on equal footing.

- Iram Gonzalez -

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14 - Freire, *Teachers as Cultural Workers: Letters to Those Who Dare Teach*.
15 - Manca and Meluzzi, "Strengthening Online Learning… during the COVID-19 Crisis,"
16 - Farina et al, "High School Student Burnout: Is Empathy a Protective or Risk Factor?"
17 - Ibid.

18 - Freire, *Pedagogy*, 44.

Applying Heidegger to Arendtian Climate Discourse

- Christian Whisenant -

…to try and place our work into the context of the Anthropocene is to conceal the world… our action cannot integrate a worldly (i.e. Anthropocentric) view, as to do so would be to lose sight of the project.

Hannah Arendt's argument in Labor, Work, and Action outlines three facets of our life that impact the way we encounter and engage with the world. These divisions have recently been used to help understand the nature of climate change, and our social and political relationship to it. In this paper, I will argue that much like the majority of work done on this topic would suggest, Arendt's work is helpful for discussing the politics of the environment; Arendt's work is deepened, however, by incorporating Heidegger's world/earth distinction into her argument. While thinkers such as David Ott, Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen, and Jake Greear all point out interesting ways to reconceptualize Arendt's framework, they also point us towards a deeper Arendtian concern. In this essay, I will argue that integrating Heiddegger's work while pairing it with some of the work done by other Arendt scholars can show us that, in an Arendtian framework, we are unable to completely get the issue of climate change into view as nature contains an enclosed/earthy element.

Arendt's main argument is applicable to environmental concerns. In the text, Arendt develops a distinction between the active life on the one hand, and the contemplative life on the other. She explains how philosophy has historically focused on the contemplative life, but she goes on to claim that this focus is mis-

guided. More specifically, this focus on the contemplative life fails to capture the true nature of our being in the world. Our being is more accurately described by three types of engagement: labor, work and action. Labor is a cyclical engagement in which we work on the earth for sustenance. These engagements are repetitive, and do not last particularly long after they have been completed (e.g. food rotting). In Arendt's own words, "labor is an activity which corresponds to the biological processes of the body… the metabolism between man and nature".[1] Work, on the other hand, is best distinguished by the Greek word techne. With techne, we shape things into a lasting form and derive meaning from objects according to their utility. Work is not cyclical, and it provides a basis for the world in which action is possible. Work's "sum total constitutes the human artifice, the world we live in."[2] Work, in short, creates the objects that underlie our world, though our world is not merely limited to work. Action is another component of our world.

Action draws heavily from Heidegger's conception of mit-sein, the "with-being" or being with others. Our engagement with others is a key part of the phenomenological world for both Heidegger and Arendt. However, Ar-

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1 - Arendt, 365.
2 - Ibid., 366.

endt goes a step further than Heidegger and claims that our engagement with others in the social world is the ultimate mode of being. It allows us to engage in projects that are uncertain while also giving us and the world meaning. Arendt explains that "wherever men live together, there exists a web of human relationships... every deed and every act new beginning falls into an already web."[3] Action, in short, is the way we work with others in a projective manner. Projective here refers to any projects we engage in. When we are with others, we are able to create and work on a project via action. These projects have multiple aims and indefinite outcomes, but they are important in part because they also simulate the death of societies. This relates to Heidegger, who claims that death is what gives life meaning insofar as we cannot project ourselves into it nor can we project past it (An interesting example of this attitude comes from page 311 of Being and Time, where Heidegger explains when Dasein faces death, they find themselves "in an impassioned freedom towards death -- a freedom which... is faactical, certain of itself, and anxious"). Arendt, in short, develops a subtle Heideggarian picture of the world in which we engage at a cyclical, constructive and social level. The social and constructive levels are also referred to as the vita activa.

A fair amount of work has been done on the applicability of Arendt's framework to climate questions. More specifically, Arendt's framework is helpful in answering the question of how we should act to solve the destruction of the Anthropocene.[4] Many have pointed out that Arendt's framework is able to sidestep a multitude of problems that arise in discussions surrounding climate, because her vision of the world is not purely physical. This allows her to step outside a reductionist framework and dev-

elop a more phenomenological understanding of our relationship to nature. David Ott, a lecturer of philosophy at Loyola University, explains that "Our goal is to balance human worldly existence with a healthy nature; and it must be recognized that these two goals are somewhat at odds with each-other."[5] In other words, Arendt shows us that our relationship to nature is not one of kinship or existence-within, but of extraction. Accepting this truth, or a version of it, allows us to step outside of reductionist frameworks and consider our world as such. By viewing the world the way Ott outlines it, we come closer to understanding why the Anthropocene is being destroyed - it is for our work - and why it is difficult to solve the problem - the world is phenomenological in nature. Paired with the benefits of looking at nature in this way, then, is a new way of looking at the world itself. Jake Greear, an instructor at Johns Hopkins, claims that we have been separated from the world. In this detached state, "if the 'environment' is conceived as something like the Arendtian world, these [political] concerns appear quite inadequate to a true environmental politics."[6] This relationship, in other words, allows us to see that it is the world's meaning for us that creates certain ethical relationships to nature that we often ignore.

Furthermore, Arendt's framework helps us understand, again, the difficulty of considering these questions when the world is considered phenomenologically rather than in reductionist, physical terms. It is important to note that Arendt's framework does not emerge unscathed from these applications. Different points mutate depending on the nature of the discussion. However, work constitutes a type of violence against the natural world, according to Arendt, and labor provides an important gateway to understanding why the political and ethical changes we should make in relation to the environment are so difficult to implement and/or grasp. Ari Hyvönen, a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä in Fin-

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3 - Ibid., 366.
4 - The Anthropocene refers to the time-frame in which Humans began and continued to impact their environment. I use Anthropocene here as it emphasizes the impact humans have on their environment. Not only does this mesh nicely with the concept of labor and work, it also keeps us oriented towards climate change.

5 - Ott, "The World and Earth: Hannah Arendt and the Human Relationship to Nature".
6 - Greear, "Hannah Arendt and the Geopolitics of Ecology".

land, provides a satisfying example of this sort of mutation. He suggests re-conceptualizing labor as a type of action, insofar as labor is something with political consequences. More than that, labor today affects our ability to carry out projects, and has come to replace work. For Hyvönen, then, labor can be considered action as it has real political implications and affects our project. This again leads us to the conclusion that labor should be considered action because of its political consequences since it impacts the objective grounding of the world.[7] Arendt's framework, in short, forces us to re-conceptualize the world and can be used to re-orient the discourse around the Anthropocene, albeit with small changes to her framework.

Even though Arendt's work can be applied to environmental questions as-is, incorporating Heidegger's world earth distinction helps deepen the relationship between Arendt and the Anthropocene while also explaining how labor, work and action are interlinked. Such an application is useful whether Arendt intended it or not, and is itself implicit in Arendt's work. Heidegger introduces his own world/earth distinction in On the Origin of the Work of Art in which he argues that art occupies a space that contains a mediation of both world and earth. The world is an inherently open phenomenon, in which we are able to project possibilities through things and others. Earth, on the other hand, is something that conceals itself from us, because it is both closed to us and in the process of enclosing itself. It remains closed, and yet worlds are built on earth. In the context of art, for example, color is something which opens a world to us, but if we reduce color to its material nature, we interpret it merely as a physical phenomenon. This world which art potentially opens remains closed to us, and the earthly nature of art closes the world for us, as we are no longer considering art in a projective sense.[8] A key part of this discussion is the question of what constitutes art's work, which is distinct from Arendt's concept of work, and

Heidegger concludes that art's work is to disclose truth. This disclosure requires an opening via world, and an enclosing via earth.

This distinction is not only helpful for understanding art, but also for understanding Arendt's work at large. This is present both in her work explicitly, and in the secondary literature regarding Arendt's relationship to the environment. In Labor, Work, and Action, Arendt briefly explores the nature of art. She explains that "the inherent purpose of a work of art... is to attain permanence... nowhere else does the sheer durability of the man-made world appear in such clarity."[9] She goes on to explain that work and art have a lot in common, and "the same workmanship" is required for each.[10] This workmanship seems to rely on nature, which shows us that art and workmanship share a common ground. Thus we see how art and work share a grounding; nature is the grounding for Arendt, on the one hand, and the earth for Heidegger on the other. Both Arendt and Heidegger give art - and by a shared quality Arendt also gives work - a dual character. One side is open to projection, the other cuts the world off and conceals it from us.

The secondary literature also maintains Heidegger's world/earth distinction, whether knowingly or not. Greear's work, for example, makes the explicit claim that Arendt is leaning on this sort of description and describes Arendt's earth as a "meaningless, unstable compost heap".[11] While less explicit, the same distinction also exists in the other two works. Ott, for example, claims that Arendt sees a distinction between the human and natural world which leads to the clarity of evaluation outlined above. Hyvönen also notices this distinction, outlining Arendt's work at times as "our capacity to act into nature."[12] Both Arendt's work and the secondary literature, in short, support the application of Heidegger's world earth distinction to Arendt's work.

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7 - Hyvönen, "Labor as Action: The Human Condition in the Anthropocene".
8 - Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art"

9 - Arendt, 370.
10 - Ibid., 370.
11 - Greear, 99.
12 - Hyvönen, 250.

This distinction is already implicit in both Arendt's work and the literature surrounding it, but making it explicit allows us to see the relationship between labor, work, and action more clearly. The vita activa, i.e. work and action, are similar to the work of art insofar as they contain both earthly and worldly aspects. Work is required to build a world of objects we can project ourselves into. This worldly aspect of work is best encompassed by Heidegger's idea of readiness-to-hand. A chair receives its essence from our relationship to it, i.e. our recognition of it as a tool. This same chair made of wood is one which "if expelled from the human world...will again become wood."[13] In relation to the Anthropocene, then, work takes on a violent relationship to nature but only in its earthliness. We must cut down trees to make chairs, but this characterization misses what it is to be a chair. Objects that come from work are in relation to nature/the Anthropocene, but viewing objects in this manner conceals the world to us.

Labor is a trickier concept to integrate into this framework. Our labor acts on nature in a cyclical manner, allowing us to continue living. Much of the work done on Arendt's relationship to the Anthropocene focuses on labor in different ways. Several scholars, for example, claim that labor becomes action insofar as our labor has started to impact the world we are able to project ourselves into (Hyvönen, e.g.). The world/earth distinction, however, makes labor's relationship to action clearer. Even though Arendt claims labor opens us to "the blessing of life as a whole"[14], it remains something we do not understand in terms of our project. Labor is required to keep the subject of Being alive, but it is not the basis of projection or of a world. Rather, it is work that is the basis of projection. Labor, then, is an encounter with earth, but because of earth's act of concealment, it is not available to us for/in our projects. Labor is an encounter with earth we cannot integrate into action because it is inherently enclosing. Labor has an enclosed element because we are unable to consider labor in its entirety while still keeping our project in view (just as art has a dual aspect, part of which is enclosing).

There are a few potential objections to this reading of Arendt, the most pressing of which is the claim that applying Heidegger's distinction here is unwarranted. Though we touched on the justification for using this distinction above, it requires a more clear analysis. Not only does Arendt introduce this distinction via her brief discussion on art, she also introduces it in her discussion on work. Above we saw that work can be viewed in its relationship to nature, but this obfuscates the role work plays in relation to action. As Ott points out, work provides the basis for action in some ways. More generally, it seems that applying Heidegger to Arendt's concept of work may be criticized on the grounds that such a reading limits the scope of action. Arendt seems to think action opens up a myriad of ways of looking at the world. If we read her in a Heideggerian way, however, there are some things we cannot talk about when it comes to action. This creates a problem in both Arendt's project in general and the secondary literature surrounding Arendt's relationship to the Anthropocene. Such a reading is, however, justified. Even though Arendt focuses on action's capacity for freedom she already accepts limits to it in certain ways. She allows for uncertainty in all our actions[15], and centers the political around the human. There is a sense in which the world, for Arendt, is already limited in scope. Therefore, the world only has meaning in relation to humans. This becomes clearer when one applies Heidegger and the Anthropocene.

While such a reading of Arendt seems justified, it is not clear how it impacts the interpretations of the relationship between her view and the Anthropocene. Reading Arendt's work this way is more helpful for situating the discussion around the Anthropocene, but makes implementation much more difficult. Greear, Hyvönen, and Ott all agree that Arendt provides a framework that allows us to criticize

13 - Arendt, 367.
14 - Ibid., 366.
15 - Ibid., 372.

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the problem more appropriately. Starting with labor and work, for example, allows us to understand the nature of our engagement with the world. Where these pieces miss the point, however, and where Heidegger becomes useful is in our understanding of fully approaching and viewing the problem. A consequence of Arendt's work is that we cannot grasp the Anthropocene in its entirety without losing the world. To reduce objects of work to earthliness, for example, is to ignore the role they actually play in our world. In a similar vein, even though we know nature plays a role in work, and by extension action, trying to get that nature into view is near impossible. Labor comes the closest, and even that leaves us separated from the social projects that give our lives meaning. While it's true that Arendt is able to side-step common problems with climate/Anthropocene discourse, this leaves her unable to bring the whole problem into view. That being said, obfuscation is not necessarily a problem in this case. If we accept nature as secondary in the dialectic of our experience, we can still care for it without bringing it into view. A good example is Hyvönen's work. Viewing labor as action, as Hyövnin does, is still possible but we must understand that this view is limited in some ways. We cannot situate the nature labor circulates through in the context of our larger projects, because to do so is to lose those projects (as we would lose sight of the project by focusing on its enclosed aspect). Conversely, viewing labor as something projective doesn't completely work as we lose its earthy/concealed aspect i.e. its relation to nature-as-such. Still, we can be aware that enclosing is part of "the blessing of life," and do our best to defend it on those grounds. While a lot of the solutions grounded in Arendt's work are compelling, it is false to say that Arendt manages to bring the Anthropocene into view. Instead, she shows us that part of our experience is out of view. This does not mean we shouldn't protect nature, as nature is required for both labor and in determining work, but it does mean a clear and concise defense of nature is in some ways out of the question.

To conclude, Arendt's work in Labor, Work, and Action is invaluable. She provides an interesting way of looking at the world/Anthropocene that can be deepened by applying Heidegger's world/earth distinction. Work, in short, contains earthly and worldly aspects but to try and place our work into the context of the Anthropocene is to conceal the world. Action, which takes place in a world of both people and things, also addresses these earthly and worldly parts. The world is built on these objects, which contain both aspects as outlined above. Not only that, but action is an inherently projective way of engaging with the world, for we take on a project which is built on earth and has worldly aspects. This means that our action cannot integrate a worldly (i.e. Anthropocentric) view, as to do so would be to lose sight of the project. Both work and action have earthly and worldly aspects, and the dual nature of work helps us understand the nature of action with more depth. Labor, while an integral part of how we engage in the world, does not necessarily open itself to action/the political; instead, it is a way of engaging with nature and as such is also closed off. Because of the way our work and action are structured, in other words, climate change remains an issue we cannot grasp completely. This does not completely do away with the conversation around our responsibility/relationship with the Anthropocene, but it does limit it in many ways.

- Christian Whisenant -

Moral Intuition:
Non-Human Animals as Moral Patients

- Brett Clark -

While it would be wrong to hold them morally responsible to the same degree as full moral agents, the evidence has shown that non-human animals are and should be considered moral agents in some relative sense.

Morality has been contested by philosophers since the early Greeks and continues to be an ever-present debate in contemporary society. Likewise, the question as to who is deserving of moral attributes has been debated for just as long. Topics of morality are multifaceted, often controversial, and focus heavily on whether an action—or behavior—is right or wrong. It is difficult to pinpoint wherein exactly morality lies, how it is exercised, and who is deserving of being considered a moral agent. Inquiries such as these have helped shape human's attempt at understanding morality and how it is exercised. For example, Plato argued that happiness—or rather—well-being, is the highest aim of moral thought and conduct.[1] Aristotle argued that a human's function is to exercise the soul's activities according to reason.[2] It is ultimately true that one could exercise their soul badly; however, Plato would hold that this would not be a characteristic of a moral person. Oppositely, Aristotle would argue that the exercising of one's soul badly is nevertheless still reason based. These conceptions of morality as reason based set the stage for many to follow in their philosophy and argue that the ability to engage in moral behavior was dependent upon one's ability to reason.

Moral psychologists Jonathan Haidt and John Doris reject the notion that humans facilitate moral behavior solely through reason. Rather, they argue that moral judgments are made first according to intuitions and that reason is then used to reaffirm the moral position.[3] If this is the case, then humans would not be the only beings capable of moral behavior. Studies conducted by Brosnan and De Waal, and investigations by Beckoff and Pierce appear to affirm this notion and argue that non-human animals similarly engage in moral behavior through certain "gut level" intuitions—much like humans. Beckoff and Pierce argue that social play grants insight into morality insofar as it is a voluntary activity that requires participants to understand and abide by the rules.[4] Any play outside of the rules will be corrected and can even result in brief ostracization. Whereas De Waal's study of Capuchin monkeys supports early evolutionary origins of inequity aversion.[5] These cases upset the notion that humans are the only beings experiencing moral behavior. If this is true, then humans may need to look to other social queues to explain moral behavior. Furthermore, non-human animals would be worthy

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1 - Parry, "Ancient Ethical Theory".
2 - Ibid.

3 - Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion.*
4 - Ibid., 116.
5 - Brosnan and de Waal, "Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay".

of moral consideration and would thus be considered moral patients.

This paper will be broken into four sections that assert an alternative approach to how moral judgments are made. Moreover, it will display how non-human animals could be considered moral agents in a relative sense. The first section will work to upset the commonly held belief that humans are the only beings capable of experiencing moral behavior, insofar as this behavior is predicated upon reason and self-reflection. Once this belief has been disrupted, the second section will offer an alternate approach to making moral judgments; one that coincides with empirical evidence and suggests that humans base their moral behavior on intuitions. After providing evidence to assert social intuitionism, the argument will then be extended to non-human animals and affirm that non-human animals do engage in similar intuitions. If this is true, then non-human animals could be considered moral agents in a relative sense. The final part of this paper will solidify this argument and address the moral theories of philosophers such as Kant, Mill, and Bentham, who assert that moral agents are also moral patients. Therein, the paper will examine the potential objection that humans would have to hold animals morally responsible for their actions. Subsequently, an adequate response refuting this common argument will be presented before concluding that on all moral theories, non-human animals are also moral patients.

Humans as Moral Agents

It has long since been the rhetoric that humans are the only beings capable of engaging in moral behavior. This assertion is based primarily on the notion that what separates humans from non-human animals is their ability to critically self-reflect and thereby posit rational belief changes.[6] Furthermore, this ability is often what constitutes human's rationalization that they are superior to non-human animals. The theory that backs this notion is referred to as reflectivism and can be understood as the ability to think about one's own mental processes from a first person point of view.[7] Reflectivism has been attributed to morality insofar as it is the exercise of human agency in judgements and behavior that is being ordered by self-conscious reflection about what to think and do.[8] While reflectivism may be a useful tool in changing moral attitudes, it is not, however, the first step in the process of making moral decisions. If reflectivism is true, then it would require that a thinking moral agent be constantly aware of their own mental processes even down to the most mundane of tasks such as wiping one's nose.

The empirical evidence provided by Henry Roediger's study of implicit memory suggests that humans engage in actions where conscious remembering is unlikely to play much of a role.[9] It has been observed that when a person is placed in situations where little conscious effort is required the person will perform better in these situations than situations requiring a more conscious effort. It is not until a person begins to self-reflect on how a complicated situation should be approached that performance deteriorates.[10] If this is true, as the evidence suggests, then it would be inaccurate to claim that reflection is the sole action necessary for moral judgments. Thus, an alternate approach to how humans engage in moral behavior will need to be addressed.

Social Intuition and Morality

Jonathan Haidt's social intuitionism model of moral judgments argues that humans do not facilitate moral judgments and behaviors through reflection, but rather through rapid intuitive processes followed by post hoc reasoning.[11] The ability to self-reflect on a moral judgment, while possible, is not a sufficient faculty to be used when adjusting moral attitudes.[12] A more appropriate approach says that other people, such as friends and family, are more likely to trigger new intuitions, thus influencing a shift

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6 - Doris, "Reflection".

7 - Kornblith, On Reflection.
8 - Doris, "Reflection", 19.
9 - Roediger, "Implicit Memory: Retention without Remembering", 1043.
10 - Ibid., 1043.
11 - Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 55.
12 - Mill, *On Liberty*, 45.

in one's moral judgements and behaviors. In a group setting, this can be used to influence or correct another's intuitions and judgments.[13] This is often achieved by a peer's ability to provide sufficient reasoning and arguments that contradict one's post-hoc reasoning. Evidence suggests that intuitions are the brain's evaluation of situations in terms of potential threat or benefit to the self.[14] Wundt's doctrine of affective primacy reaffirms this notion by suggesting that emotions (positive or negative) are the underlying factors that constitute whether something is to be approached or avoided.[15] Moreover, each emotion has an affective reaction that ultimately decides whether one likes or dislikes something the moment it is noticed; often these reactions occur before one can cognize what is happening. This evidence is contrary to the popular belief that humans are rational beings who first perceive, then categorize, and then react. The evidence suggests rather that humans first perceive, then react, and then categorize. So, moral judgments would more accurately be defined as a product of our intuitions, and that exterior influences are the driving force behind correcting moral behaviors.

Non-Human Animals and Morality
Non-human animals operate on a similar system. They have a central level of "gut-level" intuitions. These intuitions are primarily used to evaluate whether something should be approached or avoided. The previous section demonstrated that human minds are constantly reacting intuitively to everything in terms of potential threat or benefit to the self. A non-human animal's brain will make these same evaluations thousands of times a day to optimize benefits to the self in a way void of conscious reasoning. Non-human animal minds, much like human minds, are constantly reacting intuitively to everything they perceive, and, much like human minds, they apply appropriate responses based on these intuitive reactions.

In Wild Justice, Beckoff and Pierce seek to provide evidence that suggests morality is not a mere human phenomenon.[16] Their approach is to define morality as a suite of other-regarding behaviors falling into the three rough clusters of cooperation, empathy, and justice.[17] If the basis for moral behavior is predicated on these behavioral clusters, it would mean that the behavior of social non-human animals falls within these boundaries. In their study, Beckoff and Pierce observe social play in wolves, coyotes, and domesticated dogs as the function of morality in that it provides opportunities for participating individuals to gain a sense of acceptable behavior.[18] For example, individuals in wolf packs will teach their cubs correct behaviors through social play[19] in order to establish their role within the community as a fair and cooperative member.[20] Moreover, social play can assist in the overall efficacy of the group so long as the individual's utility is maximized for the overall good of the group through cooperative behaviors. Wolves on a hunt will engage in cooperative behaviors for the overall benefit of the group. If one wolf exerts more effort for the kill, they intuitively feel they are deserving of a greater portion and will engage in behaviors that defend the intuition of fairness. Oppositely, the other wolves in the group will intuitively see this as an inequity and engage in behaviors that attempt to correct the entitled individual. This behavior is based on the notion of inequity aversion. These behaviors illustrate that these animals have a conception of morality.

In a more controlled study, Brosnan and De Waal tested five female capuchin monkeys in an attempt to show that non-human animals have a general preference for fairness and an overall resistance to inequalities.[21] Capuchin monkeys are highly sociable and cooperative primates where, like most other non-human primates, food sharing is a common occurrence.

13 - Ibid., 45.
14 - Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 64.
15 - Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*.

16 - Bekoff and Pierce, "Justice: Honor and Fair Play Among Beasts".
17 - Ibid., 138.
18 - Ibid., 116.
19 - Ibid., 124.
20 - Ibid., 120.
21 - Brosnan, "Monkeys".

The tests consisted of training two monkeys to exchange a pebble for a reward. Once the monkeys had successfully accomplished the task, the same reward (a cucumber slice) was given to them both in return for their efforts. Soon however, the experimenters switched the reward. The first monkey received a slice of cucumber, whereas the second monkey received a grape. Eager to participate again in hopes for a similar payoff, the first monkey hastily accomplished the task expecting the higher reward, i.e. a grape. Instead, the first monkey again received the cucumber, while the second monkey was once again presented with a grape. Noticing the inequity between the rewards, the first monkey began to refuse the cucumber and, by extension, would refuse to cooperate altogether. The capuchin monkeys noticed the unfairness by comparing the rewards to those around them. It was not until a higher, more desirable reward was offered that the grape became more coveted than the cucumber. Now, one could argue that the monkeys are not recognizing a sense of inequity but are rather manifesting symptoms of greed. While they are in fact showing envy and greed over the greater reward of their counterpart, these emotions are not possible without an intuitive sense of justice and fairness.

These same behaviors can be found in children when deciding who they wish to allow in their social groups and by extension who they choose to play with. Children, much like non-human animals, intuitively look to moral behaviors within others that share the same intuitive beliefs. In an attempt to unlock the origins of morality, experimenters presented a cohort of children with scenes of a puppet attempting to open a box. As the puppet worked to open the box, it was either assisted by another puppet who sought to cooperate or thwarted by one who wished to obstruct the progress of the puppet. Researchers found that children as young as three months old would choose the puppet who assisted in opening the box, as opposed to the puppet who slammed the box shut.[22]

Sociable non-human animals, much like human children and adults, engage in moral behaviors like cooperation, fairness, and justice by utilizing similar intuitions. If this is true, as the evidence suggests, it would follow that non-human animals do engage in moral behavior through intuitions; much like a child recognizing fairness and cooperation. As such, it is clear that animals are moral agents.

A Message Not Well Received
The declaration that non-human animals engage in moral behaviors and should thus be considered moral agents is a position that is generally not well received. Despite its reception, the evidence suggests that non-human animals do engage in basic moral behavior through "gut-level" intuitions, much like that of a human child. Must moral theories reflect a conception of morality based on these intuitions. Hume held that sentiment—or rather intuition—is the driving force for the moral life of a person.[23] Bentham was in agreement with Hume and insisted further that what constitutes a person's moral worth is the maximization of pleasure, and the avoidance of pain.[24] Mill agreed with Bentham's hedonism, yet argued that an individual's capacity to suffer is what grants them moral worth.[25] While Kant's Categorical Imperative insists that reason is what governs moral agents—as well as what grants them their worth[26]—he did acknowledge that sentiments are essential for describing why people behave morally.[27] Moreover, Schopenhauer maintained that sentiments such as sympathy, and intuitive reactions to suffering are what grant moral patiency.[28] From these moral theories it follows that moral agents are also moral patients. Therefore, non-human animals are moral agents in a relative sense.

22 - Stahl, "Born good? Babies help unlock the origins of morality".

23 - Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 134.
24 - Driver, "The History of Utilitarianism".
25 - Ibid.
26 - Johnson and Cureton, "Kant's Moral Philosophy".
27 - Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 139.
28 - Schopenhauer, "A Critique of Kant".

Moral Agents as Moral Patients

Although the empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that non-human animals are moral patients, there are some who would insist further that allowing non-human animals into the realms of moral agency is not possible. This assertion is predicated on the argument that if non-human animals are moral agents, then humans would have to hold non-human animals morally responsible for their actions. Following this assumption to its logical end would require that humans remove children and the mentally handicapped from being considered moral agents. However, most would agree that young children are moral agents in some relative sense. Additionally, most would agree that mentally handicapped who are high-functioning adults are also moral agents in some relative sense. Still, both parties lack full agency insofar as they are dependent upon full agents. Other humans, then, do not hold them morally responsible to the same degree as full moral agents. It follows then that animals can be considered in a similar way. While it would be wrong to hold them morally responsible to the same degree as full moral agents, the evidence has shown that non-human animals are and should be considered moral agents in some relative sense.

The evidence in this paper has shown that humans do not operate on the faculty of reason when making moral judgments; rather, moral judgments are made through rapid intuitive judgements where post-hoc reasoning is used to justify the initial judgement or behavior. Similarly, non-human animals operate on a series of 'gut-level' intuitions, thus allowing them to engage in moral behaviors much like those exhibited in human children. Because human children are not considered full moral agents, it would be erroneous to hold non-human animals to the same standards. Still, human children, as well as non-human animals, are considered moral patients insofar as they are dependent upon full moral agents. Their patiency is extended further insofar as non-human animals, much like human children, are conscious, sentient beings capable of

suffering who possess a level of cognitive abilities.[29] According to the moral theories described here, all moral agents are also moral patients. In short, it is consistent with all moral theories that non-human animals are also moral patients.

- Brett Clark -

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29 - Regan, "Indirect Duty Views".

End of Essays

About the Authors...

Madeline Brenchley

Madeline is a Senior at Utah Valley University majoring in Philosophy with a double minor in Classical Studies and Ethics. Following their undergraduate education, Madeline plans to attend graduate school in philosophy with the goal of going on to become a professor in the field.

In addition to their role as a student, Madeline is employed as an Instructional Assistant for Ethics and Values courses at UVU and as the Intern for UVU's Student Life Office and Dean of Students.
Outside of work and school, Madeline is passionate about activism and mutual aid work. At UVU Madeline serves as president, vice president, and secretary of three student clubs, respectively, which advocate for and support marginalized groups: A Hand Up (addressing basic needs insecurity and homelessness); SURF (Students United for Reproductive Freedom); and IRSU (Immigrant and Refugee Student Union). Outside of UVU, Madeline works as a shift leader for Food Justice Coalition preparing and serving meals to unsheltered individuals in Salt Lake City.

In their free time, Madeline enjoys reading poetry and philosophy, talking with children, and writing and playing music on guitar.

Colby Gardner

Colby was born in Fontana, California. He graduated summa cum laude from Brigham Young University in Philosophy in December of 2018. He is currently a second-year law student at Washington University in St.Louis. He plans on having a career in corporate law while dabbling in philosophy on the side. In his free time, Colby enjoys hiking and exploring new trails, running, and spending time with his two kids.

Trevor Woodward

Trevor is a fourth-year undergraduate student at University of Idaho. His primary philosophical interests are in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Logic, and Philosophy of Language. He is hoping to attend graduate school in philosophy in the fall.

Tallulah Farrow

Tallulah is an Australian who hails originally from Canberra. They are a former student at the University of Colorado Boulder. While there they pursued a Bachelor of Science degree, majoring in both philosophy and anthropology and minoring in political science. Their academic work focused specifically in cultural anthropology with an emphasis on caring for both climate and gender issues. During the Covid-19 pandemic their academic and career goals took them back to their native Australia where they are working on other projects at this time. While they intends in the future to return to university in order to get a degree in anthropology, they use the skills they developed while studying philosophy and anthropology almost daily in their current work. In their spare time Tallulah enjoys indoor gardening, drawing, and creating "sit" items for themselves and their friends. They also spends much of their time writing and having meaningful conversations with others.

Conor Thomas

Originally from the Chicago area of Illinois, Conor is a philosophy major at Brigham Young University, with minors in logic, sociology, and theoretical and applied ethics. His main areas of interest include political philosophy, normative ethics, and meta-ethics, along with the philosophy of social science. After completing his undergraduate degree, Conor plans to get a masters degree in public policy. His hobbies include skateboarding and playing guitar, and is a big fan of cool graphs and sourdough bread.

Rylan Garwood

Rylan grew up in Montrose, a small city in western Colorado. During high school he moved to Las Vegas. He is currently living near Seattle, Washington. It is by far his favorite location of the bunch, and he is planning on staying there.

Iram Gonzalez

Iram was born and raised in Las Vegas, NV. He graduated in the Spring of 2021 with a dual English and Philosophy major at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Iram has a wide range of interests in philosophy, but spends more time engaging with ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of science, and the history of philosophy. He also dabbles in literary theory and criticism, which is greatly influenced by continental philosophy.

Iram plans on furthering his education with a master's degree in either English or Philosophy. Iram would love to find a career in professional writing to put his time spent in his undergraduate years honing writing skills to good use!

Iram enjoys reading in his free time, with his favorite genres being classic literature, modern fiction, and philosophy. He meditates quite often, and ran a meditation group regularly before the pandemic hit. Every now and then, Iram volunteers for a local hospice in Vegas, which helps him connect with his community.
Rylan is majoring in philosophy and psychology. He enrolled at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas to study neuroscience. Along the way, he took a required philosophy seminar and fell in love with the field. He is primarily interested in philosophy, but has found that it pairs quite well with psychology.

He tends to research problems that heavily irritate him when they are unsolved. Rylan is firstly focused on ethics–particularly normative ethics–educational ethics, animal ethics, and conversational ethics. Secondly, he is incredibly passionate about public philosophy and our need for pre-college philosophy. Finally, Rylan finds the problems within epistemology and the philosophy of language rather irritating, especially when thinking about their ethical implications (looking at you, theories of justification).

Rylan is rather determined to obtain a Ph.D. in Philosophy and teach at the college and pre-college levels. He cannot put into words how influential and helpful my philosophy professors have been for him. He feels that if he can be half as influential to one of his future students, all of his research will have been worth it. He would also love to engage in Philosophy for Children (P4C) activism and contribute to P4C programs. Currently, he is brainstorming the ethics of humor as well as theories of moral desert.

During his free time, you can find Rylan playing jazz standards on his piano, practicing barebow archery, staring into the abyss, or corrupting the youth.

Christian Whisenant

Christian is a philosophy major with a minor in film at Brigham Young University. His main areas of interest include Phenomenology and contemporary agency theory. After graduation, Christian is considering working towards a doctorate in philosophy. During his free time, he enjoys biking, hiking and watching films.

Brett Clark

Originally from Bellingham, Washington, Brett Clark has lived in Utah now for six years. He is a student at Utah Valley University majoring in philosophy and minoring in environmental studies. His primary interest in philosophy is eco-phenomenology, but he also has a special interest in existentialism, phenomenology, environmental sociology, and applied ethics. His eventual academic goals are to earn a Juris Doctor with aspirations of working in the field of environmental law. In Brett's free time, he likes to be in the outdoors. He enjoys hiking, backpacking, camping, snowshoeing, kayaking, trail running, and cycling. When not outside, Brett can be found relaxing with his dogs and enjoying a good book.

About the Staff...

Ryan Ord

Ryan is a Senior at Utah Valley University, majoring in Philosophy with a minor in Classical Studies. He graduated from UVU in 2020 with a Bachelor's degree in English Literary-Studies, returning to school solely due to his dedication to academia--not the incredibly profitable future a *second Humanities degree* must bring. Ryan was born and raised in Utah, one day hoping to elude it's grasp and attend graduate school (for Philosophy, not English--the novel is culturally dead). In his free time he reads what he must and consumes whatever assorted media allows relaxation and vegetation. Poetry and theater are cool too.

Hayden Berg

Hayden studied philosophy and psychology at Utah Valley University. His main areas of interest are existentialism, epistemology, phenomenology, and critical theory. He also secretly likes Kant quite a bit. Hayden hopes to apply to graduate programs soon and put the fantastic education UVU provided to good use. In his spare time, Hayden loves watching films of all sorts, reading apocalyptic sci-fi or philosophy, and making music with his band Sea Elephant.

Juan Palencia

Juan is a Senior at Utah Valley University double majoring in philosophy and mathematics. His main areas of interests are Metaphysics, History of Philosophy, Phenomenology and German Idealism. After graduation, Juan plans to attain a doctorate in Philosophy in hopes of finding a career in academia. During his free time, he enjoys songwriting, exploring nature, audio recording, and watching films. He was born and raised in Palm Desert, California.

David Maxwell

David is a Junior at Utah Valley University, doing a double major in Philosophy and Psychology. After graduation, he hopes to attain a doctorate in clinical psychology and receive training and certification in psychoanalysis, which is his main area of interest. After this, David plans to have a career as a psychotherapist.

In addition to psychoanalysis, his interests include subjects such as developmental psychology, philosophy of mind, and phenomenology. In his free time, David enjoys reading up on these subjects and discussing them with friends at various local diners, as well as watching and analyzing films, television shows, and other artistic works through different philosophical lenses.

Emily Gibson

Emily is a dual Philosophy and Anthropology major with a Chinese Language minor at Utah Valley University. She hopes to continue her education in graduate school studying Linguistics. Her interests within philosophy include Chinese and eastern philosophy, philosophy of language, multicultural philosophy, epistemology, Pre-Socratics, and feminist philosophy. During her free time, Emily paints, watches excellent tv shows, cooks, creates curated playlists, reads (mostly YA romance novels), and spends time with family and friends.

James Winder

James is a long time Utahn and Senior at Utah Valley University. He is majoring in Philosophy and minoring in history with plans of getting a Master of Library and Information Sciences. His specific interests in Philosophy include jurisprudence, history of philosophy, and the Transcendentalist movement. In his free time James enjoys a good book and most anything that is crafty, with cross stitch and watercolor painting being his current favorite hobbies.

Alex Zhou

Alex is an international student from mainland China. He is a senior at Utah Valley University double majoring in Philosophy and Psychology. His interests in Philosophy are Ancient Greek philosophy and Classical Chinese Philosophy. Alex is a big time sports fan. He is obsessed with the Utah Jazz, and sometimes his passion for basketball affects other areas of his life. His justification for his obsession for basketball is that the Ancient Greeks were also into competitive sports, and that Plato himself is a wrestler. He thinks he is in good company.

Clifford Simpson

Clifford is a junior at Utah Valley University majoring in Philosophy and minoring in Classics. His primary focus in Classics is Ancient Greek literature (primarily the Platonic and Socratic dialogues). Clifford spends most of his free time working on Ancient Greek and Latin and plans to learn Semitic languages to work with Sumerian and Akkadian professionally. He would like to focus on Assyriology in graduate school. In addition to languages, Clifford enjoys working on IT-related systems at his home and tries to implement as many systems as possible.

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